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Abstract
Naval Diplomacy and the Making of an Unwritten Alliance: United States-Brazilian
Naval Relations, 1893-1930
Karina Faria Garcia Esposito
This dissertation explores U.S.-Brazilian relations through the prism of naval diplomacy
between 1893 and 1930. Broadly, this dissertation explains the growth of U.S. naval
involvement in Brazil, emphasizing the motives of Brazilian and American policymakers,
and the role of naval officers in strengthening bilateral relations. This study begins by
examining the Brazilian Navy Revolt of 1893-94, contextualizing it within the formative
years of the Brazilian Republic, while discussing U.S. naval intervention in the conflict.
It then explores U.S.-Brazilian naval relations in the early twentieth century, explaining
the growing association between the two countries’ navies after the turn of the century.
That collaboration culminated in cooperation during World War I, and with the
establishment of an American Navy Commission to teach at the Brazilian Naval War
College. Finally, this dissertation explores the dynamics of the U.S. Navy Mission in
Brazil during the first formative years after its establishment in 1922. Introducing naval
diplomacy to the historiography of U.S.-South American relations illuminates the origins
of American influence in Brazil, including the crucial role of Brazilians in pursuing
closer ties, as well as the development of a U.S. policy focused on reducing European
influence, promoting regional security, and increasing U.S. commercial power in the
region.
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Chapter 1: Introduction
Overview:
This dissertation explores the evolution of United States-Brazilian naval
diplomacy from 1893-1930, starting with the Brazilian naval revolt of 1893-1894,
transitioning into the World War I-era, and continuing into the 1920s. My work will add
to the historiography of U.S.-Latin American relations and U.S. naval history by
examining how the U.S. Navy played a role in carrying on the American civilizing
mission of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century in Brazil.1 In doing so, it will
demonstrate that the United States became more deeply involved in expansion to the
south, particularly economically, at the same time it consolidated its hold over the
territories in western North America.
Specifically, this dissertation will explore three case studies, the Brazilian Navy
Revolt of 1893-94 and U.S. intervention in the conflict, U.S.-Brazilian naval cooperation
during World War I, and the American naval mission in Brazil in the 1920s. All three
case studies reveal similar American foreign policy goals in Brazil; specifically, to
increase American trade, diminish European influence, achieve hegemony in Latin
America, and establish regional security. By exploring the evolution of the American
strategy through these three case studies, this dissertation will show how American

1

Generally, historians characterized U.S. foreign policy of the late nineteenth and early twentieth
century as deeply grounded on a sense of civilizing mission. The country went through profound
changes between 1890 and 1945, stemming from increased industrialization, immigration, and
urbanization. As concepts of race, class, and gender changed drastically during this period,
American reformers and policymakers aimed at addressing some of these issues and promoting a
more orderly, efficient society, while simultaneously embarking on a civilizing mission abroad in
an effort to spread American values, businesses, and promote balance of power with the other
dominant powers, especially as the U.S. position in the world went through profound changes,
particularly after the Spanish-American War of 1898.
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influence, through the use of its navy, reached new heights in the 1920s. The U.S.
progressed from a relatively hesitant approach in the Brazilian Naval Revolt of 18931894, to a more assertive, forward-leaning position with the establishment of a naval
mission in Brazil in the 1920s. This dissertation illuminates the continuity in the U.S.
strategy, while recognizing a change in American power and influence in Latin American
by the 1930s, aided by its navy.
Although this dissertation focuses primarily on U.S. interests and policy towards
Brazil, and relies mostly on American sources, it also draws on Brazilian sources to shed
a light on Brazil’s perspective, offering an appreciation of both American and Brazilian
motives for building a long-term naval relationship between the two nations. To a greater
degree than other scholarly publications, my work incorporates both American and
Brazilian historiography and primary sources. Brazilian sources enhance the key
argument by presenting the view of the Brazilian navy and government in regards to their
aspirations to reorganize and strengthen their navy in the early twentieth century. From
Brazil’s viewpoint, this dissertation shows a conscious decision on the part of Brazilian
policymakers to accept and encourage American aid in 1893-94 to strengthen their
position against the insurgent Brazilian Navy, and later, during World War I, a cognizant
decision to invite an American naval commission to teach at the Brazilian Naval War
College, and in 1922 to choose a U.S. naval mission as opposed to a British naval
mission. As Brazil sought a leadership position in South America, a foreign policy
focused on an approximation to the U.S. in the early twentieth century promised to
increase Brazil’s position in the region, while also elevating Brazil’s prestige overseas.
Moreover, Brazil was pursuing its economic interests, as Brazilian exports in the early
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twentieth century consisted mostly of agrarian products, particularly coffee, for which the
U.S. increasingly became Brazil’s best customer.
First, this dissertation traces U.S. intervention and imperialist expansion in Latin
America back to the Brazilian naval revolt of 1893-94. The U.S. government’s actions
during the conflict demonstrate a concern with asserting U.S. economic and military
prominence in the Western hemisphere, and a willingness to use intervention in Latin
America as a stepping stone to global power status prior to the more well-known
Spanish-American War. As historian Walter LaFeber notes in “United States Depression
Diplomacy and the Brazilian Revolution,” although the Brazilian Revolution “has since
faded in importance in American diplomacy,” not only did American newspapers discuss
the conflict extensively at the time, the revolt also became one of U.S. Secretary of State
Walter Gresham’s “most difficult problems.”2 The U.S. intervention in the Brazilian
Navy Revolt of 1893-94 is also useful in examining the American domestic anxieties that
grew out of the social changes and cycles of economic depressions in the early 1890s,
which also helped shape American policy towards Latin America. Hence, U.S.
intervention in the Brazilian naval revolt reveals how domestic changes in America were
causing a more expansionist U.S. foreign policy, as well as the desire of U.S. foreign
policymakers to pursue hegemony in the region and promote regional security.
This first case study also examines the role of U.S. navy commanders as informal
diplomats in the Brazilian naval revolt, highlighting their interactions with the U.S. and
Brazilian governments, and with the Brazilian naval insurgents. The “New Navy”
strategy which emerged in the late 1880s, called for a stronger navy able to not only
2

Walter LaFeber, “United States Depression Diplomacy and the Brazilian Revolution, 18931894,” The Hispanic American Historical Review, 40 (1960): 107.
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protect the American coast and merchant ships, but also to more aggressively protect
American interests overseas. In advancing this strategy, American officers increasingly
took on the role of informal diplomats abroad. According to naval strategist Alfred
Thayer Mahan’s sea power theory of the 1890s, “economic prosperity and national
security could not be separated,” and “the key to both was a powerful navy deployed to
every region of the planet.”3 The Brazilian Navy Revolt gave the New Navy the
opportunity to test its new purpose in carrying out the nation’s foreign policy, ensuring
that U.S. interests prevailed abroad. As historian Richard Challener observes, by
promoting a strong navy, Alfred Thayer Mahan “had defined a purpose, a mission, for the
New Navy.”4
Although the New Navy’s goals were to carry on the U.S. civilizing mission
abroad, historian Peter Kartsen argues that there have been disagreements between
scholars on what exactly that civilizing mission was in the 1890s. For some, the navy had
been “a wise instrument of an ‘innocent’ American diplomacy, ‘protecting peaceful
traders from murderous onslaughts by natives,’ defending American honor, freedom, and
rights, punishing aggression, surveying the deep for posterity.” Other historians however,
such as LaFeber, have stressed “the active role naval forces played in protecting
American trade and investors abroad.”5 These two interpretations help highlight the navy
officers’ own struggles with the realization that the American Navy would play a
defining role in Latin America in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century.

3

Brian Loveman, No Higher Law, American Foreign Policy and the Western Hemisphere Since
1776 (Chapel Hill, NC: The University of North Carolina Press, 2010), 151.
4
Richard Challener, Admirals, Generals, and American Foreign Policy, 1898-1914 (Princeton,
NJ: Princeton University Press, 1973), 14.
5
Peter Karsten, The Naval Aristocracy, The Golden Age of Annapolis and the Emergence of
Modern American Navalism (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1971), 141.
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Specifically, in this case study, the navy commanders’ conduct towards the insurgents
and the Brazilian government, and towards their own nation, clarifies that these officers
were key players in the shaping of U.S. diplomacy in Brazil in the late nineteenth
century.
Although some previous studies have examined on the Brazilian Navy Revolt of
1893-1894, this research aims to analyze in greater depth the role the U.S. Navy
commanders played in U.S-Brazilian diplomacy in light of Mahan’s call for a stronger,
more active New Navy in the 1890s.6 U.S. Navy commanders operating off the coast
communicated directly with the insurgents, as well as the Brazilian government, issuing
demands, providing guidelines for the protection of trade and American lives, and
mediating the conflict between the Brazilian government and the insurrectionists. The
direct pressure the U.S. Navy commanders exerted upon the diplomatic negotiations in
the conflict helps explain the developing role the New Navy would assume in advancing
U.S. foreign policy in the late nineteenth century, a role which continued to become more
prominent in the early twentieth century. Importantly, by incorporating Brazilian sources
and historiography, this case study also offers insight into the insurgents’ goals, placing
the revolt within a larger context of a crucial and complex period in Brazilian history.

6

For transnational works that focus on the naval revolt, see Hélio Leôncio Martins, A Revolta da
Armada (Biblioteca do Exercito Editora: Rio de janeiro, 1997), 26 (translated by author);
hereafter Martins, A Revolta da Armada; Fellisbello Freire, Historia da Revolta de 6 de Setembro
de 1893, Volume I (Rio de Janeiro: Cunha e Irmãos, 1896), 14 (translated by author); hereafter
Freire, Historia da Revolta de 6 de Setembro de 1893; William S. Dudley, “The Brazilian Naval
Revolt of 1893,” paper given at the Naval Symposium in Annapolis, MD, 4 October 1997; Walter
LaFeber, “United States Depression Diplomacy and the Brazilian Revolution,1893-1894,” The
Hispanic American Historical Review, 40 (1960): 107-118; Joseph Smith, “Britain and the
Brazilian Naval Revolt of 1893-4,” Journal of Latin American Studies, 2 (November 1970): 175198.
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Second, this dissertation explores U.S.-Brazilian relations from 1894 to World
War I, particularly focusing on how naval diplomacy contributed to strengthening
bilateral relations. As new naval and commercial powers emerged in the late nineteenth
century, especially Germany, the U.S. continued to rely on its navy to expand trade with
Latin America, and to promote regional security.7 Moreover, this second case study
explores Brazilian Minister of Foreign Affairs Barao do Rio Branco’s, “Baron of Rio
Branco,” foreign policy from 1902-1912, in which he actively promoted a policy of
approximation with the U.S. government, successfully transitioning Brazil out of a
European sphere of influence toward an American dominated sphere.8 As Rio Branco’s
strategy consisted of increasing Brazilian military prestige, maintaining and strengthening
the country’s coffee exports to the U.S., and elevating Brazil’s regional and global
standing, U.S.-Brazilian naval diplomacy played a key role in achieving these goals from
the Brazilian perspective. As historian E. Bradford Burns noted, Rio Branco’s ministry
“marks the apogee of their friendly relations,” and his strategy had a long-term impact in
bilateral relations.9
In addition, this second case study looks at a naval commission the U.S. sent to
teach at the Brazilian Naval War College during World War I, at a time when the British
Navy represented the dominant influence within the Brazilian navy. The U.S. naval
7

For German-Latin America relations, see Nancy Mitchell, The Danger of Dreams, German and
the American Imperialism in Latin America, (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina
Press, 1999). Mitchell argues that President Woodrow Wilson’s advisor Colonel Edward House,
“was worrying about Berlin’s design on Brazil in 1914,” 1. Moreover, that German ships
“increasingly prowled Latin American waters,” and many Germans “publicly railed against the
Monroe Doctrine,” 3.
8
Rio Branco’s policy of approximation was grounded in the notion that it was in Brazil’s national
interest to align its foreign policy with that of the United States, pursuing similar objectives and
taking close positions on international issues.
9
E. Bradford Burns, The Unwritten Alliance, Rio-Branco and Brazilian-American Relations
(New York and London: Columbia University Press, 1966), 76.
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commission, through the work of American navy officers, strengthened interpersonal
relations between the two navies, eventually leading Brazil to sign a naval mission
contract with the U.S. in 1922, instead of a British contract, a significant achievement for
the U.S. Finally, this case study reveals a continuity in the U.S. strategy during World
War I that went beyond winning the war in Europe militarily. In fact, U.S. strategy during
the Great War, similar to the 1893-1894 period, encompassed ushering out the dominant
European cultural, political, and economic power in Latin America, particularly the
traditional British and emerging German influence in Brazil. The U.S. Navy, which
worked closely with the Brazilian Navy during the war, aided in this strategy. Moreover,
like the Brazilian Navy Revolt, this second case study also incorporates Brazilian sources
into the discourse, offering an insight into Brazil’s aspirations in regards to its naval
power, and how the country viewed its participation during World War I.
Lastly, a significant part of this dissertation examines the U.S. naval mission in
Brazil in the 1920s, and how that experience helped shape U.S.-Brazilian foreign
relations in the 1920s and 1930s, particularly at the onset of World War II. In analyzing
U.S. naval relations in Brazil and its naval mission in the 1920s, it is important to explore
several factors at play from the American perspective, beginning with the role of the
American Navy in contributing to the establishment of an informal United States empire
in Latin America. As this third case study reveals, the indoctrination of the Brazilian
Navy was a crucial aspect of the U.S. Navy Mission and particularly significant to the
U.S. strategy in Latin America since the 1890s. First, the Brazilian military wielded
tremendous influence on Brazilian politics. Hence, the U.S. government could indirectly
influence policy in Brazil through the work of American Navy officers in the Brazilian

7

Navy. Second, the naval mission influenced the purchasing habits of the Brazilian Navy,
facilitating American commercial expansion as Brazil sought to modernize its navy. And
lastly, the mission contributed to diminishing the European influence in the Brazilian
Navy, particularly the traditional British navy.10 In order to achieve these goals,
American naval officers served in an advisory capacity to the Brazilian Navy, and taught
at the Brazilian Naval War College, transferring American methods into the Brazilian
Navy, and aiding in the modernization of the Brazilian naval equipment. Moreover,
Brazilian sources will provide a deeper understanding of the Brazilian government’s
desire to modernize its navy and contract a foreign naval mission, as well as how
Brazilians viewed the country’s relationship with the U.S. in the 1920s.
Finally, emphasizing the importance of the naval mission in the 1920s helps
explain the unique background of the 1930s Good Neighbor era relations between the
U.S. and Brazil. Even though the U.S. foreswore direct military intervention with the
Good Neighbor policy in Latin America, few scholars have looked at how U.S. leaders
exerted influence “behind the scenes” through the institutionalization of military
cooperation before the 1930s, including the naval missions in Peru and Brazil.11 The

10

Historian Joseph Smith argues that this process also “underlined the increasing Brazilian
dependence in and vulnerability to the new strategic and commercial power of the United States
in South America.” See Joseph Smith, “The American Diplomacy and the Naval Mission to
Brazil, 1917-30,” Inter-American Economic Affairs, 35, (1981), 73.
11
Most recently, Joel Christenson’s dissertation, “From Gunboats to Good Neighbors: U.S. Naval
Diplomacy in Peru, 1919-1942,” (PhD Dissertation, West Virginia University, 2013), explores
the U.S. naval mission in Peru. For the Good Neighbor Policy, see Samuel Flagg Bemis’s
orthodox work Latin American Foreign Policy of the United States (New York: Harcourt, 1943);
written at a time when the cooperative spirit between the United States and Latin America
seemed to be at an all-time high. Bemis characterized the relationship between the United States
and Latin America as a positive one, based on a mutuality of interest and cooperation. Bemis
highlighted American altruism and non-interventionist spirit during the Good Neighbor Era. To
Bemis, U.S. interventions had been temporary and often a reaction to “external” forces, in which
the U.S. had to respond; Donald Dozer’s revisionist work in Are We Good Neighbors?
(Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1959), challenged Bemis’s argument, arguing that U.S.

8

naval mission in Brazil lasted until 1977, influencing American-Brazilian relations
throughout World War II, and during the Cold War.

Historiography:
This dissertation bridges the fields of foreign relations and naval history, offering
a contemporary analysis of the U.S. government’s commitment to protect its interests in
Latin America in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, specifically how the
U.S. Navy strengthened the American sphere of influence in the region. Prior to 1898,
contact between the U.S. and Latin America was limited to commercial interactions.
After the Spanish-American War, the U.S. pursued a policy of exclusive domination in
Central America and the Caribbean, with the aid of the American Navy.12 Moreover,
better transportation, a stronger navy, and the temporary weakening of the European
powers during World War I, allowed the U.S. to develop a more cohesive strategy in
South America, avoiding the use of direct intervention tactics that had been regularly

motives during the Good Neighbor policy was guided by American’s attempt to keep foreign
powers out, particularly Germany, while simultaneously promoting American economic interests
and generating economic dependency in the region, not as a reaction to outside forces like Bemis
had suggested; Dozer’s works is also significant in explaining Latin American-United States
foreign policy after World War II. Even though the Latin American countries eventually
collaborated with the U.S. during the war, they would later be disappointed by the U.S. Cold War
policies, in which Latinos, including Brazilians, believed the U.S., choosing to focus on Europe
instead, with plans such as the Marshall Plan which diverged funds to European reconstruction
after World War II, had turned its back on Latin America.
See also Frederick B. Pike, FDR’s Good Neighbor Policy, Sixty Years of Generally Gentle Chaos,
(University of Texas Press, 1995).
12
See David Healy, Drive to Hegemony, The United States in the Caribbean, 1898-1917
(Wisconsin: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1988); David Healy, Gunboat Diplomacy in the
Wilson Era, The U.S. in Haiti, 1915-1926 (The University of Wisconsin Press, 1976); Michael J.
Hogan, Informal Entente, The Private Structure of Cooperation in Anglo-American Economic
Diplomacy, 1918-1928 (Chicago: Imprint Publications, 1991); Alan McPherson, The Invaded,
How Latin Americans and their Allies Fought and Ended Occupations (New York: Oxford
University Press, 2014); Bruce J. Calder, The Impact of Intervention: The Dominican Republic
During the U.S. Occupation of 1916-1924 (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 1984).

9

applied in the Caribbean and Central America. As Russel Weigley asserts in The
American Way of War, “nevertheless in the 1890s the United States was ready to extend
its economic and political influence beyond the North American continent, the Navy
would surely be a convenient if not essential means of assisting such extension.”13
Specifically, the proliferation of naval missions after World War I, in Peru and Brazil for
example, resulted from the change in the status quo after the Great War, in which the
U.S. came to dominate the sphere of influence in Latin America, a topic this dissertation
will also explore using U.S.-Brazilian relations as a case study.

U.S. Foreign Relations 1890-1930 Historiography:
Fueled by domestic economic instability, Progressive Era ideology, as well as a
civilizing mission that characterized the nation’s foreign policy in the 1890s, the U.S.
developed a more assertive approach towards Latin America.14 The country went through
profound changes between 1890 and 1945, stemming from increased industrialization,
immigration, and urbanization. American industrial power grew exponentially after the
1860s, culminating in a potent industrial economy that not only affected the workplace
and domestic landscape, but also helped shaped U.S. foreign relations.15 Fueled by a
13

Russell F. Weigley, The American Way of War, A History of the United States Military Strategy
and Policy (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1973), 181.
14
Joseph A. Fry in “From Open Door to World Systems: Economic Interpretations of Late
Nineteenth Century American Foreign Relations,” Pacific Historical Review, 65 (1996), explores
the economic expansion of the U.S. Gilded Age foreign policy. According to Fry, after the Civil
War, “the focus shifted to a ‘New Empire’ of foreign trade,” as opposed to the territorial
expansion policy prior to the war, 279.
15
The historiography on Gilded Age and Progressive Era America is extensive, ranging from a
focus on the middle class reformers, to businesses, presidents, and immigrants as leaders in
reform movements. Some works that shed light on these changes include, Robert Weibe, The
Search for Order; Alan Trachtenberg, The Incorporation of America, (New York: Hill and Wang,
2007); Gabriel Kolko, The triumph of Conservatism, (New York: Free Press, 1977); Michael
McGerr, Decline of Popular Politics (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988); Richard
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quest for overseas markets, ideological exceptionalism, and the increasing pursuit of
hemispheric hegemony, the nation embarked on a civilizing mission abroad in an effort to
spread American values, businesses, and to dominate the balance between Western
European powers in the hemisphere. Increasingly in the nineteenth century, the U.S.
looked to Latin America as a region of tremendous potential for trade.
The three case studies this dissertation explores, places the U.S. Navy as a key
tool in advancing the multitude of American interests in Latin America in the late
nineteenth and early twentieth century. The scholarship on U.S. foreign relations during
this period has diversified from a focus on balance of power and commercial expansion
to include cultural expansion, transnational studies, and issues of gender and race as
shapers of American foreign relations.16 In exploring the evolution of U.S. foreign policy
in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, realist historians viewed the nation’s
strategy as a quest for balance of power in the hemisphere, traditionally dominated by
European powers.17 As the historiography on U.S foreign policy diversified, revisionists

Hofstadter, The Age of Reform, (New York: Vintage, 1960); Steven J. Diner, A Very Different
Age, America of the Progressive Age (New York: Hill and Wang, 1977); Alan Dawley’s
Changing the World: American Progressives in War and Revolution, (Politics and Society in
Modern America (Princeton, NJ: Princenton University Press, 2005) offers a good approach to
the transporting of American Gilded Age and Progressive Era ideology overseas. Dawley argues
that reformers’ ideology and general faith in progress helped shape United States foreign policy,
what Dawley refers to as “the new internationalism.” Regardless of their motives and social and
political alignments, progressives believed in the internationalization of their efforts for social
justice at home.
16
An international approach to research adds foreign archival records to the study, while a
transnational approach examines the historiography of foreign scholarly works about a particular
topic. Transnational research allows the historian to examine how a particular topic has been
interpreted by other nations.
17
George Kennan’s American Diplomacy, 1900-1950 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1951), for example, aimed at devising a plan for American foreign policy in order to improve the
nation’s power as well as the U.S. position in relation to the Soviet Union. To realists, the United
States should pursue the nation’s self- interest, rationally, and aimed at increasing the nation’s
power and national security. Therefore, to Kennan, American foreign policy and civilizing
mission in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century had been misguided by excessive
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beginning with William Appleman Williams in Tragedy of America Diplomacy,
highlighted the importance of trade to the U.S. imperialistic goals abroad. According to
Williams, the U.S. civilizing mission was really one of economic quest focused on trade
expansion, especially after Frederick Jackson Turner’s influential closing of the
American frontier thesis in the 1890s. Economic expansion in Latin America was an
alternative for Americans who believed that new frontiers produced democracy and
practicality.18 LaFeber’s revisionist work, New Empire, builds on Williams’s argument,
articulating a more intricate connection between American domestic and foreign policy,
enhancing the revisionist argument, particularly the continuity in American economic
expansionist ideology, originating before the Spanish-American War, a topic this
dissertation explores in Chapters 2 and 3. Moreover, LaFeber looks at the role that the
fear of domestic economic depressions had in driving American intervention in other
Latin American nations, connecting the economic depression of 1880s and 1890s to the
U.S. involvement in the Brazilian Navy Revolt of 1893-1894, for instance, in order
promote stability in those nations, but most importantly, to protect American trade.
In Spreading the American Dream, Emily Rosenberg, takes the new left argument
a step further by arguing that the American civilizing mission did not just consist of a

moralism and legalism, often concerned with domestic and international public opinion.
According to Kennan, moralistic policies, such as those promoted by President Wilson, had been
overly concerned with promoting a positive image of the United States abroad and with domestic
and international public opinion.
18
William Appleman Williams, The Tragedy of American Diplomacy (New York: W.W. Norton
& Company, 1959), 71. Williams, like other revisionists, focused on economics as the
determinant factor in American foreign policy, specifically, the interests of American businesses
in international affairs. According to Williams, the American civilizing mission abroad became
one in which the United States, through the Open Door policy, was able to shape and ultimately
control the economic makeup of developing nations, legitimized by the attempt to elevate those
nations to the superior principles of freedom and democracy. This in evident in U.S.-Brazilian
commercial relationship.
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quest for economic expansion, but also represented an effort to spread American cultural
values abroad. Like revisionists, Rosenberg connects domestic and foreign policy, but
furthers their argument by inserting an ideology of cultural expansion. Rosenberg
explains that this cultural expansion promoted values, which consisted of protection of
private property, promotion of free trade, and an assumption of superiority of the
American culture.19 This dissertation enhances Rosenberg’s argument, adding the naval
diplomacy element and how the transferring of American naval practices and materials,
and the strengthening of personal relationships between American and Brazilian naval
officers, aided in U.S. cultural expansion in Brazil.
As a more cultural approach continued to influence U.S. foreign relations
historiography, historians emphasizing on issues of gender, race, and ideology rhetoric
also viewed U.S. expansionist aspirations as a product of domestic developments.20 For
instance, Financial Missionaries of the World: The Politics and Culture of Dollar
Diplomacy, also written by Emily S. Rosenberg, weaves together culture, particularly
gender aspects, and economics turns to explain U.S. foreign policy and civilizing mission
in late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Blending revisionist and realist
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To Rosenberg, American foreign policy is best explained by an ideology of Liberal
Developmentalism, promoting American style of modernity, rooted in a promotion of freeenterprise, free communication, and promotion of American culture abroad. The three case
studies this dissertation explores, inserts U.S. naval diplomacy as a strategic tool used to fulfill
these goals. See Emily Rosenberg, Spreading the American Dream, American Economic and
Cultural Expansion 1890-1945 (Hill and Wang, 1982).
20
For instance, Robert Dallek in The American Style of Foreign Policy (New York: Alfred A.
Knopf, Inc., 1983), suggests that Progressive Era reformers sought validation for their goals of
making society more efficient in the form of American foreign policy. Progressives’ civilizing
mission aimed at victory of morality and stability abroad, which represented the true principles
reformers had been pursuing domestically, 66. In the Progressive Era, when numerous domestic
reformers promoted the extension of American values at home, the United States engaged in a
period of heightened imperialism abroad, especially in Latin America. As Dallek also assertes,
Theodore Roosevelt viewed as a responsibility of the United States to protect developing nations’
interests through regulation of their finances, 44.
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interpretations, Rosenberg pursues her synthesis by exploring state-to-state relations with
the U.S. government and its financial advisors as the primary agents, while considering
the role of non-state actors, such as the economic interests of private bankers in foreign
nations. According to Rosenberg, the U.S. civilizing mission became one in which the
U.S. aided the economies of developing countries by offering loans combined with
financial advice, promoting imperialism through the effective use of a controlled
monetary exchange.21 U.S. naval modernization efforts in Brazil in the early twentieth
century were essential in promoting American economic expansion and investment in the
region.22
Another U.S. foreign relations study that changed the field, is Louis Perez’s The
War of 1898, a classic transnational study of the Spanish American War. Perez
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Although the Dollar Diplomacy policy is often associated with William Howard Taft, both
Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson followed similar tactics in international relations. By
connecting private loans to government supervision, dollar diplomacy was a way to control,
guide, and therefore, civilize inferior nations.
22
Like Rosenberg’s cultural approach, Amy Greenberg’s 2005 work Manifest Manhood, explores
the influences gender anxieties had in both domestic and foreign policy. Furthermore, the
connection between domestic reforms and foreign policy becomes clear through the gendered
language used in filibustering during the period between the Mexican American War and the
American Civil War. Domestic changes and reform programs, such as the women’s rights
movement, market revolution, and the gradual switch from skilled to unskilled labor, caused
insecurities which motivated American men to engage in territorial expansion and conquest in
Latin America. See: Amy S. Greenberg, Manifest Manhood, and the Antebellum American
Empire (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 196. In the case of Financial
Missionaries of the World, the Progressive Era agitation at home for a more democratic and
efficient government also helped shaped both Wilson’s and Roosevelt’s presidencies and
reflected policy making abroad. See: Emily S. Rosenberg, Financial Missionaries to the World:
The Politics and Culture of Dollar Diplomacy, 1900-1930 (Durham, NC: Duke University Press,
2004). Another cultural approach in which domestic and foreign policies are closely intertwined
is Alan Dawley’s 2003 work, Changing the World. Dawley shows how the political philosophy
of Progressive Era reformers helped shape their understanding of an international world order,
modeled after their own principles of civic engagement and democracy. Therefore, the civilizing
mission was a dual one, in which progressives aimed at fixing problems both at home and abroad.
According to Dawley, “progressivism found a certain cohesion in three overlapping aims:
winning social and economic justice, revitalizing public life, and improving the wider world.”
See: Alan Dawley, Changing the World: American Progressives in War and Revolution
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2005), 3.
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particularly looks at how historians from the various schools of thoughts have attempted
to explain the Spanish-American War in the U.S. through a prism of erroneous
perceptions from Americans at the time of the conflict, contributing to the perpetuation of
myths about American motives in entering the war with Spain. Perez challenges
historians to conduct multi-archival research and integrate foreign historiographies into
their work, to better understand U.S. foreign relations and its impact on other nations.
Luiz Alberto Moniz Bandeira’s “Brazil as a Regional Power and its Relations
with the United States,” explores the U.S. civilizing mission from the Brazilian
perspective as well. Like Williams, Bandeira emphasizes Brazil’s economic dependence
on U.S. trade in the early twentieth century, blending a revisionist approach with cultural
history. Bandeira traces the root of this market dependence to the second half of the
nineteenth century, in which Brazil’s exports to North America increased gradually,
eventually reaching 47.1 percent in 1927, another topic this dissertation explores.
According to Bandeira, during that period, “Brazil was 60-70 percent dependent on
coffee exports and on the North American market.”23
Lastly, another compelling analysis of American foreign policy between 1890 and
1945 in Latin America, is Julie Greene’s The Canal Builders. Greene moves beyond a
state-to-state analysis, looking at more intricate connections between workers involved in
the building of the Panama Canal. Moreover, Greene criticizes previous historiographies
of the Panama Canal, which had focused on it being a symbol of American ingenuity and
23

Luiz Alberto Moniz Bandeira, “Brazil as a Regional Power and its Relations with the United
States,” Latin American Perspectives, 33 (2006), 14; This economic dependence, as Rosenberg
suggested, created an unbalanced relationship between the two countries in which America’s free
trade ideology clashed with Brazil’s quest for a more balanced power hierarchy in the Americas.
Eventually, as a direct reaction against the U.S. civilizing mission, Brazil looked to break free
from economic dependency on the U.S. by improving its relations with other South American
countries as part of its strategy to increase its bargaining power with the U.S., 12.
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technological progress. Like Greene, this dissertation moves beyond state-to-state
relations between the U.S. and Brazil to include the contributions of naval officers in the
shaping of foreign policy.24

U.S. Navy Diplomacy, 1890-1930 Historiography:
The historiography on U.S. naval relations and its role in shaping American
foreign policy in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century included the
contributions of prominent naval strategist figures such as Theodore Roosevelt, and
Alfred Thayer Mahan.25 In doing so, several works thoroughly explored how both
Roosevelt and Mahan launched the concept of the “New Navy” and redefined American
foreign policy in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. In Theodore Roosevelt’s
Naval Diplomacy, Henry J. Hendrix explores Roosevelt’s role in helping shape the navy
as an agent of American expansionism abroad. Hendrix’s work contributes to the foreign
policy and naval diplomacy historiography by blending domestic developments during
the Progressive Era, such as Social Darwinism and the industrial revolution, as crucial
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drivers of American expansionism in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century.
Hendrix points out that “Social Darwinism… held that nations, like species, had to battle
to survive;” hence, “failure to expand was a failure to compete.”26 Thus, Roosevelt’s
central theme rested on the concept that “the United States needed a modern fleet if it
were to take its place among the world’s Great Powers and needed to be prepared to use
it.”27 Consequently, Roosevelt broadened the scope of the Monroe Doctrine by
suggesting a “Large Policy,” promoting the U.S. as the “dominant power in the Western
Hemisphere.”28 As Hendrix points out, “the United Stated needed to back the Monroe
Doctrine with credible combat power and needed to be prepared for war in order to avoid
it.”29 In addition, as Richard Challener argues, in Admirals, Generals, and American
Foreign Policy, “it was a world in which the Navy-as America’s traditional ‘first line of
defense’-had a clear mission both to protect such ‘established’ national policies as the
Monroe Doctrine and the Open Door and to preserve law and order in those less fortunate
parts of the globe where those conditions did not prevail.”30
Like Hendrix, this dissertation also includes domestic ideologies, as well as
economic and political changes as factors in shaping American policy in Brazil. This
dissertation builds on Hendrix’s work by shifting the focus to American navy officers
who helped implement this new strategy in Brazil. Moreover, while Hendrix focuses on
the traditional turning points in the use of the American navy as agents of foreign policy,
such as the Spanish-American War, the Venezuela Crisis of 1902, and the Panama Canal,
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this dissertation shifts the discourse a few years back, to the Brazilian naval revolt of
1893-94, as an earlier manifestation of the New Navy in South America.
Behind the Throne offers yet another noteworthy work that blends foreign policy
and naval diplomacy. Noting that foreign policy was increasingly concentrated in the
executive branch in the U.S., this work looks at the behind the scenes contributions of the
“servants of power,” who advised American presidents, helping shape American foreign
policy throughout the years. Specifically, in chapter 3, “Admiral William B. Caperton,
Proconsul and Diplomat,” David Healy looks at how Caperton’s close interactions in
Haiti, the Dominican Republic, and Nicaragua, helped shape the U.S. government views
about the region, influencing American policy in those nations in the early twentieth
century. In 1914, Caperton took charge of the North Atlantic Fleet, which had been
formed in 1902. As Healy explains, “Caperton’s new command was created mainly for
diplomatic purposes.”31 Caperton directly conducted foreign policy on behalf of the U.S.
in those nations and notably had “largely improvised policy as he went along, receiving
State Department approval after the event.”32 Healy’s work focuses on the Caribbean and
Central American regions, on which most U.S. naval diplomacy historiography
traditionally concentrated. Building on Healy’s work, my dissertation gives us an even
better understanding of Caperton’s contributions in shaping American naval diplomacy
by exploring his activities in Brazil during World War I, while adding the role of other
naval officers who were in close contact with the people in South America and how their
experiences also helped shape American hemispheric policy.
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In These People’s Navy, Kenneth J. Hagan offers a comprehensive analysis of
how the American Navy has helped shape American foreign policy since the country’s
inception. In his section on late nineteenth and early twentieth century, Hagan focuses on
the traditional narrative of the New Navy and Gunboat Diplomacy, technological
innovations in warship building, while also factoring in European geopolitical balance of
power, especially as Germany rose as a naval power. Hagan’s work also explores the
divergence in strategy between those who argued for a smaller navy, capable of
protecting American commerce, and those like Mahan, who advocated for a larger, more
powerful navy able to control the seas. As Hagan asserts, “since the age of Mahan, the
U.S. Navy has hewn to a doctrine of challenging all rivals for command of the sea.”33 My
dissertation contextualizes these developments within the framework of U.S.-Brazilian
relations.
Notably, Robert Scheina’s Latin America, explores the development of the Latin
American nations’ navies from 1810-1897, including the Brazilian and Argentinian
navies, which offered great regional context for this dissertation.34 Scheina also
acknowledges that the Latin American navies had traditionally yielded great influence in
domestic policies. This dissertation builds on Scheina’s work by looking at the Brazilian
navy more closely and including Brazilian sources, while incorporating U.S.-Brazilian
foreign policy and naval diplomacy into the discourse.
Lisle A. Rose’s Power at Sea, Volume I, also offers a comprehensive U.S. naval
history between the 1890s and World War I, discussing the expansion of an American
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“sea empire” which eventually surpassed the dominant British naval power. Rose
explores how Mahan’s sea power theory and the New Navy influenced naval strategists,
such as Theodore Roosevelt, and helped shape foreign policy. As Rose notes, “Mahan
clearly set forth the rationale for a powerful defensive fleet,” with the key part of his
argument being expansion.35 The navalism of the late nineteenth and early twentieth
century generated conflict between the prominent naval powers, the U.S., Britain,
Germany, and Japan. U.S.-Brazilian naval relations between 1893-1930 are a great
example of how these powers, specifically the U.S., Britain, and Germany, developed
their strategy, and how the U.S. came to be the dominant naval power in Brazil after
World War I.
In his innovative work, The Dictator Next Door, Eric Roorda argues that prior to
ending the military occupation in the Dominican Republic, the U.S. trained the
Dominican national military before turning in the control of the country to the
Dominicans. One of the military officers the U.S. trained, Raphael Tujillo, was a ruthless
dictator who in the 1930s took over the Dominican government, with the support of the
U.S., under the banner of the Good Neighbor policy. Roorda argues that Tujillo’s training
in the 1920s under the supervision of American marines, gave him an insight into the
inner workings of various American policy-making departments, allowing him to
manipulate them in different ways to further his goals. His brutal regime left a lasting
impact on how Latin Americans viewed the U.S. military, often generating antiAmericanism sentiments. My dissertation follows a similar methodology, in exploring the
transfer of American naval methods to the Brazilian Navy, particularly through the
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Brazilian Naval War College. My work views the relationship as a product of bilateral
interests, recognizing the agency of the Brazilian government and navy in choosing to
strengthen naval relations with the U.S., and in inviting American officers to train and
serve as advisors to the Brazilian Navy.36 Moreover, like Roorda, this dissertation uses
both American and foreign archival research.
More recently, Joel Christenson’s dissertation argues that, “a consensus began to
form in Washington that the United States should cultivate a broad political stability in
regions favorable to its interests without resorting to force. That consensus strengthened
throughout the decade as Latin American resentment at U.S. gunboat diplomacy
mounted.” Eventually, this “accelerated the turn in U.S. policy away from armed
intervention in Latin America that would culminate with President Franklin D.
Roosevelt’s declaration of a non-interventionist ‘Good Neighbor Policy’ in 1933.”37
Similarly, this dissertation explores this soft-diplomacy method in Brazil in the 1920s.
Importantly, “over time U.S. foreign policymakers came to view the naval mission that
followed as an almost ideal type of solution to the challenges they confronted balancing
the United States’ aspiration to draw South America into its imperial fold with prevailing
political realities that made armed intervention there inconceivable.”38 As Christenson
also writes, his work “rejects the simplistic view of empire as a vehicle for the outright
domination of weaker nations by stronger ones. It accepts instead a more sophisticated
view of imperial relationships in which both the stronger and weaker nations, at various
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turns, succeed in advancing their own interests despite the broad and persistent inequality
in power between them.”39 This dissertation also broadens the analytical scope by
including Brazil’s aspirations through its naval diplomacy with the U.S.
U.S.- Brazilian Foreign Relations, 1890-1930 Historiography:
Finally, a brief background on U.S.-Brazilian relations helps place these three
case studies within the larger context of bilateral relations between the two nations.40
Some classic works on U.S.-Brazilian relations include E. Bradford Burns’s Unwritten
Alliance and Joseph Smith’s Unequal Giants, as well as Smith’s Brazil and the United
States. Burns offers multi-archival research that includes the correspondences of
Brazilian Foreign Ministers from the Arquivo Nacional, Itamaraty, in Rio de Janeiro,
viewing the bilateral relationship in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century as
evidence of an unwritten alliance between the two nations. My dissertation expands on
Burns’s work by also incorporating transnational historiography and by including
Brazilian naval records. Applying a transnational approach to the research contributes to
understanding important nuances in the relationship. Furthermore, the three case studies
include the contributions of the U.S. and Brazilian navies in fostering friendly relations
between the two nations. Like Smith in Unequal Giants and Brazil and the United States,
this dissertation also shows periods of “convergence and divergence,” between the two
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nations while considering the role of the U.S. Navy in helping to define this
relationship.41
The Brazilian historiography on Brazilian foreign relations also offers a rich
context for how Brazilians have viewed the bilateral relationship between the two
countries. Specifically, the classic work of Clodoaldo Bueno, Poltica Externa da
Primeira Republica, Os Anos de Apogeu-de 1902 a 1918, views the bilateral relations as
encompassing several periods in which American and Brazilian interests complemented
each other, although Bueno also clarifies that the U.S. did not seek a formal alliance with
Brazil. Bueno also argues that the U.S. did not shy away from imperialism, it simply used
a different strategy than the traditional European powers. Moreover, like revisionists in
the U.S., Bueno argues U.S. foreign policy rested primarily on economic expansion and
imperialism, with security concerns coming second. In fact, the policy of approximation
to the U.S. that the Minister of Foreign Relations Rio Branco sought in the early
twentieth century, intending to build an alliance between the U.S. and Brazil, was
unilateral. Importantly, Bueno also asserts that Brazil’s transition from a primarily
European influenced nation to one primarily within a U.S. sphere of influence in the early
twentieth century was a spontaneous action on the part of Brazil. Factoring in the
traditional rivalry between Brazil and Argentina, Bueno also argues that Brazil sought a
closer relationship with the U.S. in order to counter Argentina’s ascendance in South
America.42
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Bueno also wrote another important work focusing on an earlier period of
Brazilian foreign policy, A Republica e sua Politica Exterior, (1889-1902). He views the
1889-1918 as a period of crisis in imperialism regarding spheres of influence, alliances,
and global conflicts. Specifically, Bueno views this period as the beginning of the U.S.
imperialism overseas, which viewed Latin America as a region that had to be brought
under its sphere of influence. Policies such as the Spanish-American War, the “Big
Stick,” and Dollar Diplomacy served as strategies to accomplish this goal. Here the
historiography follows the traditional American foreign relations revisionist and cultural
historiographies, where those three key foreign policy developments represented a
turning point in U.S. overseas imperialism.43 In the next chapters I will analyze the
Brazilian historiography on U.S.-Brazilian relations more closely as they apply to the
three case studies I will be exploring.

Chapter Organization:
The subsequent chapters will follow a chronological approach in advancing the
key argument, starting with the Brazilian naval revolt of 1893-1894. Chapters 2 and 3
explore U.S. intervention in the Brazilian naval revolt, demonstrating that the critical
moment in which U.S. hemispheric strategy entered a stage of increased assertiveness
occurred half a decade before the Spanish-American War. In tracing the more aggressive
43
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U.S. presence in South America to the Brazilian naval revolt, this case study adds depth
to the scholarship on the projection of American power through the New Navy, which
has traditionally focused on the Venezuela-British Guiana border dispute, and
overwhelmingly the Spanish-American War.44 Moreover, the U.S. military intervened in
Brazil during a critically important insurrection, ensuring that the pro-U.S. Republican
government prevailed over the supposedly pro-monarchist rebels. This intervention not
only significantly altered Brazilian political history, but it also presaged increased U.S.
interventionist activity in Latin America, including South America. American influence
in the hemisphere can be traced back slightly earlier than the traditional, more wellknown Spanish-American War, and the British Guiana-Venezuela dispute of 1895.
Chapters 4 and 5 look at U.S.-Brazilian naval diplomacy after the naval revolt of
1893-1894, highlighting the World War I period, and the U.S. naval commission in
Brazil. Specifically, these two chapters look at how the U.S. Navy was used as a vehicle
to further American World War I strategy in South America. Lastly, Chapters 6 and 7
explore U.S.-Brazilian foreign and naval diplomacy in the 1920s within the context of
U.S. corporatism in Latin America and increasing concern for security in the
hemisphere.45 Specifically, these chapters focus on the U.S. naval mission to Brazil from
1922-1930, and the contributions of American and Brazilian naval officers in
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strengthening bilateral relations through the transferring of practices and through more
personal interactions at the Rio de Janeiro Naval War College.
Together, these three case studies illuminate the roles of American and Brazilian
naval officers in advancing their nations’ interests, the origins of a more assertive U.S.
policy toward Latin America, and the emergence of an unwritten alliance between the
two nations between the 1893 and 1930.
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Chapter 2: The United States Intervention in The Brazilian Navy Revolt of 18931894, Part I: U.S.-Brazilian relations
“… I received your telegram in response to my request for instructions which I shall
endeavor to carry out, the chief obstacle being that we have no naval force in these
waters to sustain our demands for justice…”
Legation of the United States in Brazil to U.S. Secretary of State Walter Gresham, 18931
Introduction:
By the 1890s, the expansionist strategy the U.S. government had articulated for
most of the nineteenth century increasingly relied on the strengthening of its New Navy,
which helped transform the country’s foreign policy into a tangible, more aggressive
overseas operation. Specifically, the U.S. government looked to its navy as a way to
diminish European influence in Latin America, expand U.S.-Latin American trade, and
promote American cultural, social, and political principles in the hemisphere in the late
nineteenth century. The next two chapters look at a case study in Brazil in 1893-94, when
a faction of the Brazilian Navy revolted against the Brazilian government, culminating in
the U.S. Navy’s involvement in the conflict. These two chapters illuminate several
important dynamics that speak to scholars of U.S. foreign policy, navy history, and U.S.South American relations. In particular, it shows that the evolution of the U.S. response
to the Brazilian naval revolt progressed from observation, to involvement, to intervention,
while also demonstrating the increased confidence of U.S. policymakers and naval
officers in using the New Navy as an effective tool of diplomacy in the region prior to the
Spanish-American War.
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First, these chapters explore the impact that U.S. Navy diplomacy had on internal
developments in Brazil at a crucial transition period for the newly established republic.2
Historians have thoroughly explored U.S.-Latin American relations in the late-nineteenth
and early-twentieth century, as well as the emergence of a New Navy and the U.S. as a
military power at the turn of century. This case study factors in these well-known foreign
policy and military trends, while exploring the role that the U.S. Navy played in U.SBrazilian relations and how it influenced political developments in Brazil. As the
transnational historiography and primary sources reveal, both the Brazilian and U.S.
governments had crucial interests threatened by the naval revolt.
Second, these chapters explore naval diplomacy and the impact of U.S.
intervention in the conflict from the point of view of American and Brazilian Navy
officers, public opinion, and the U.S. and Brazilian governments. Drawing on the
memoirs, manifests, and letters that Brazilians and American Navy officers wrote, as well
as pointing out how they sometimes contrasted with public opinion and official policies, I
offer a complex picture of foreign policy as a combination of ideologies, strategies,
operations, and tactics, which did not always work in a cohesive way. This became
particularly relevant in 1893, when the grand naval strategy Captain Alfred Thayer
Mahan articulated only a few years before was first put to a test. Finally, the transnational
historiography and Brazilian records also illuminate the intricate relationship between the
navy insurgents and the Brazilian government within the context of complex political and
social developments since before the establishment of the Brazilian republic in 1889.

2

The empire of Brazil became a Republic in 1889 as a result of a military coup against the
monarchical rule of Emperor Dom Pedro II.
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On September 6, 1893, a faction of the Brazilian Navy revolted against the
Brazilian government. This was not the first time the Brazilian Navy assumed an
assertive role in politics, taking a position against the Brazilian government. However,
the 1893-94 revolt not only happened at a crucial time in U.S. history, it also displayed
unique characteristics. Many Brazilians and Americans accused Great Britain of using the
revolt as an opportunity to restore monarchy in Brazil, undermining the growing U.S.
influence in the region. Hence, U.S. policymakers paid the conflict a great deal of
attention. U.S. Secretary of State at the time, Walter Q. Gresham, understood how crucial
the outcome of the revolt would be to U.S- Brazilian relations and to U.S. influence in
South America.3
Background and Context
U.S., 1890s:
U.S. concern about disruption in the Brazilian government was heightened by
fears that it might interrupt trade with the U.S. Domestically, the early 1890s had
witnessed massive cycles of economic panic. The revolt in Brazil threatened a U.S.
commercial agreement and expansion of trade with one of the largest Latin American
economies as the country sought to increase its international commerce.4 According to
historian Joseph A. Fry, to revisionist historians of U.S-Latin America relations, “this
consensus solidified as repeated depressions disrupted the economy and incited an
3
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alarming level of social protests.”5 As David Healy also explains in Drive to Hegemony,
“the Panic of 1893 and subsequent collapse of the domestic markets brought urgency to
the search for buyers abroad.”6
Strategically, the 1890s also witnessed a push for the New Navy to protect
American interests overseas at the same time American foreign policymakers sought to
strengthen the nation’s influence in Latin America, while diminishing the European
power in the region. Fearing the threat a monarchist revolt would bring to the Monroe
Doctrine and regional security, and guided by the need to maintain a firm trade
relationship with Brazil to alleviate economic pressure at home, American policymakers
assumed an assertive position in the conflict. As Lisle A. Rose’s explains in Power at
Sea, as Mahan developed a more cohesive strategy for the New Navy, “the captain’s
genius lay not only in showing his people the way to a seemingly endless frontier out on
the world ocean and on the far distant coats of the earth, but also in stimulating their fears
of continued vulnerability from predatory European nation-states.”7
Brazil, 1890s:
To the Brazilian government, the naval revolt represented a threat to the newly
established republic of 1889, which had replaced a monarchy. The incident occurred at a
crucial time in Brazilian history; the republic was only four years old and had undergone
a turbulent coup d’état, and a countercoup in November 1891. By 1893, the nation was
vulnerable to internal political, social, and economic instability. According to Felisbello

5

Joseph A. Fry, “From Open Door to World Systems: Economic Interpretations of Late
Nineteenth Century American Foreign Relations,” Pacific Historical Review, 65 (1996): 280
6
David Healy, Drive to Hegemony, The United States in the Caribbean, 1898-1917 (Wisconsin:
University of Wisconsin Press, 1988), 35.
7
Lisle A. Rose, Power at Sea, The Age of Navalism, 1890-1918 (University of Missouri Press,
2007), 14.

30

Firmo de Oliveira Freire, Brazilian Minister of Finance at the time of the 1893-94 naval
revolt, and who later wrote about the incident, the conflict was a result of a political
friction within the federal government, between the federal and state governments, as
well as the ongoing power play between the army and the navy.8 Historian Angela
Fonseca Souza Assis also asserts that the revolt “was caused by the disorder and
indiscipline that developed in Brazil due to the proclamation of the republic, affecting
both the federal government… with the army’s authoritarian dominance, with the navy
wanting to enjoy the same benefits…”9
A brief background on Brazil’s economic and political history and its transition
from a parliamentary monarchy to a republic, as well as the navy’s role in establishing
and eventually challenging the new republic, helps contextualize the naval revolt of
1893-94 as evidence of a vulnerable new regime. Shedding a light on Brazil’s internal
struggles also assigns greater meaning to the U.S. intervention at such a defining and
tumultuous period in Brazil. The nation had undergone profound changes, including the
abolition of slavery in 1888, the proclamation of the republic in 1889, and a military coup
in only a short period of time. As Brazilian historian Eduardo Bueno noted of these
turbulent beginnings, “all the misconducts of Brazilian politics and economy completely
materialized in the first ten years of the Republic."10
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In 1870, a few years prior to the official birth of the Brazilian republic, “a
manifest was published creating the Republican Party, launching the idea for the adoption
of a democratic regime in Brasil, inspired by the examples in the U.S. and other South
American nations.” As historian Hélio Leôncio Martins illuminates, although the
document was more “philosophical and literary than action” it did influence the army,
especially after the Paraguayan War.11 In addition to the growing tensions between the
military and the monarchical rule, the monarchy regime was facing some challenges,
“with the physical decaying of the Emperor,” which would lead to the potential ruling of
the unpopular Cond’Eu, who had married the Brazilian Emperor’s daughter, Princess
Isabel, as well as the probable economic and social consequences of the eventual
abolition of slavery.12
A military coup on November 15, 1889, led by proclaimed army Marshal Manuel
Deodoro da Fonseca, deposed the Imperial government of Dom Pedro II, and declared
Brazil a Provisional Republic. To U.S. officials, the proclamation of the republic
represented a victory. As the head of the U.S. Legation in Petropolis, Rio de Janeiro,
wrote, “our constitution and flag has been copied, and, looking to future relations, I desire
our country to be first to acknowledge the Republic.”13 It is also important to note that the
11
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Brazilian Army rose as a more prominent military institution in comparison to the
Brazilian Navy, an important development in the nation’s military history, and as some
Brazilian historians argue, one of the reasons for the navy’s revolt in 1893. In February
1891, Brazil passed a federal constitution highly influenced by the rhetoric of the U.S.,
Chile, and Switzerland constitutions.14
In Brasil Uma Historia, Eduardo Bueno explains that since the imperial rule in
Brazil, the army had lost its prestige in comparison to the Brazilian Navy. The
Paraguayan War had revived the prestige of the Brazilian Army.15 Afterwards, the young
cadets from the Brazilian Military School defended the republican ideals, and together
with the more traditional army officials, such as Marshal da Fonseca, gave motion to the
November 15 coup that ousted Dom Pedro II.16 Moreover, on the eve of the proclamation
of the republic, Bueno asserts that the Brazilian Navy, considered a more noble
institution, was, in fact, monarchist. Bueno also makes an important observation; since
Brazilian independence, the navy, “commanded by English officials like Lord Cochrane
and John Greenfeld, was privileged in relationship to the army… receiving more
attention from the Empire.”17 This perception of the navy as monarchist influenced public
opinion in Brazil and U.S. policy towards the naval revolt of 1893-94. Historian Martins
also explains that the new republic’s cabinet members lacked the experience in this new
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political system, which exposed the fragile state of the new government early on, while
the Brazilian Army continued to increase its influence in Brazilian politics.18
Eventually, conflicts between the new Congress and the executive power led to a
coup d’état on November 3, 1891, in which President Deodoro da Fonseca dissolved the
Congress, claiming that the latter threatened the stability of the republic, calling for a new
Congress to be formed. Edwin H. Conger, head of the U.S. Legation in Brazil, wrote the
U.S State Department, “owning to fear of plots for the restoration of monarchy, the
President has on this date by decrees dissolved Congress and declared Martial law.”19
U.S. Secretary of State, James G. Blaine asked Conger, “to convey to the Brazilian
President the friendly solicitude of the United States in behalf of the Republic of Brazil,
and the fervent hope of its people that the free political institution so recently and so
happy established in Brazil may not be impaired.”20 Conger reported that Admiral Jose
Custodio de Mello, future leader of the naval revolt of 1893-94, and other high officials,
including Vice President Marshal Floriano Peixoto, conspired to overthrow Deodoro da
Fonseca’s regime in a counter coup, a plan that materialized on November 23, 1891.
Once the conspiracy deposed President Fonseca, Vice-President Peixoto, who
opted to maintain the title of Vice President, justifying the legality of his position,
assumed the leadership of the Republic.21 Vice President Peixoto nominated Admiral
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Custodio de Mello as his Minister of Marine. Immediately after the counter coup of
November 23, 1891, internal conflicts between the states and the federal government
intensified throughout Brazil. Vice President Peixoto forced the resignation of several
state governors with the help of his Minister of Marine.22 According to a historical
account provided by the U.S. Legation in Brazil, when Peixoto assumed office, “the
people of the states were incited to depose their governors, and, with the aid of the newly
appointed local officers, they elected new governors, who in time appointed new officers,
all of whom were supposed to be favorable to Floriano’s [Peixoto] ideas.” Morover,
Mello and the rest of the President’s cabinet supported these actions.23 As evidence of
Peixoto’s and the Brazilian military’s growing power, in 1891, the Brazilian Congress
ceded power to Peixoto to take the necessary actions to protect the republic.24
At the southernmost region in Brazil, Rio Grande do Sul, a rebellion rose against
the government of Peixoto. Southern Brazil had been undergoing political instability even
prior to the proclamation of the republic, due to internal divisions, proximity to the
Argentine frontier, and civil wars since the Empire Era.25 During the Peixoto
administration, a harsh divide between the Partido Republicano, the Republican Party,
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who Peixoto supported, and the Partido Federalista, the Federalist Party, in Rio Grande
do Sul, led to local conflicts that eventually entangled the federal government, which
believed its interests would be better protected under the Republican Party.26 Mello later
claimed in his Manifest that Peixoto’s action in the southern Brazil would be a decisive
factor in his decision to turn against the Vice President.
On April 1893, Edwin Conger from The Legation of the U.S. in Brazil reported
on the conflict unfolding at Rio Grande do Sul. Conger wrote to Secretary of State Walter
Gresham, “there exist in the state two rival factions, one headed by Julio de Castillos, the
present governor, and the other by Gaspar Silveira Martins. The struggle is on the part of
the latter and his followers to depose the former, and a majority of the people of the state
are in sympathy with the Silveira Martins Party,” the Federalist Party. Conger also
reported that, “the national government supports Castillos as has sent large bodies of
troops from his and other parts of the Republic to uphold him.” Conger wrote, “the
Martins forces are not very well organized and are very poorly equipped, yet their
devotion to their cause and their determination not to submit to a regime forced upon
them by the national government will make their suppression a difficult matter by the
national force.”27
On April 27, 1893, the Brazilian Minister of Finance, Dr. Innocencio Sezedello
Correa, resigned, claiming disagreement over financial policies with the Peixoto
government. Dr. Fellisbello Firmo de Oliveira Freire, “the recently appointed minister of
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foreign affairs, was transferred to the ministry of finance, still having charge of the
foreign ministry ad interim, and Admiral Felippe Firmino Rodrigues Chaves was
appointed minister of marine.”28 On April 28, Admiral Custodio de Mello left his post as
Minister of Marine, criticizing the way Peixoto was dealing with the Rio Grande do Sul
internal conflicts and accusing the Vice President of prolonging the war instead of
fighting for peace.29 Conger also explained Mello’s motives to Secretary Walter
Gresham. Conger wrote, “Admiral Custodio de Mello sets forth his grievances the refusal
of the Vice-President to adopt his views for a settlement of the Civil War now in progress
in Rio Grande do Sul, and a general disposition on the part of the Vice President to
manage matters without consultation with him.” Conger added, “this is a very serious
rupture in the vice-president’s official family…” Conger noted, “Admiral de Mello
having been the chief organizer and leader of the movement of November 23, 1891,
which deposed Marshal Deodoro from his assumed dictatorship, and restored the legal
government with Vice-President Peixoto at its head.”30
In his resignation letter, Mello wrote, “in view however, of the mission with
which the minister of war has been charged by your Excellency of continuing the conflict
which is imbruing in Rio Grande do Sul with blood, I consider my permanence in the
government unprofitable…” Mello continued, “it is publicly known and felt that the
actual administration in Rio Grande do Sul does not represent the majority of our
compatriots in that state. It is not a chosen government imposed by popular opinion, and
under such conditions it is a weak government, which can only be sustained by the
28
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support of the federal military forces.” Mello wrote Peixoto, “now Marshal, the
republican situation needs stability; its institutions need to be consolidated, and the first
condition of steadiness which the Republic stands in need of is, precisely, peace and
public tranquility, avoiding henceforth and forever these internal commotions which
disturbs our credit and hold the country constantly under the threat of armed agitation and
the surprise of sanguinary conflicts.” Regarding the character of the ongoing southern
revolt, Mello explained, “most of them fought after the coup d’état of 3d November,”
against Fonseca’s rule, “for the revindication [sic] of national honor and dignity… we
ought to at least judge these our compatriots with the impartiality which old servitors of
the country are entitled to and by their political antecedents.” Mello also expressed his
grievances for being left out of the decision making in regards to the revolt in Rio Grande
do Sul, which was indicative of the ongoing power play between the army and the navy.
He wrote Peixoto, “your excellency has not only failed to consult me in regard to matters
connected with the revolutionary movement in Rio Grande do Sul, but has actually
withheld them from my knowledge in a manner highly offensive to the honorable office
that I hold.” Finally, Mello vouched to “serve the Republic, upholding its institutions and
legally constituted authorities…”31
On May 26, 1893, the head of the U.S. Legation in Brazil wrote the State
Department that the House of Deputies in Brazil was hoping for impeachment of the Vice
President, due to the violation of their constitution. According to the Legation, the House
of Deputies accused Vice President Peixoto of “numerous violations of the constitution
and laws, to wit, declaring Martial law without warrant, improperly interfering in state
31
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affairs, carrying on an unnecessary war, squandering the public funds, compulsory
recruiting for the army and navy, chattering banks of emission, ignoring legal tribunals,
etc.” Conger added that the House remained divided on their support for Peixoto, with
those opposing him, criticizing his actions at Rio Grande do Sul.32 These earlier conflicts
move the narrative of the Navy Revolt, which broke out later in September, beyond a
mere monarchist conspiracy, giving agency to the Brazilian military, pointing to a much
more complex power play and disagreements between the founders of the Brazilian
republic of 1889. As June Hahner points out in Civilian-Military Relations in Brazil,
1889-1898, “the Brazilian armed forces have tended to view themselves as the guardians
of the republic they helped establish in 1889.”33
With Mello withdrawing his support for Peixoto, the Vice President feared that
the overall support of the Brazilian Navy would also fade. Hence, he looked to strengthen
his relationship with the Brazilian Army, giving several administrative positions to army
officials.34 In fact, to historian Martins, Mello’s true motivations to revolt against the
Peixoto government was due to the increasing prestige given to the Brazilian Army, not
on the Southern revolt, or on the Admiral’s proposal to elect a civilian to the
Presidency.35 At the onset of the naval revolution in September 1893, both the American
and Brazilian governments often pointed to a possible navy conspiracy to restore
monarchy in Brazil as the reason the revolt broke out. The Brazilian historiography and
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primary sources however, add a more nuanced examination of the tensions between the
army and the navy, which preceded the revolt, and their growing influence in politics.36
U.S.-Brazil, the Navy Revolt of 1893-94:
As the events described above intensified, the U.S. had already been articulating a
more assertive foreign policy towards Latin America. In order to understand the
relevance of U.S. naval diplomacy in Brazil during the naval revolt of 1893-94, one must
consider the growing importance of Latin America and Brazil to U.S. aspirations for
economic dominance in the region, which culminated in the signing of a commercial
reciprocity agreement between the two nations. In addition to the desire to strengthen
commercial ties with Brazil, and the quest for hemispheric hegemony more broadly, one
must also take into consideration the relevance of American domestic developments
during the Gilded Age and Progressive Era, in shaping America’s increasingly aggressive
foreign policy of overseas expansion.37
Specifically, as an attempt to relieve the nation from cycles of economic
depression in the early 1890s, the U.S. Congress drafted a commercial bill, the McKinley
Tariff. One of the terms of the bill included a provision for a reciprocity trade agreement
with Brazil, in which certain products would be admitted free of duty into both countries.
36
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Specifically, Section 3 of the McKinley tariff “provided for admission of non-competitive
products into the United States and the purchase by such concessions of differential
advantages for United States exports in markets where they competed with those of other
countries.”38 According to Guy Shirk Claire, “under this treaty, Brazil retained the
advantage of free admission of sugar, molasses, hides, coffee, and teas, and the United
States secured free admission into Brazil for a long list of agricultural and manufactured
goods.”39
Signing a tariff agreement with one of the most important emerging South
American powers was significant in the assertion of U.S. foreign policy aspirations in
Latin America, and in alleviating domestic economic instability at home. As commercial
trade marked the relationship between the U.S. and the most influential South American
nations, it became imperative that the U.S. protect and expand this relationship. With the
early 1890s commercial panic in the U.S., the stability of trade agreements, such as the
reciprocity agreement between the United States and Brazil in 1891, became a crucial
matter to the U.S. government. In fact, tariff agreements were seen as highly beneficial to
U.S. economic expansion in the 1890s.40 In “Britain and the Brazilian Naval Revolt of
1893-4,” historian Joseph Smith also points out that, “it appeared that the United States
economic expansion had fixed Latin America as its primary target.”41 Walter LaFeber
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also noted, Secretary of State Gresham, “saw in the business decline which followed the
1893 panic, ‘symptoms of a Revolution.’”42
Although the U.S. had experimented with reciprocity agreements prior to 1891,
“in the late eighties the reciprocity idea underwent a change.” Claire explained, “a new
concept of using reciprocity as a weapon, and as a method of securing new markets,
especially in Latin America, arose.”43 Claire also added that, “the only important
application of Section 3 of the McKinley Act was the Brazilian Treaty of February 5,
1891.” Hoping that the agreement would give a much-needed boost to the Brazilian sugar
industry in particular, Brazil signed immediately the reciprocity commercial agreement
with the U.S. According to Claire, “Colombia, Chile, and Argentine Republic refused to
negotiate similar treaties.”44
The reciprocity agreement between these two nations indicated the U.S. interest in
establishing a firmer trade relationship with Brazil. As LaFeber points out in New
Empire, “this agreement became one of the most important reciprocity treaties signed
under the McKinley tariff.”45 It is also important to note that both President Fonseca, and
later, Vice President Peixoto, as well as the Brazilian Foreign Minister to the U.S., had
been generally favorable to the tariff agreement, making a politically stable Brazil even
more crucial to American interests. As U.S. Secretary of State John W. Foster wrote in
1891, “fortunately the Minister of Brazil at Washington, Senhor Salvador de Mendonca,
was not only very friendly to the United States, but had been, in the International
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Conference, a strong advocate of reciprocity.”46 The U.S. Legation in Petropolis, Brazil,
also added in 1891 during Marshal Fonseca’s rule, “I must also say that one of the strong
grounds of their opposition to the President,” referring to the Brazilian Congress, “has
grown out of these reciprocity negotiations with the U.S. He has all the time been a true
friend of this policy, and has fought loyally for the arrangement, even against almost
overwhelming odds.”47 In response to Secretary Blaine’s letter announcing that the U.S.
Congress had passed the reciprocity agreement and was desirous of closer trade relations
with Brazil, the Brazilian Consul General to the U.S., Mendonca, who also remained in
his post during the naval revolt of 1893-94, replied positively to the agreement as well.
Mendonca wrote, “I am pleased to be able to inform you, that the United States of Brazil
are equally animated by the desire to strengthen and perpetuate the friendly relations
which happily exists between them and the United States of America, and to establish the
commercial intercourse between the two countries, upon a base of reciprocity and
equality…” Lending his support, Mendonca continued, “and I heartily participate in the
hope which you express, that it may prove to be the happy fortune of you, Mr. Secretary,
and myself to be instrumental in establishing commercial relations between the two
Republics on a permanent basis of mutual profit.”48
After the Brazilian southern states had already started revolting against Peixoto,
and after the future leader of the naval revolt, Admiral Custodio de Mello, had already
resigned, Conger wrote to the Brazilian Minister of Finance, Freire, “this determination
on the part of the Brazilian government to vigorously maintain the conditions of the
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reciprocity arrangement will be duly appreciated by my government.”49 As LaFeber
asserts in The New Empire, while the reciprocity agreement had received a “cool
reception in Brazil, only resolute stands taken by several Brazilian presidents, especially
Floriano Peixoto, had prevented the nation’s legislature from repudiating the agreement.”
LaFeber adds, “the rebellion was led by political enemies of Peixoto, some of whom
bitterly opposed him on the issue of this treaty.”50 Although the agreement would be
repealed by the U.S. Congress in December 1893, “the proposed substitute, however, the
so-called Wilson Tariff was being framed with the express intention of obtaining even
more South American markets.”51
In addition to the revolt in the Southern part of Brazil serious hindering of
international trade, several European nations’ previous opposition to the reciprocity
agreement also represented a threat to American interests. In fact, the U.S. government
had been aware of European opposition to the agreement. As Conger wrote to Foster, in
1892, “I may also add that the European merchants, who have as yet established no
connection with the United States, are still violent in their opposition.”52 Moreover, from
the inception of the agreement, U.S. diplomats suspected British hostility towards the
reciprocity agreement. Conger, wrote to Secretary of State Blaine in 1891, “there can be
no doubt that combined systematic, and stubborn efforts of European officials, merchants
and capital have been continually made to bring about its repeal.” Conger added,
“especially has this been done by the English bank in this city and London, who have
been able to practically control the credit of this country by actually fixing the value of
49
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Brazilian money, in their arbitrarily established daily notes of exchange and having
forced the price down to the lowest point, attempt to make the Brazilians believe it is but
one of the logical results of the reciprocity arrangement.”53 Great Britain was the
strongest commercial power in Brazil by the late nineteenth century. When the Brazilian
Navy, accused of monarchist aspirations, revolted against the government in 1893, the
belief that the British would use this as an opportunity to weaken the commercial
agreement or any trade agreement between the U.S. and Brazil, also helps explain the
shift from the U.S. neutrality policy to subsequent intervention in Navy Revolt.
Another issue the reciprocity agreement created was the general discontent of the
Brazilian population towards what they believed to be an unfair contract. The reciprocity
agreement between the U.S. and Brazil had been particularly important in creating the
conditions for establishing a reciprocity agreement between Spain and the U.S. by
improving American economic negotiating power overall. To the U.S., the reciprocity
agreement with Brazil represented a strategy to lure Spain into a similar contract,
enabling Americans to acquire cheap sugar from Cuba. The U.S. government hoped that
Spain, threatened by the exclusive Brazilian sugar trade with the U.S., would also sign a
reciprocity agreement with the United States in order to ship sugar from Cuba to the U.S.
As Foster wrote in his Diplomatic Memoirs, “I felt, however, that the agreement with
Brazil would make the sugar-planters of Cuba the more anxious to preserve a free market
in the United States for their production.”54 Foster had served as U.S. Secretary of State
from June 1892 to February 1893.
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Moreover, according to historian Lars Schoultz, “with the consumption of coffee
and sugar rising six-fold during the years from 1865 to 1897, Cuba and Brazil remained
the largest U.S. trading partner in Latin America.”55 Some Brazilians were unhappy once
they found out their commercial agreement was not exclusive, especially regarding the
terms on sugar trade. Conger sent an article from a newspaper in Brazil showing the
strong opposition several Brazilians displayed against the agreement. The Brazilian
article asserted, “we opened the door and forced the entrance of Spain: we admirably
served the interests of the United Sates.” Moreover, the article bitterly pointed out that
the McKinley bill, which in 1891 led to the creation of the reciprocity agreement between
the United Sates and Brazil, would make these sorts of arrangements possible with any
nation that wanted them.56 Joseph Smith in Brazil and the United States, notes that, “the
fact that the Cuban sugar would now also have free entry into the United States
effectively destroyed Brazilian expectations of capturing a monopoly of the American
sugar market.” Smith also explains that Conger “was writing that public reaction was by
‘no means as cordial as we had a right to expect,’ and there was even the prospect that the
Brazilian Congress would vote to repeal the treaty.”57
Undoubtedly, domestic instabilities and conflicting opinions regarding the
reciprocity agreement in the early stages of the republic represented a threat to U.S.
commercial and geopolitical interests in Brazil, and consequently the already fragile
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American economy. In July 1893, as the Rio Grande do Sul revolt intensified, the U.S.
carefully observed the newly establish republic of Brazil fall into political chaos. On July
18, 1893, Secretary Gresham wrote to the Legation of the U.S. in Petropolis, Brazil, “I
transmit a copy of letters representing the Brazilian Government owning the telegraph
lines along the Brazilian coast have prohibited all cipher messages from the United States
to Brazil, while allowing messages in cipher to be sent from Brazil to the United States.”
The domestic tensions in the south of Brazil had prompted Vice President Peixoto to
restrict the exchange of telegraphic messages between the two countries. In the 1890s,
telegraphic communications were crucial to the conduct of and stability of international
trade. As Secretary Gresham pointed out, “the restriction is not only an onerous fetter
upon legitimate commerce, and quite unusual in the intercourse of trading nations, but is
singular in permitting cipher messages to pass in one direction, yet not in the other.” As
evident of the navy’s growing role in international affairs, Gresham also suggested as a
possible solution to the problem, that messages be sent through Brazilian naval officers
using cipher codes, although he angrily stated that, “it would operate as a censorship and
be calculated to embarrass the operations of American importers, who, as the
Government is aware, take a very large proportion of the staple exports of Brazil.”58
Given the importance of Latin American markets both to U.S. domestic and
foreign policies, political instabilities in Brazil threatened to interrupt business and the
already contested reciprocity agreement. On July 14, 1893, Mr. Thomas T. Eckert from
the Executive office of the Western Union Telegraph Company, wrote Secretary
Gresham, “the Government of Brazil has issued instructions, on account of political
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disturbances, forbidding the use of cipher or code words in the telegrams sent to Brazil.”
Eckert added, “these instructions cannot but result in great inconvenience and in the
restriction of business.”59 The Coffee Exchange of the City of New York also expressed
their concern to Gresham when Brazil prohibited all cipher dispatches from the United
States to Brazil, while allowing messages from Brazil to the United States: “this places
our merchants, and especially the coffee trade of the United States, at a great
disadvantage and under heavy expense.”60
On September 6, 1893, while the Brazilian government and the U.S. dealt with
disturbances to international trade due to the political instabilities in the Southern Brazil,
the Brazilian Navy stationed at Rio de Janeiro under Mello’s command, revolted against
the Brazilian government. Two days after the beginning of the revolt, Gresham urged
Thomas L. Thompson, the head of the U.S. Legation in Brazil, “to concert with other
legations and make by separate note representations of the Brazilian Government in
regard to the suspension of telegraphic intercourse, by which, especially at this time,
commerce suffers serious injury.”61 The conflict had now expanded from Southern Brazil
to the capital, Rio de Janeiro, the most significant international trade port in Brazil.
Adding to the challenge of international trade, the insurgent navy’s strategy would rely
on the forts and ports of the town, a commercial risk that the European powers and the
U.S. could not take in the 1890s. This strategy complicated the actions of the foreign
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navies stationed at Rio de Janeiro, whose neutrality remained ambiguous, a crucial factor
I will explore later.
In his Manifesto, Mello accused Vice President Peixoto of ruling by dictatorship
and corruption and asked that he resign. As Minister of Marine, Mello had insisted on a
peaceful resolution to the conflict in the south, claiming that the weak government in Rio
Grande do Sul would not last. Retired Brazilian Admiral Eduardo Wandenkolk, former
member of the national senate, had previously tried to coordinate an alliance between Rio
Grande do Sul rebels and the navy, but he was captured.62 In his criticism of Peixoto’s
action in sending the Brazilian Army to put down the revolt in the South, Mello
explained, “Against whom? Against outside enemies? Against foreigners? No. The
president of the Republic armed Brazilians; against Brazilians he raised legions of so
called patriots, carrying mourning, desolation, and misery to all corners of the Republic,
merely in order to satisfy his personal caprice and to strengthen for the future, by terror,
his iron dictatorship.”63
In 1895, Mello published his own views on the 1891 counter coup against
Marshal Deodoro, which he had also led, in a short monograph titled, A Historia da
Revolta da Armada de 1891. Mello’s work not only reveals the reasons behind the 1891
revolt, but it offers an important insight into the political instabilities since 1889, as well
as the views of a prominent navy officer, who had helped shape the early years of the
republic, and who led the 1893-94 naval revolt. Since to Mello the 1893 navy revolt was
grounded on the same principles as the 1891 revolt against Fonseca: corruption and rule
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by dictatorship, his 1895 publication can also shed a light on the 1893-94 naval revolt.
Former President Fonseca had dissolved the Congress in the November 3, 1891 coup,
which Mello believed was a threat to the Republic.64 To Mello, the Navy Revolt of 1891
was an effort to preserve the law and the republic. As he writes, “from the Admiral to the
inexperienced sailor, all united only thinking of the moralization of our homeland, and
consequently, its progress, and how this need can only be obtained through a republicantype government that has for a while meant order, liberty, and fraternity….65 Mello
continued, “those who today condemn the Revolution of September 6,” 1893, “supported
the reaction against the coup d’état of November 3, 1891…” for they believed in the
legality of the Peixoto regime. However, Mello asserts that the Peixoto regime was no
more legal than Fonseca’s regime.66 As Mello stated, “no: the truth is that they condemn
the revolution of September 6, like they would have condemned the reaction to the Coup
d’etat, had the legality cause not been triumphant…” To the Admiral, in 1893, those who
opposed the navy revolt chose to support the Brazilian government out of convenience,
not based on principles.67 Moreover, to Mello, Peixoto’s government was just as
tyrannical as Marshal Deodoro’s regime, and hence he expected that the people and state
governors would have supported his cause like they done in 1891. Mello believed that
had the 1893 revolt been triumphant, the state governments would also recognize the
legality of this movement.68 This is an important strategy on the part of Mello to obtain
international support for the revolt, especially after the insurgents announced the creation
64
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of a provisional government in Southern Brazil. Affirming that the state governments
would follow given his victory could allure the great powers to more quickly recognize
the insurgents as belligerents, a factor that proved decisive in the outcome of the revolt.69
The revolt of 1893 had exposed the vulnerability of the new republic and its
consequence to U.S. Latin American trade and fearing a British conspiracy, America’s
quest for hegemony and security in the region. Hence, the U.S. government turned to its
navy to protect the U.S. interests in Brazil. As Schoultz points out in Beneath the United
States, “what the United States discovered when it began looking for overseas customers,
was a neomerchantilist world where navies controlled access to markets.”70 The Brazilian
Navy Revolt gave America’s New Navy the opportunity to test its new purpose in
carrying their nation’s foreign policy, insuring that United States’ interests prevailed
abroad. President Cleveland, whose second term started in 1893, had also supported the
building of a modern navy fleet. In fact, historian David Mislan points to Cleveland’s
growing concerns with foreign policy towards the end of his second term, challenging
historians who characterized Cleveland’s foreign policy as isolationist.71 Instead, Mislan
characterized Cleveland’s foreign policy as “based on the preservation of American
autonomy and respect for sovereignty and international law.” He added that Cleveland
“paid close attention to British and German behavior in the Western Hemisphere and the
Pacific Ocean.”72 In fact, the concern with British and German influence in Brazil helped
shape the U.S. approach in that country in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century.
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The next chapter will look at the Brazilian naval revolt of 1893-94 more closely,
highlighting the contributions of the American Navy officers, and their interactions with
the naval insurgents, the U.S. State Department, and the Brazilian government.
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Chapter 3: The United States Intervention in The Brazilian Navy Revolt of
1893/1894, Part II: Testing the “New Navy.”

Introduction:
This chapter explores the U.S. involvement in the Brazilian naval revolt of 189394, focusing on the contributions of the U.S. Navy officers. Initially, the U.S. government
pursued a balanced policy towards the naval revolt, wary of negotiations with the
Brazilian government and the insurgents. Although recognizing the need for a strong
navy fleet at the Rio de Janeiro harbor, the U.S. announced its neutrality. In order to
guarantee the safe passage of American merchant vessels in the harbor, the State
Department had to carefully maneuver between both the insurgents’ and the Brazilian
government’s demands. On September 7, 1893, U.S. Legation on Brazil, Thomas L.
Thompson reported to Secretary of State Walter Q. Gresham that, “on the previous night
the representatives of France, Great Britain, Germany, Italy, and Portugal all, with
himself, declined, for the purpose of maintaining a strict reserve with regard to political
events in Brazil, to attend a conference to which they had been invited by the Vice
President of Brazil in which measures to adopt in the event of bombardment were to be
discussed with him.”1 Gresham also urged Thompson not to recognize the insurgents as
belligerents, for it would be “an unfriendly act toward Brazil and a gratuitous
demonstration of moral support to the rebellion, the insurgents having not, apparently, up
to date established and maintained a political organization which would justify such

1

7 September 1893, Mr. Thompson to Mr. Gresham, Section 34, 46,
https://uwdc.library.wisc.edu/collections/frus/; accessed on September 22, 2016, Foreign
Relations of the United States (FRUS); hereafter, Section 34, FRUS.

53

recognition on the part of the United States.”2 Moreover, giving belligerent status to the
insurgents would prompt the United States to recognize the insurgents’ rights to expand
and protect their line of fire through commercial blockades, and, therefore, be forced to
limit the passage of American merchant vessels.
The attitude of the U.S. Legation in Brazil however, seemed to lean against the
insurgents. On September 28, Thompson wrote to Gresham that, “the repeated firing on
Rio de Janeiro has resulted in the death of many noncombatants and the destruction of
property; says that the further bombardment of the city is a danger to American life and
property, and that if approved by the Department he will advise that a decided stand be
taken against allowing it against a defenseless city.” He added that, “he has advised the
commanding officer of the Charleston to protect American goods on barges against
seizure by the revolutionists, and to use force if necessary.”3 Thompson continued to
report to the Secretary of State on what he believed was a weak revolt, adding on October
13, 1893, “it is difficult under present conditions to fix the legal status of Admiral de
Mello and the revolting squadron. No favorable demonstration has been made for them
on shore.” Thompson concluded in his note, “they are insurgents without apparent
responsibility or backing.”4 On October 23, requesting to be recognized as belligerents,
Admiral Custodio de Mello wrote to Thompson, “you are witness sir, of the progress of
the revolution of Rio Grande do Sul and of the insurrection of the squadron as well as the
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sympathy that they arouse in the entire country.”5 However, on November 7, Thompson
reported that, “the insurgents do not appear to make any progress, and the daily fighting
at the bay and along the shore are attended with no important results.”6
Some evidence from the Brazilian archives also suggest that the U.S. State
Department and President Cleveland quietly supported the Brazilian government early
on. In 1894, a correspondence between Salvador de Mendonca and the Brazilian Minister
of Foreign Affairs, Carlos de Carvalho, describing how the events had unfolded in
Washington, Mendonca described his meeting with Secretary Gresham. According to
Mendonca, early in the revolt, the Brazilian government had inquired about purchasing
the American war ships USS Charleston and USS Newark, stationed at Rio de Janeiro.
Mendonca wrote, “at this moment the Secretary of State told me he could not sell me the
war ships, but that he could do better than that, taking the side of the Brazilian
government. He added that the principle European nations were ready to cooperate with
him on an intervention that would end the naval revolt at our Capital’s port.” Mendonca
also wrote that Gresham affirmed that if the Brazilian government consented to this
action, to send him a list of the insurgent and foreign war ships at the bay. According to
Mendonca, he explained to Gresham that it would be difficult to convince the Brazilian
government to accept such action, which might find intervention threatening, adding that
the European naval forces, which were superior to that of the U.S. in Rio de Janeiro,
could use this as an opportunity to install a monarchy. According to Mendonca, “at this
moment, Gresham revealed that given the character of the revolt in Brazil, he had had
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conferences with President Cleveland, whose solicitude for the Brazilian government,
suggested a project to initiate intervention before the Europeans imposed on us, to our
discredit.” Mendonca also wrote, “they,” Gresham and Cleveland, “had remembered an
offer of mediation, but gave up on that plan, since its implementation depended on the
recognition of the insurgents as belligerents.” According to Mendonca, Gresham
suggested that, “the intervention could happen under a pretense of protection of the
merchant marine, while the European nations did not possess a solid plan, saying they,”
the Europeans, “only desired the reestablishment of order and peace in Brazil.”7
The correspondence above between Mendonca and Carvalho reveals the U.S.
goals and strategies early in the revolt. Initially, the U.S. sought to protect American
merchant ships in Rio de Janeiro and this dictated most of the American diplomacy
towards the insurgents. Eventually, American policymakers used protection of their
merchant ships to justify the U.S. Navy intervention in the revolt. On the same note,
Mendonca explained that after his conversation with Gresham, Mendonca wrote the
Brazilian government but did not receive an answer, which he interpreted as his
government’s reluctance towards encouraging foreign intervention. Mendonca also said
that, on October 16, 1893, Gresham gave him all the assurances of the U.S. government’s
moral support to the Brazilian government. Mendonca added, “he discussed with me the
possibility of a circular throughout the European Courts, that would declare that any
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intervention on Brazilian domestic conflicts, would be considered by the government of
the United States a violation of the Monroe Doctrine.”8
The U.S. Navy and the Brazilian Navy Revolt of 1893-94:
At the onset of the revolt, the U.S. Representative in Brazil, Thompson, reported
to Secretary Gresham on the presence of foreign naval vessels at the Rio de Janeiro
harbor, “Foreign powers are represented as follows: England, 3; France,1; Italy, 1;
Portugal, 1. Congress is supporting the government. Local trade on land continues as
usual; foreign commerce has been entirely suspended until to-day, when restrictions on
telegraphic communications were partly removed…. No shipments to foreign ports have
been made since the revolt commenced.” On September 8, Thompson also reported to
Gresham that the Brazilian government had declared martial law, and urged Gresham to
send the U.S. Navy.9 Thompson added, “I respect and fully urge the necessity of the
presence of a naval force in Brazilian waters sufficient to protect our commercial
interests and American citizens.”10 To LaFeber, Secretary Gresham, “had to get
American ships into the harbor for the double purpose of keeping American trade flowing
and strengthening the pro-United States elements in Brazil.” Adding, “further, he had to
withhold belligerent status from Mello or else the United States would be forced to allow
Mello to blockade the harbor, stop trade, and probably overthrow the Peixoto
government.”11 Once the U.S. Navy arrived, Thompson reported to Gresham that he had
8
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urged the navy commander to protect American goods on barges against seizure by the
revolutionists and to use force if necessary.12 The New Navy was to fulfill its role of
protecting United States trade in foreign waters, placing the U.S. alongside other
European powers in South America.
Another crucial component of this case study deserves a closer look. Due to the
nature of the revolt, a naval insurrection, the foreign naval commanders and officers were
in direct contact with the insurgents and would, therefore, play a crucial role in the
diplomatic negotiations on behalf of their governments. As Brazilian Navy Captain
Francisco Villar wrote in his memoir, “I have come to analyze some interesting aspects
of the Revolta da Armada,” (how the “Navy Revolt of 1893-94” is referred to in Brazil),
“and show the influence of the intervention of the foreign navies stationed at the
occasion.”13 As Captain Villar explained, “I was a little over 17 years old when Brazil
was launched in the unlucky September 6 revolution.”14 Captain Villar asserted, “ever
since the beginning of the movement, the intervention of the foreign naval forces here
stationed impeded any idea of an attack against the capital of the Republic by the
revolutionary ships.”15
On September 9, Secretary of State Gresham wrote to Thompson, “the USS
Detroit has been “ordered to proceed to Rio de Janeiro and that the Charleston will
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probably arrive there on this day.”16 On September 11, Thompson reported, “Marshal law
has been declared and that commerce and trade are suspended.”17 Thompson also
enclosed a copy of Mello’s speech of 6 September 1893, in which the Admiral explained
the reasons for his actions, condemning the corruption in Peixoto’s government. Mello
concluded his proclamation, “long live the Republic. Long live the constitution,” perhaps
distancing himself from the perception of a monarchist revolt.18 On September 19,
Thompson reported, “there is no apparent improvement in the political situation here, if
indeed is not becoming more complicated. No popular demonstrations on the part of the
people have been made and very little interest is manifested in the contest, which seems
to be confined to the army and navy, the former supporting the President and civil
authority and the latter Admiral Mello…”19
As the U.S. government developed its strategy towards the Brazilian naval revolt
of 1893-94, the U.S. Navy was entrusted to carry on the State Department’s neutrality
policy as well as the protection of American trade. On September 26, 1893, the U.S.
Cruiser USS Charleston arrived at the Rio de Janeiro harbor. Acting U.S. Secretary of the
Department of State, Edward Henry Strobel, instructed Thomas Thompson on September
28, 1893, at the request of the Navy Department, “to furnish the commanding officer of
the USS Charleston with a copy of order to the effect that further destruction and
bloodshed should be prevented by the exertion of all the moral force of the Government
16
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of the United States, by protest and otherwise, and that the protection of American
persons and property should be made the object of every possible effort.”20 Thompson
wrote Gresham that the very next day he met with the USS Charleston’s Commander,
Captain Henry F. Picking. Thompson instructed Captain Picking that, “everything
possible within the scope of international law should be done through the instrumentality
of his force to foster American Commerce and protect American interests.”21 In addition
to securing the passage of American merchant vessels at the Rio de Janeiro port, foreign
naval commanders were also helping to coordinate the rules of international trade in light
of the conflict at the harbor. The U.S. Foreign Minister in Brazil instructed all American
merchant vessels to carry the flag of the United States to ensure protection of the traffic
of their vessels. They could apply for this protection at the United States consulate “or, if
necessity should require, on board the U.S. cruiser Charleston.”22
As evidence of the important role the U.S. Navy would take on the negotiations,
on October 1, 1893, Thompson, met with the representatives of England, Portugal, Italy,
and France, where they agreed to consult with the navy commanders of their respective
nations on Admiral Custodio de Mello’s threat to bombard Rio.23 As Thompson wrote
Gresham, “I conferred with the Representatives of England, Portugal, Italy, and France,
with regard to taking some action to prevent the bombardment of the city, when it was
agreed that we consult the commanders of the warships of our respective governments in
20
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the harbor.” Thompson reported that, “the commanders of the English, Italian, American,
Portuguese, and French Naval forces before Rio de Janeiro have informed Rear Admiral
Mello that they will oppose, by force if necessary, all his attacks upon the city of Rio de
Janeiro.”24 On October 3, 1893, the Brazilian Foreign Minister, Joao Felipe Pereira,
informed the foreign diplomatic representatives that the Vice President “saw with
satisfaction that the commanders of the English, Italian, Portuguese, American, and
French naval forces informed Rear-Admiral Jose Custodio de Mello that if necessary,
they would oppose with force all his undertakings against the city or Rio de Janeiro.”25
In order to protect merchant vessels at the harbor, the foreign naval commanders
also assumed the role of mediators between the Brazilian government and the insurgents.
On October 2, Thompson reported that, “upon the announcement made by the admiral
commanding the revolting war vessels of his intentions to bombard Rio de Janeiro, the
French, Portuguese, Italians, and U.S. ministers held on this day a conference, and
advised the commanders of the foreign vessels, who agreed to do so, to take measures to
prevent such bombardment in case of necessity.”26 The foreign naval commanders urged
the government of Brazil “to deprive Rear- Admiral de Mello of all pretext for hostile
action against the city of Rio de Janeiro,” asserting that, “if these conditions were not
met, they would consult with their respective governments on what actions to take.”27
Upon observing that the Brazilian government disobeyed these orders, the commanders
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threatened to “withdraw the intimation which they addressed to Rear-Admiral de Mello
to abstain from every act of hostility against the city of Rio de Janeiro.” On the same
enclosure, the foreign diplomatic representatives explained to the Brazilian Foreign
Minister that, “the commanders of the naval forces, in bringing these facts to the
knowledge of the representatives of their respective governments, have asked them to
intervene with the federal government in order that it shall give the necessary orders for
the removal of the cannons comprising the batteries actually in the city.” The foreign
naval commanders believed that the presence of the cannons placed by the Brazilian
federal government could provoke the insurgents to attack the city. The Brazilian
Minister of foreign affairs responded that the Vice President “had only placed the
batteries on 12th because he concluded from the inaction of the foreign squadron, in view
of the bombardment of Niteroi and many points of Rio de Janeiro that it considered the
two cities as fortified, and he declared further, that he could not accede to the request for
the reason show, but he promised to order that the batteries should not provoke hostilities
on the part of the revolted squadron, and this resolution was accepted as sufficient.”28
However, the foreign naval commanders disagreed with this assessment.
The representatives of the foreign powers at Rio de Janeiro informed the Brazilian
Foreign Minister that, “is the belief of the foreign commanders the presence of
improvised batteries in the city of Rio de Janeiro had always been the pretext given for a
bombardment.”29 The foreign diplomatic representatives also added, “with regard to the
remark of his excellency the minister of foreign affairs that, contrary to the information,
28
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which had come to the knowledge of the commanders of the foreign naval forces, ‘the
batteries already established had not been strengthened and no new ones had been
established,’ the commanders of said forces, relying upon direct observations and upon
facts of public notoriety, hold to their opinion.”30 As the conflict intensified, it became
clear that only the nations which possessed a navy ship in the harbor were in position to
carry on diplomatic mediations, thus providing support for the contention that the U.S.
needed a strong naval fleet. As Thompson explained to Gresham, “the news that an
accord had been arranged through the mediation of the foreign powers possessing a naval
force in the harbor, and to the effect that the city would not be bombarded nor
provocation given therefore had caused a return of confidence and very general feeling of
security.”31
On October 21, 1893, The USS Newark arrived in Rio de Janeiro. That same day,
Thompson wrote Gresham regarding Admiral Custodio de Mello’s “renewed threat to
bombard Rio de Janeiro, founded on the alleged manufacturing of torpedoes at the
Government arsenal; also a rumor to the effect that Rio de Janeiro will be declared under
blockade.”32 Then, on October 24, 1893, Thompson informed Gresham that he had
received, through the U.S. naval commander, “communication from Admiral Mello
announcing that a Provisional Government of the United States of Brazil was established
on October 14 at Desterro, the Capital of Santa Catharina, in southern Brazil.” Moreover,
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that de Mello had requested belligerent status from the United States.33 As further
evidence of the American naval commanders direct contact with the revolt, on November
10, 1893, Thompson informed Gresham that U.S. Navy commander, Rear-Admiral O.F.
Stanton, delivered to him communication from Admiral de Mello and from the Minister
of Foreign Affairs of the new Provisional government, Annibal Eloy Cardozo. Thompson
hesitantly accepted the letters but was careful not to “acknowledge receipt of the
documents by letter.” Thompson reported to Gresham that “he hesitated to receive them,
but as they came through the medium of our admiral, decided to do so…” which could be
dangerously interpreted as United States acknowledgment of belligerent status had
Thompson done so.34
An incident in October 1893, involving the U.S. Navy Commander in charge of
the South Atlantic forces, O.F. Stanton, highlighted the tensions between the United
States government officials’ diplomatic policies and the navy officer’s actions at the
harbor. On October 20, according to the Brazilian Consul General to the U.S, Stanton
saluted the flag of the insurgent ship. Mendonca explained to Secretary Gresham that the
act indicated recognition of belligerence to the insurgents by the U.S. government.
According to Mendonca, Gresham explained to him that the act was perhaps a
misunderstanding on the part of Stanton, who might not have known that the ship was an
insurgent one. However, on October 22, Thompson went on board the USS Newark to
speak to Stanton. Thompson reported that upon his departure, the insurgent leader,
Admiral Custodio de Mello came on board. Thompson wrote, “when the visitor was
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announced I signified my desire to leave, but it was not convenient for me to do so at
once, and a few minutes later I was introduced by Admiral Stanton to the commander of
the insurgent naval forces.” Thompson also observed that Mello’s visit was of “social
character, as no allusion whatever was made to politics of the revolution.” Reporting on
Stanton’s behavior, Thompson emphasized that he “saw nothing whatever to indicate
partiality on the part of Admiral Stanton.”35
Mendonca also communicated with Gresham about the visit, “the leader of the
revolt visited the Newark, and was saluted upon leaving.”36 Whether Stanton favored the
Brazilian insurgents over the Brazilian government remains unclear, but his actions
violated crucial neutrality laws. Stanton’s actions infuriated the Brazilian government,
complicating the relationship between the United States government and Brazil. The U.S.
had no choice but to dismiss Stanton from command. In fact, Secretary Gresham’s wife,
Matilda Gresham, remembered, “when Rear-Admiral Stanton saluted the insurgent flag,
he was recalled and Rear-Admiral [Andrew Ellicott] Benham was sent in his stead.”37
The New York Times also reported on the incident on October 25, 1893, “the peremptory
removal today of Commodore and acting Rear-Admiral Stanton, stationed at Rio de
Janeiro, Brazil, from the command of the South Atlantic Station, was one of the most
starling surprises ever experienced in Washington official life, and for a time it has
almost obscured the interest in the silver fight.” According to the article, U.S. Secretary
of the Navy, Hillary Herbert, issued the following statement, “the navy department

35

10 November 1893Mr.Thompson to Mr.Gresham, Section 34, No70, 72,
https://uwdc.library.wisc.edu/collections/frus/; accessed on September 22, 2016, FRUS.
36
23 December 1894, Salvador Mendonca to Carlos Carvalho, Washington Ofícios, 1893-1896,
File #233/4/11, Arquivo Nacional, (translated by author).
37
Matilda Gresham, Life of Walter Gresham, 1882-1895, Volume II (Chicago: Rand McNally and
Company, 1919), 779.

65

learned by authority late today by telegram from Rear-Admiral Stanton, in command of
the Naval Forces at Rio de Janeiro, that this officer had saluted the flag of Admiral Mello,
commanding the insurgent fleet. This salute was unauthorized by any instructions the
Admiral had received.” Moreover, “it was an unfriendly act towards a friendly power,
and the Secretary of Navy after consulting with the President and the Secretary of State,
issued an order detaching Admiral Stanton from command of his squadron, and turning it
over to Captain Picking, the next officer in rank.” The article added that, “Commander
Stanton had been specially selected for his post of duty because he was considered to
possess in a pre-eminent degree those qualifications of coolness and discretion which
fitted him to deal with the revolutionary conditions prevailing in the various countries to
which his assignment would naturally call him.” The New York Times also noted that,
“one of the highest officers in the service, who probably influenced in no small degree
Commodore Stanton’s appointment remarked today, ‘this matter is as much as surprise to
me as a slap in the face would be.’”38
The challenging situation that the foreign navy commanders faced at Rio de
Janeiro was not limited to Stanton. Navigating between the insurgents’ line of fire,
protection of trade, and their roles as agents of diplomacy, placed them in a difficult
situation. The Brazilian Captain of the Port in Rio de Janeiro, Jose Pinto da Luz, wrote to
the Brazilian Minister of War on October 10, 1893, “it is worth noting that in the islands
close to Niteroi,” across the Rio de Janeiro bay, “there are foreign navies whose captains,
by solicitation of their consuls, have gone on board, being very possible that some of
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them communicated with that city and the insurgents, which the authorities of Rio de
Janeiro should observe, as to provide an prohibitive act for the relationship between the
captains of the foreign navies in front of Mocangue, Vianna, and Conceição Islands, to
bring protests from their diplomatic representatives.”39 On October 21, Brazilian Minister
of Marine, Firmino Chaves, also stated his disapproval of the foreign navy commanders’
conduct since the start of the revolt to the Brazilian Minister of Foreign Relations.
Chaves reported that the commanders had moved their ships at the request of the leader
of the revolt, without the approval of the Office of the Minister of Marine. Chaves also
complained that the foreign commanders did not seem to care when the insurgents seized
their merchant vessels, an act Chaves viewed as supporting the revolt. Chaves added that,
since the beginning of the revolt, the commanders also failed to officially visit or present
themselves to the Minister of the Marine, as it had been customary. Chaves ended by
urging the Brazilian Minister of Foreign Affairs to deal with this urgent issue.40
Moreover, Chaves wrote to the Brazilian Minister of Foreign Affairs that he feared the
insurgent ships were too close to the foreign navy ships, perhaps using them as a
protective barrier because if the Brazilian government was to fire and hit the foreign navy
ships by mistake, it would provoke a conflict.41
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The revolt took on a new life when, on December 10, 1893, renowned Brazilian
Admiral Saldanha da Gama, then director of the Brazilian Naval School, informed
Captain Henry Picking that he had taken command of the insurgent forces in Rio de
Janeiro. Mello had travelled to Southern Brazil to assess their progress in that region.
Critics of the revolt have pointed to da Gama’s strong support of monarchy as another
evidence of a monarchist conspiracy. For instance, prior to da Gama announcing his
support, the head of the U.S. Legation in Brazil, Thomas L. Thompson, wrote to
Gresham, “the admiral is reputed to be an avowed monarchist. It is said he does not
hesitate to proclaim himself on all occasions in favor of the reestablishment of the
Empire, and that he declined, for that reason, to accept appointment from the Republic.”42
Rumors that the British were conspiring on the side of the insurgents intensified.
As historian Lars Schoultz pointed, “Great Britain was the principal European competitor
for Latin American markets.”43 Moreover, the Brazilian Council to the U.S., Salvador de
Mendonca, noted a change in Gresham’s attitude towards the revolt. According to
Mendonca, Cleveland, and Gresham had previously communicated with him regarding
their intervention plans, in conjunction with the English government. Mendonca
however, had not received a prompt answer from the Brazilian government regarding the
U.S. government’s plans. Mendonca noted that, “Gresham no longer opened up to him
like he had done up to that point, and he noted that the European diplomacy sought to
influence Gresham’s spirit, like they had done to Thompson,” of the Legation of the U.S.
in Rio de Janeiro, “and Mr. Picking,” the U.S. Commander in charge after Stanton’s
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departure. Mendonca feared that European diplomacy might persuade the U.S. to allow
the restoration of monarchy if the Brazilians desired, and if stability in Brazil would favor
both European and American trade.44
The U.S. was now dealing with a more powerful insurgent force, which might
have been able to achieve belligerent status, forcing the U.S. to recognize a muchdreaded commercial blockade. It also prompted the U.S. government to deal with the
possibility of a British conspiracy to support the insurgents’ cause, allowing the
monarchy to be restored in Brazil, which would favor British trade and political influence
in the region. As Thompson had observed on December 13, 1893, prior to da Gama
formerly announcing his support to the revolt, “the Brazilian harbor Villegagnon,” in Rio
de Janeiro, “as well as Admiral Saldanha de Gama, commander of the Brazilian naval
school and arsenal located in Ilha das Cobras have so far remained neutral in the
conflict.” According to Thompson however, da Gama was an “avowed monarchist,” and
that he seems to be “in sympathy with the insurgents.”45
On December 13, 1893, Thompson informed Gresham that in an interview with
the Brazilian Minister of Foreign Affairs, “he exhibited confidentially and affidavit the
commandant of the British naval forces offered munitions of war to insurgents on behalf
of his government.” Moreover, the Minister had declared, “that the object of the
insurgents from now on will be the restoration of the empire.”46 Brazilian historian Hélio
Leôncio Martins viewed Mendonca’s actions as a strategy to obtain U.S. State
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Department support. According to Martins, Mendonca used two arguments, “the
monarchy tendency of Saldanha evident in his manifest, and the necessity of
accomplishing the Monroe Doctrine proclaiming ‘America for the Americans,’ which
was being severely hit by European intervention.”47
Political instability continued to plague the Brazilian government. On November
18, Thompson reported an unfolding conflict in Pernambuco, in northeast Brazil.
Thompson sent “a request of the United States consul at Pernambuco, where, according
to a prevalent report, the citizens and troops have been engaged in a conflict, that at the
instance of American citizens a war vessel of the United States be sent to that Port.”48
Gresham, “remarking that Mr. Thompson’s telegram of the 19th does not afford a
sufficient basis for instructions,” instructed him to consult with the commander of the
U.S. naval forces, also warning him that, “he should report facts and not rumors.”49
Meanwhile, da Gama’s leadership at the harbor continued to spread fears of a
monarchy restoration aided by the British. On December 14, 1893, Thompson reported to
Secretary Gresham: “da Gama has informed commanders he will endeavor to prevent
landing merchandise. British naval officers have withdrawn protection.”50 One day later,
Thompson wrote Gresham, “the naval officers of Great Britain have ceased protecting
their shipping upon a notice given by Da Gama to the foreign commanders that he is
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about to make an effort to stop merchandise from being landed.”51 Brazilian Minister of
Finance, Fellisbello Freire, commented on Thompson’s observations of the relationship
between the foreign navy commanders and the revolt once Saldanha joined. According to
Freire, Thompson wrote Gresham on December 31, 1893, “before this time (command of
Admiral Saldanha), all of the foreign governments represented by the naval forces,
assumed and maintained a similar position as our government… when all of a sudden, the
foreign commanders completely cut all communication with the land, with the British
authorities giving an order that the commandants would no longer give protection.”52
According to LaFeber, “Gresham especially feared the withdrawal of the British
fleet protection, for he believed it would be a prelude to recognizing da Gama’s
belligerency.”53 In her memoir, Gresham’s wife wrote, “the sympathy of the British
shipping interests at Rio, the activity of the monarchists in Lisbon, London and Paris, and
the large sums of money spent by the Duc de Montpensier of Spain, the head of the
Bourbon family, and immensely rich, made it a question of much concern to our
government.” Mrs. Gresham also recalls a letter that her husband wrote to Mr. Isadore
Strauss, who spoke on behalf of American businesses in Brazil. According to Mrs.
Gresham, in response to the threat of monarchy, Secretary Gresham wrote, “the
administration has not neglected anything necessary for the protection of American
interests at Rio, and I can say to you in confidence, that should European powers attempt
to reestablish the monarchy in Brazil, the Monroe Doctrine will not only be asserted but
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maintained.”54 Regarding the relevance of her husband’s actions, and the significance of
the outcome of the naval revolt, Mrs. Gresham wrote, “this was the last attempt on the
Western Hemisphere to restore Monarchy.”55
Some Brazilian newspapers also accused the insurgents of being monarchists. As
one article noted on December 30, 1893, the insurgents “shot one of their thick canons in
that direction and saw that the Republic doesn’t sleep,” since the government fired back,
“when in front of you, you have a bunch of monarchists.”56 There were also rumors that
Princess Isabel’s husband, Conde D’Eu, was to be declared emperor of Brazil by Mello;
Princess Isabel, who had signed the “Golden law” which abolished slavery in Brazil in
1888, was the daughter of former Brazilian Emperor Dom Pedro II. As the Brazilian
article pointed out, “the platonic proclamation of Conde D’Eu as emperor, is very
possible, having Admiral Mello, in fact, since a few days, according to private telegrams,
left the comedy of the Savior of the Republic, and confessed that he would work towards
monarchy.”57 On January 22, another newspaper reported, “to contribute to the
population’s doubts, the constant entrances of the British war ships Sirius and Beagle,
whose neutrality, as we already mentioned, no one believes…” The article also accused
the British war ships of surveying the bay for the benefit of the insurgents, adding that
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even if these speculations are inaccurate, “there is always a doubt among the patriots that
never believed the lies from the British Navy Squadron.”58
Others viewed da Gama’s motives as more complex than the mere desire to
restore monarchy. As Brazilian Captain Villar’s memoirs revealed, “I, only a simple
candidate in the second year of the Naval School… felt a vivid curiosity for the
revolt…”59 Villar spoke of the Director of the Naval School, da Gama, “Admiral
Saldanha could sense our anxiety and profoundly penetrated our feelings.” To Villar, da
Gama viewed the rebellion as an impediment to the creation of a new and more
prestigious navy in Brazil. According to Villar, to da Gama, the revolt “would make it
impossible to restore Brazilian naval power.”60 To da Gama, “it would never again be
possible to ally such exigencies;” the Admiral believed that a strong navy needed to be
extremely focused and disciplined, free of “variable rumors of party politics
competitions, who ruin everything.”61 In fact, da Gama feared that if the navy continued
to get involved in political conflicts, it would be impossible for it to develop into a strong,
stable and respectable institution. When the Brazilian Navy had secretly met prior to
revolting on September 1893, Villar asserted that, “Saldanha da Gama did not participate
in the conspiracy… he absolutely reprimanded the movement.”62
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A closer evaluation of da Gama’s writings also reveals the more complex
dynamics of the revolt. First, the Admiral was careful to affirm that he had not promoted
the naval revolution, but was dragged into it due to how events had unfolded since the
start of the revolt.63 When da Gama finally joined the revolt, he asserted that his motives
were to combat militarism, as evident in his manifest of December 7, 1893. In fact, da
Gama called the republic of 1889, which had been created by the removal of Dom Pedro
II through a coup, a product of militarism, and that the current government was nothing
more than a continuation of this militarism. Critical of the military coup that overthrew
the empire, in his Manifesto, da Gama, wrote, “the respect, however, which is due to the
will of the nation, freely expressed, tells us that it is proper for it to choose, on its own
responsibility, the kind of institutions that it desires to adopt.”64 Da Gama also criticized
the Brazilian Army for defending a government that, in his opinion, had lost the public’s
support and its international prestige. The Admiral urged Brazilians to support the Navy
Revolution of 1893, also calling the rebellion in Rio Grande do Sul their opportunity for
“political redemption,” and their chance to expunge the “slavery into which the
militarism of 1889 wants to retain them in.”65 This section of his manifesto suggests his
distaste for the republic of 1889, perhaps leading his critics to view his disdain as proof
of his monarchist tendencies and true motives for joining the revolt.
As fears of a monarchist conspiracy intensified, on December 5, Thompson wrote
Gresham on the issue of bombardment of the city, and the foreign naval commanders’
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position. Thompson noted, “the government is situated within the corporate limits of the
city of Rio de Janeiro and cannot be deprived of the right to defend itself from assault.
The city has remained unfortified, but infantry with small arms are stationed near the
shore to prevent the approach of insurgent launches to land troops.” Thompson reported
that “many men, women, and children have been killed at points far removed from the
location of the infantry on the city port, and the commanders of the foreign naval forces
declined to interfere to prevent the indiscriminate firing.” Thompson added, “I foresaw
this difficulty and suggested that the naval commanders should require the insurgents to
give notice of any intention to bombard the city.” Importantly, Thompson reported, “they
did not, however, think they could do that, because in warning Mello not to bombard they
had assumed an attitude of hostility to the insurgents.”66 Thompson included the
communication from November 17, between the Diplomatic corps to the Brazilian
Minister of Foreign Affairs regarding the bombardment issues. The Diplomatic corps
wrote that, “the foreign naval forces in the bay of Rio de Janeiro having examined the
complaints made on the 8th instant to the dean of the diplomatic corps are of the opinion
that the fire directed upon the city of Rio de Janeiro by Fort Villegaignon and the
Aquidaban,” an insurgent ship, “with machine guns was provoked by the incessant firing
of inexperienced troops sanctioned along the shore of the city.”67
In regards to the insurgents’ strategy in Rio de Janeiro, da Gama added that like
his predecessor, he would also not fire “with great guns from the fleet against the city
unless some very urgent circumstances or unless the batteries on shore shall provoke such
66
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fire.” On the same note, da Gama also requested that Captain Picking relay his goals to
the diplomatic representatives of the U.S. Admiral da Gama ended by offering Picking
his “personal esteem and distinct consideration.”68 Da Gama’s direct communication with
Captain Picking also highlights the role of the New Navy as informal diplomats in
foreign waters. As naval commanders assumed a diplomatic role, the situation escalated
when Picking’s assessment of the conflict and of the U.S. State Department’s instructions
differed from that of the United States Legation in Brazil. On December 13, Thompson
reported to Gresham that, “he has had an interview with the minister of foreign affairs of
the Federal government, who declared on behalf of the same, that the restoration of the
Empire will be henceforth the object of the insurgents.”69 On December 14, Thompson
reported that, “the naval officers of Great Britain have ceased protecting their shipping
upon notice given by da Gama to the foreign commanders that he is about to make an
effort to stop merchandise from being landed.”70 A few days later, Thompson announced
to Gresham that, “the commanding officers have ceased to interfere for the protection of
commerce.” Thompson added that, “it appears from the protest of American vessels that
Capt. Picking, the senior officer of United States forces, has also withdrawn
intervention;” also noting that he had been unable to verify such information as “Capt.
Picking does not communicate with the land.”71
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As the revolt continued to gain momentum from da Gama’s support, the tensions
between Thompson and Picking intensified. On December 21, 1893, Thompson wrote
Gresham that, “merchant vessels, a few days since, by order of the government moved
from their anchorage near islands Enxadas, Cobras and Santa Barbara.” Thompson
added, “American vessels with the full permission of the proper authorities to discharge
in this neighborhood and at docks have been denied protection by Picking, upon the
ground that they would interfere with insurgent line of fire and therefore would be a
violation of the neutrality.” Thompson argued that the insurgents’ fire was “desultory and
not confined to any one locality in the bay.” Moreover, Thompson added that Picking’s
refusal to protect merchant vessels “will be serious impediments to our commerce.”72
The protection of commerce had been the most important concern to the foreign
representatives, but Picking’s refusal presented a challenge to the Legation of the U.S. in
Rio de Janeiro. On December 31, 1893, the representatives of Great Britain, Italy, the
United States, France and Portugal sent a request to their respective naval forces. The
representatives feared that da Gama’s plan to prevent merchant vessels from entering the
harbor would hinder foreign trade. The foreign representatives begged the naval
commanders to “observe that such pretension would hamper the commercial operations
of the foreigners which the said representatives and commanding officers are charged by
their respective government with the duty of protecting.”73
It is also evident that the navy commanders were acting on their own judgment at
times and negotiated with the insurgents on where they should anchor their ships at the
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harbor. Brazilian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Cassiano Nascimento, sent a letter to the
British Foreign Minister to Brazil, Hugh Wyndham, concerning the recent change in
anchorage of the foreign ships. Nascimento informed Wyndham, “as to the anchorage of
the ships of war, it has not been changed by the Government.” Nascimento added that,
“the change was made by the commanders of the foreign naval vessels who, without
asking permission from the competent local authority and accepting an invitation from
M.de Mello, anchored in the part of the bay where they now are.”74 According to the
Brazilian Consul General to the U.S., on October 18, Gresham had expressed Picking’s
complaints in regards to the Brazilian government changing of docking location for the
merchant ships. Upon receiving this communication, fearing the withdrawal of U.S.
support, Mendonca noted, “I comprehended that the crisis I had anticipated for a month
and had expected would arrive at any moment… and that the U.S. had lost their faith in
the victory of the Brazilian Republican government.” Mendonca feared that the U.S. had
started to compare the Brazilian conflict to the Chilean crisis.75 Mendonca added, “in a
less than reconciliatory tone, Gresham told me that Mr. Picking said that our government,
after ordering that the merchant ships leave the dock between Cobras and Enxadas
Islands to the back of the Bay, that there they were refused barges for unloading.” As a
result, Captain Picking believed that this action forced the merchant ships to interfere
with the line of fire of the insurgents. Importantly, remembering this incident, Mendonca
wrote that Gresham had told him that he would follow Picking’s advice. At this point,
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Mendonca reminded Gresham of the monarchist character of the revolt. When Gresham
asked how Mendonca arrived at such conclusion, Mendonca explained, “the telegram that
you showed me from Picking is sufficient, that he was playing the game of the English
Lang,” the British Captain.76
On December 31, 1893, da Gama sent a note to Picking directly requesting for the
recognition of insurgents as belligerents, based on increasing popular support for the
rebels’ cause as well as the insurgents’ military accomplishments. Da Gama asserted, “in
view of what I have just presented to your Excellency, and of the manifest public
sympathy with the cause of the revolution, you can no longer have any hesitation on the
ground of neutrality, which might hinder or delay our recognition as belligerents on the
part of the nations, like that which your excellency represents, more directly interested in
the affairs of Brazil.” Da Gama ended his note requesting that Captain Picking intervene
on his behalf to the diplomatic representatives of the United States.77
On December 31, Thompson wrote to Gresham regarding Picking’s actions at the
harbor. Thompson wrote, “Captain Henry F. Picking, U.S Navy, commanding naval
forces, South Atlantic Station, is denying protection to certain American vessels which
were about to unload cargoes at the port of Rio de Janeiro in a zone described by the
islands of Cobras, Enxadas, and Santa Barbara.” Thompson added, “Capt. Picking still
adheres to his decision in this matter, and that the commercial operations of American
vessels are now carried on by the sufferance of the insurgent commander.” Thompson
continued, “this unfortunate situation arose through the construction placed upon your
76
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instructions to me of November 1 by Capt Picking, who contends that the question of
protection to life in commercial operations is not included therein, and, therefore, he can
not guarantee safety to persons so engaged.”78 Gresham’s instructions had indeed created
a loophole, for it had stated that American ships could move into shore, given that they
do not interfere with the insurgents’ line of fire.79 The instructions from Gresham to
Thompson on November 1, 1893, were as follows:
“There having been no recognition by the United States of the
insurgents as belligerents and there been no pretense that the port of
Rio is blockaded, it is clear that if an American ship anchored in the
harbor employs barges and lighters in transferring her cargo to the
shore in the usual way and in doing so does not cross or otherwise
interfere with Mello’s line of fire and he seizes or attempts to seize the
barges or lighters, he can and should be resisted. You will deliver or
send a copy of this instructions to the commander of the insurgents.”80
These instructions placed Picking in a very difficult and peculiar position, for it
allowed him to act on his own judgment on how to implement American neutrality
policy. Explaining his assessment of the line of fire, Picking wrote, “as the government
had by order of the Captain of the Port, directed the removal of all vessels anchored in the
above described zone in order that an attack might be made upon those islands it became
the line of fire, and vessels anchored there or at the docks bordering on the zone could not
be protected.”81 The Captain of the Port in Brazil had indeed requested that merchant
ships be removed from the insurgents’ line of fire. Thompson however, questioned
Picking on what a line of fire actually meant in the conflict. Thompson insisted that
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permitting the insurgents to blockade the foreign merchant vessels’ operations “when
they have complied with all legal requirements of the port, is practically recognizing an
illegal blockade of commerce.” Thompson added, “admitting for argument that you are
right in deciding that the zone described embraces the line of fire of the insurgents, can
the line be imaginary? If so, has not the entire bay been from the beginning a line of
fire?” Thompson asked, “have the insurgents (not having been recognized) a right to
forcibly stop the carrying on of our commerce with Brazil? Your position seems to give
an affirmative answer.”82 As Brazilian writer and abolitionist Joaquim Nabuco explained
in his book on the foreign intervention in the revolt, “the question between the American
foreign minister and his commander consisted of what that line of fire meant.”83 Nabuco
would later become the first Brazilian Ambassador to the U.S. in 1905. Thompson’s
response highlighted a bigger ongoing concern of the U.S. government. As Thompson
pointed out, if the insurgents “can object to commerce being carried on by American
ships at the docks, they can extend that objection to any other part of the bay, and so
cause an effective blockade to the port.”84
The tension between the Legation of the U.S. in Brazil and the U.S. Navy was
evident through the correspondences between Thompson and Picking. In response to
Thompson’s request of December 22, Picking answered, “I have the honor to
acknowledge the receipt of your communication of the 22nd instant. I acted on your
advice once, very much to my regret ever since. I have informed you of this verbally
82
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heretofore.”85 Although Picking’s letter does not specify what specific advice he is
referring to, the point of contention between Thompson and Picking had been the line of
fire of the insurgents, and the protection of American trade. Thompson’s December 22
letter to Picking had challenged the Captain’s assessment of the insurgents’ line of fire,
reiterating the damage that such judgment could cause to American trade in Brazil.86
Gresham’s instructions about not interfering with Mello’s line of fire, allowed
Picking to evaluate what constituted a line of fire and how to best further American
neutrality policy, even though belligerent rights had not officially been given by his
government. Even if unintentionally, Gresham’s instructions from November 1, forced
Picking to weigh his own judgment of where the line of fire was, fearing that perhaps a
bad call on his part would endanger the city. Picking explained, “I desire to protect
absolutely all the United States commerce but cannot do this in the discharging berths
without affording aid materially to the side of the Brazilian Government and interfering
with the operations of the insurgents.” Picking added, “I study carefully the interests of
sixty-five million citizens to prevent serious complications as against the interests those
citizens connected with nine United States merchants’ vessels which may be delayed only
for a short time longer…”87
Regarding the crucial role of the U.S. navy to the protection of trade, Thompson
made it clear to Secretary of State Gresham that, since “the object of the insurgents being
to deprive the Government of the revenues of custom-house, there can be no assurance of
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it without the moral support of the naval forces of the powers respectively interested.”88
Clearly the U.S Navy commanders were to play a key role in carrying on the State
Department’s policy towards the Brazilian conflict. Picking’s actions and diplomatic
conduct towards the insurgents based on his own assessment of the State Department’s
instructions, threatened the U.S. government interests in the outcome of the Brazilian
Naval Revolt. Brazilian Minister of Finance, Freire, accused Picking’s judgment of
aiding the insurgents, for it allowed them to form the illegal blockade they so desired.
According to Freire, “in Commander Picking’s opinion, they should deny protection of
the ships anchored in the zone formed by the Enxadas, Cobra, and Santa Barbara Islands
and to those that were berthed at the docking area, together with this zone, for the reason
that they were in the line of fire of the insurgents.”89
Picking was eventually dismissed from command, and Rear-Admiral Andrew
Ellicott Kennedy Benham took over the command of the U.S. Navy fleet in Rio de
Janeiro. In his note to the Brazilian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mendonca wrote that an
hour after his conversation with Gresham back in Washington regarding the fears of a
monarchy conspiracy, that the Secretary informed him that President Cleveland had
denied recognition of belligerence to da Gama. Moreover, that “Rear-Admiral Benham,
stationed at the Trinidad Island waiting for orders, would receive instructions to proceed
to Rio de Janeiro full force, and end the insurgent blockade, substituting Captain
Picking.” Mendonca also wrote that Gresham would relocate Thompson from Petropolis,
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which is about forty miles from Rio, to Rio de Janeiro City, so that he is not close to the
European diplomats.90
Highlighting the increasing U.S. influence in the conflict, once the USS San
Francisco and USS New York arrived, “the American navy became the most powerful
fleet in the harbor.”91 Considering a possible British conspiracy and Picking’s actions,
Gresham needed assurance that the powerful U.S. Navy fleet at the harbor would protect
American interests. Still worried about maintaining U.S. neutrality, following a conflict
between Benham and the insurgents, on January 30, 1894, Gresham inquired whether
there had been any changes in the “attitude of the naval forces of the United States
towards the Government of Brazil and the insurgents since Capt. Picking was relieved of
the command.” Gresham also inquired about Benham’s opinion on the revolution and
“whether the merchants of the United States are now enjoying any protection that was not
theretofore accorded by Picking.”92 Benham took a more assertive position against the
insurgents, claiming his mission to protect American life and American trade at all costs
under international laws guidelines. According to Nabuco, Picking and Benham differed
in their tactics and judgment of the line of fire. Nabuco asserts, Picking’s “justification
was that since the Brazilian Captain of the Port had ordered that the ships anchored at
Enxadas, Cobras and Santa Barbara Islands move away from those docks in order that
they are not exposed to the land fire, this would have in turn become the line of fire.”
Hence the ships docked around there, interfering with the line of fire, could not be
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protected as Gresham’s November 1 note had instructed the Commander. Nabuco
observed, “Admiral Benham interpreted those instructions differently, which resulted in
the conflict between him,” Benham, “and Saldanha.”93
According to Mrs. Gresham, upon arrival, Benham communicated to Vice
President Peixoto, “that he would be willing, as an individual, to intervene to bring the
naval revolt to an honorable termination.”94 The British Commander of the Racer in Rio
de Janeiro wrote to the Secretary of the British Admiralty on January 28, 1894 that he
had consulted with Benham. The British Commander reported, “on the 26th instant, a
conference of foreign naval commanders assembled on board of the San Francisco, to
consider this question of landing coal. It was decided that as the insurgents had no
belligerent rights, they could not prevent goods from any kind of being landed, but that it
would be necessary to use force in order that foreign commerce might be protected.”
Adding that, “the American Admiral stated that he was prepared to act, but the German
Commander wished first to communicate with his minister.”95
Da Gama also wrote a letter to the Commander of the English Forces, noting a
change in the negotiations since Benham took command, “all the ships lying in this port,
whether war ships or merchant ships, were witnesses of the opposition, as serious as it
was ostentatious, which the Squadron under my command suffered yesterday morning
from the Naval forces under the orders Rear Admiral Benham of the United States
Navy…” Regarding the issue of trade, he continued, “the measures adopted by the forces
93
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under my command have never been of such a kind as to prejudice the interest of foreign
commerce…” Da Gama explained, “on the contrary, a ‘modus vivendi’ has been arrived
at by us according to which, instead of merchant ship laying alongside the wharves of the
city, which would embarrass our military operations, we have agreed to allow the
circulation in the waters of the port under the protection of foreign flags, of tugs,
launches and lighters, which are by nature Brazilian and therefore liable to be seized by
us.” Regarding Benham’s actions, he noted, “these measures have been until now
accepted and respected by the commanders of the foreign naval forces lying in this port,
including those of the United States Navy, which has been represented here since the
present situation arose.”96
Regarding the belligerent status and commercial blockade, Benham wrote da
Gama on January 30, 1894, “until belligerent rights are accorded to you, you have no
right to exercise any authority whatsoever over American ships or property of any kind,”
adding that if Admiral da Gama proceeded to implement a blockade, his actions would be
considered “an act of piracy.”97 Benham was, therefore, intolerant of any insurgent act
that would interfere with the safe passage of American merchant vessels. After Benham’s
warning to da Gama, an American merchant vessel tried to pass through the blockade. At
Benham’s orders, shots were exchanged between the USS Detroit, and the Brazilian
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insurgents during the transit, an event that undermined the rebels’ cause and favored the
Brazilian government.98
Brazilian newspapers reported on the event, “in one of the cruellest days and of
great panic of the population of this capital…It was predicted that sooner or later, would
be obligated by force, to respect the landing of ships, especially American ships, in light
of the attitude Captain Benham assumed in regards to the situation.” The article
continued, “today was marked by the docking of three American boats.” The three ships
were looking for the Gamboa docking, being watched by the American Navy. Since
Benham had warned Saldanha, it was expected that the rebellion would respect the
docking. The newspaper continued, “shortly after the boats went in the direction of the
Gamboa, Gil Blas,” the insurgent ship, “launched in their direction in high velocity.”
From there, the newspaper reported that the insurgents started firing against the lines
protected for the docking of ships. According to the article, the American ship Detroit, at
full speed, passed between the Cobras and Enxada islands. Finally, the insurgents, fearing
the intimidation, gave into the Detroit. The article also observed that, “in the meantime,
the entire American Navy fleet positioned themselves in a line of combat… and the
incident ended without major gravity.” Most importantly, the article concluded that it
should be noted that this incident discouraged those supporting the revolt inland, since
they witnessed a demoralizing event to the insurgent cause. Those supporting the
government on the other hand, “applauded Benham’s actions, viewing it as a huge
disaster to the enemy.” In addition, the article concluded that, “after the fact from the day
before, it was predictable that discouragement would reign among the insurgents…the
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most important fact, being the change in the anchorage of the Aquidaban e Tamandare,”
which were crucial insurgent ships.99
Brazilian newspapers had been following the exchanges between da Gama and
Benham. According to a newspaper, on January 30, Benham responded to da Gama,
“permit me to say that a careful reading of the letters I had have had the honor to direct
towards you… all of them refer to acts of violence and interference committed by your
orders against American ships, being I willing to protect them.” Benham clarified, “so
there is no doubt in this matter, it is up to me to say that in no way did I interfere in the
military operations, in either side of the fight in this port- and it is not my intention to do
so. That is not my mission here.” Benham explained the legality his actions, “it is my
duty to protect Americans and American commerce, and that I will do, at any cost;
American ships must not be tangled, either if directed towards the doc, or moving
throughout the ports; with the understanding that they will suffer the consequences if they
place themselves in the line of fire, where there is legitimate hostility. I am not initiating
any principle of action. My way of proceeding is based on the established principles of
international rights.” He also asserted, “there is yet another point that will take care of
once and for all. As long as Belligerent rights is not conceded to you, you will have no
rights to exercise authority over American ships or any property.”100
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The U.S. actions’ impacted the insurgents’ ability to successfully implement a
commercial blockade, and thus favored the Brazilian government.101 As Smith points out,
although Benham claimed neutrality, “his action indicated a refusal to allow Saldanha to
establish the very blockade that would secure recognition of the belligerent rights of the
insurgents.”102 Ultimately, the U.S. neutrality policy not only favored the Brazilian
government but it also had “the fortuitous effect of strengthening diplomatic relations
between the two countries.”103 On February 2, 1894, Thompson reported to Gresham that
the insurgents had removed their commercial restrictions, noting a progress in
international commerce, all due to “the influence of the war vessels of the United States
having stopped the insurgents’ fire against American merchant vessels.”104 As LaFeber
points out in “United States Depression Diplomacy and the Brazilian Revolution,”
Benham’s incident with the insurgents prompted the other foreign navy vessels at the
harbor to comply with the United States policy, for “it was either get on the side which
was obviously strengthened by the American policy, or stop the United States convoying
by force.”105 Mrs. Gresham also wrote of the incident, “the part that our government
played in overcoming the insurrection, which had for its object the restoration of
monarchy in Brazil, perhaps because of the stirring events that were contemporaneous
with and succeeded that incident, seemed to have attracted little attention from
historians.” She added that the Brazilian Foreign Minister was a supporter of the Monroe
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Doctrine. In fact, the title of her chapter on the Brazilian Naval Revolt from her memoir
read, “Brazilian Insurrection- United States Intervened-Monarchy Prevented.”106
The U.S. Secretary of the Navy commended Benham’s actions, calling his
influence of humanitarian nature and alleging it would have “far-reaching and
wholesome influences in quite a number of countries where revolutions are so frequent as
to almost constantly imperil the rights of American citizens.”107 Fellisbello Freire, also
praised the Admiral’s actions. According to Freire, the opinion of the British minister had
oscillated between recognizing the insurgents as belligerents, or the use force against
them. Freire asserted that Benham possessed a different opinion in the matter, adding,
“the difficulties of this situation that attended against the freedom of maritime commerce,
putting the government in very difficult situations, were created by the procedure of the
foreign squadron, in its resolution to negate protection to neutral merchandize.” To
Freire, this would result in the recognition of belligerence, “this being the advice of the
English Minister to his colleagues… Fortunately, the procedure of Captain Benham cut
this plan, giving place to the establishment of normal maritime commerce operations.”108
Importantly, Freire adds, “the incident of the American Squadron was the last one of the
diplomatic history of the revolt, with exception of the asylum given by the Portuguese
navy to the insurgents…”109
Brazilian historian Hélio Leôncio Martins also asserted that January had looked
promising to Admiral da Gama, who expected that forces from the Southern Brazil and
Rio de Janeiro, which never materialized, would aid in his strategy. Martins added, “and
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finally, the negative attitude that the United States adopted in regards to the revolt,” as
another major reason for its eventual failure.110 Even though the British disapproved of
the U.S. actions, “the North American Cruisers commanded the Guanabara Bay. The
Brazilian Government acquired its squadron.”111 In Brazilian Captain Villar’s memoirs,
he remembered, “at the same time, since the beginning of the movement, the intervention
of the foreign naval forces impeded the revolutionary ships of attacking the Capital of the
Republic. This intervention and a ‘do-nothing’ attitude from the revolutionary squadron,”
referring to the squadron from southern Brazil, “contributed to the failure of the revolt in
Rio.”112
A Brazilian newspaper also observed, “the effective action from Monday restored
the complete tranquility in the city, ruptured the tentative commercial blockade, sending
everything into motion.”113 Another newspaper article from February 2, reported
Thompson writing to the State Department praising Benham’s contributions, “I inform
you that the insurgents removed their restrictive orders; all of the ships can freely reach
the beach, and there is an encouraging movement in commerce; all of this due to the
influence of the American war ships that reacted against the fire from the insurgent ships
in order to protect American commerce.”114 In fact, as American primary sources also
110
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reveal, Thompson was very much satisfied with the new commander of the South
Atlantic Station. He reported on February 5, 1894 that Benham “established and
maintains the same position with regard to commerce that I have contended for from time
to time since the revolution commenced.” Thompson added to Gresham, “the action of
Admiral Benham falls clearly within your instructions to me of November 1, and it was
with the view of carrying out these instructions that I addressed my communication of
December 22 to Capt. Picking, which he declined to consider.”115
The U.S. Navy, through its trials, errors, and eventual success at the bay, had a
crucial role in the outcome of the naval revolt. In his letter to the Commander of the
British naval forces on January 30, da Gama perhaps offered the best explanation of the
impact that the intervention had on their morale and strategy, “with a view as he asserts,
of protecting at any cost the maritime commerce of the U.S.A, as when and how it may
be convenient, his Excellency by his harsh attitude yesterday placed us in the presence of
a dilemma of either going to war with the Nation which he represents, which cannot be
our desire or intention when we are fighting for the liberation of our country from a
dictatorial government, or to annul for our part, and the sole interest of his countryman,
the modus vivendi accepted up to this day.” Explaining how Benham’s actions affected
the revolt, da Gama continued, “putting aside the moral injury resulting from the act… it
remains to be seen now if that alteration in the ‘modus vivendi’ will not modify it
completely…” Da Gama noted, “in the face of an act of force against which I cannot
pretend to act by force also at this moment, I have to consent from henceforth to the
mooring alongside the wharves of the city of the United States merchants, which by the
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principles of impartiality entails the recognition of the same advantage to all other foreign
merchant vessels which frequent this port.” Da Gama concluded, “leaving to your
Excellency to judge of the injustice and disadvantage of such situation for us who believe
ourselves to be fighting for a noble and rational cause…”116
Shortly after the Detroit incident, on February 1, the British ship Sirius returned
from southern Brazil, reporting that the insurgents had a “strong position in the South,
and have a Provisional Government.” The U.S. position regarding the conflict remained
the same, however. Thompson wrote Benham on February 6, 1894, that the U.S President
“still considers that the situation does not entitle the insurgents to recognition of
belligerence.”117 The revolt ended on March 1895. By November 1894, the country had
held free elections and Prudente de Morais was elected President. According to historian
Eduardo Bueno, the elite had realized the need to diminish military power in politics and
“retake control of the country.”118 As the Brazilian historiography and primary sources
reveal, some cast the revolt as a heroic attempt from the navy insurgents to stop the cycle
of corruption at the early stages of the republic. Others praise the leader of the Brazilian
government, Peixoto, for stopping an irresponsible attempt from monarchists and selfserving military leaders to undermine the Republic. Defending Peixoto’s actions, former
Minister of Finance, Freire, explained, “ever since we have constituted ourselves a
nation, the authority and law have always lived under pressure from the revolutionary
116
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spirit…” Adding, “only Marshal Floriano Peixoto, opened an exception in favor of the
prestige of the authority of the law, resisting the revolution and winning it.”119 Freire also
asserts that the revolt symbolized political factions fighting for power, including the
tensions between the army and the navy, as opposed to economic issues, which would
have better addressed the needs of the population, a factor that might have contributed to
the revolt’s failure.
Some have blamed the outcome of the revolt on the foreign navies’ interference,
particularly Benham’s actions. Nabuco for instance, states that the Brazilian government
was incapable of putting down the revolt, hence requesting the help of the foreign
governments represented by their navies in Rio de Janeiro. Although the foreign
diplomats refused the invitation to meet with the Brazilian government at first, they did
eventually plan on intervening, with the exception of the Germans, who hesitated
interfering in Brazilian domestic affairs.120 According to Nabuco, on October 5, the
foreign navies entered into a consensus with the Brazilian government to disarm the
capital, so that Rio de Janeiro could be considered an “open city,” hence denying Mello a
pretext to attack the city. Nabuco stated that under this deal, the foreign navies controlled
the bay for about three months, and that Peixoto used this strategy against the
insurgents.121 Historian E. Bradford Burns also explained that the “opportune
maneuvering of the United States navy in favor of the established government helped to
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thwart the attempt.”122 To Freire, however, the victory of the republic was not due to
international intervention, a factor he believes takes away from the efforts of the
Brazilians who protected the law and the republic.
Others have factored in Peixoto’s dealings with private companies to acquire
ships. On December 31, 1893, Thompson had informed Gresham of an anonymous
insurgent circular that was being distributed in Rio. The circular referred to the Brazilian
government contracting of U.S ships through the house of Flint and Co. The circular
added that, “both the officers and crews are foreigners enlisted in the United States.”
Referring to them as mercenaries, the insurgents asked, “what worth will the Brazilian
people give such a victory won by paid foreigners?”123 The Brazilian naval insurgents did
not welcome U.S businessman Charles Flint’s interference in the conflict. An
entrepreneur, Flint had entered a business deal that provided the Brazilian Government
with a dynamite gunboat. In Latin America, Scheina explained that, although the new
gunboat was “erratic and the velocity of the projectile very slow,” Flint “intimidated the
rebels by aggressively publicizing the military capabilities of his new acquisitions.”124
Scheina adds that Flint’s propaganda coupled with the ever-inconsistent commercial
blockade in the Rio de Janeiro harbor contributed to the insurgents’ defeat.
Regardless of the Brazilian Navy’s motives or the Brazilian government’s
handling of the situation, the fact remains that Benham’s action interfered with the revolt
in a decisive manner. Most importantly, given the complicated situation that Brazil faced
at the early stages of the republic, the U.S. Navy’s actions helped prevent the Brazilian
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Navy from overturning the Peixoto’s administration. Regardless of whether or not the
Brazilian Navy had inclinations towards restoring monarchy or preserving the republic,
the Brazilian government would have taken a different course had the revolt succeeded.
Moreover, the outcome of the conflict served to bring the Brazilian and U.S. governments
closer to each other by the turn of the century. As Mendonca noted, “as of this date,”
referring to the day he heard President Cleveland denied belligerency to da Gama, and
appointed Benham as Commander of the U.S forces in Rio de Janeiro, “everything went
well, and the good order given to Benham, augmented by the indignation of the English,
came to prove to the U.S. Government that as I loyally served my nation, I also served
their interests.” Mendonca added that the other foreign diplomats had almost recognized
the insurgents as belligerents.125
Historian George C. Herring asserts in From Colony to Superpower, that, “during
the 1890s, Americans became acutely conscious of their emerging power.”126 The United
States intervention in the Brazilian naval revolt of 1893-94 was a significant part of this
more assertive overseas policy, in which trade and competition with European nations
became the reference point from which Americans measured their strength. Historian
Brian Loveman argues, “the Brazilian episode illustrated the collaborative efforts of
American financiers, industrialists, mercenaries, and the New Navy in making and
implementing foreign policy.”127
Aside from the motives that drew the U.S. government into the conflict, the U.S.
Navy faced a complex reality at the Rio de Janeiro harbor. The U.S Navy Commanders
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were very much involved, and at times, steadfastly refused to engage in actions that
would interfere in Brazil’s internal affairs and threaten U.S. neutrality, directly impacting
the outcome of the revolt. The Panic of 1893, the social and domestic anxieties
Americans faced as a result of increasing industrialization, urbanization and immigration,
along with Mahan’s sea power strategy, coupled with the Open Door economic policy
and aspirations for hemispheric hegemony, required a New Navy to carry on the nation’s
civilizing mission abroad. Although the New Navy eventually fulfilled its responsibility,
this incident highlights the officers’ occasional reluctance to embrace the new role with
which they had been entrusted by their nation.
This case study can also help us understand the role of the U.S Navy in shaping
U.S-Latin American relations, setting the stage for future military presence in the
hemisphere. Although the U.S. and other European powers represented at Guanabara Bay
in Rio de Janeiro by their respective navies assumed a position of neutrality, the U.S.
Navy played a significant role in weakening the revolt and changing the status quo in Rio
de Janeiro. Historian Henry J. Hendrix points out that Theodore Roosevelt believed “the
United States needed a modern fleet if it were to take its place among the world’s Great
Powers, and needed to be prepared to use it.”128 In fact, the U.S. Navy’s contribution to
ending the Brazilian naval revolt fundamentally altered the trajectory of Brazilian history,
restored trade, and blocked a possible monarchy resurrection, setting the stage for U.S.Brazilian relations in the twentieth century.
Finally, as the primary sources reveal, the U.S. State Department’s policy towards
the naval revolt was consistent and assertive. Moreover, the tactics the U.S. Navy used to
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achieve their government’s goals developed and strengthened over time in response to
pressure from Washington D.C. Historian Robert Greenhalgh argues that, “naval matters
became closely enmeshed with other considerations of state, instead of being considered
more or less ‘on their own.’ In particular, naval policy was subordinated more than ever
to foreign policy, with the State Department sometimes assuming an overriding role in
naval affairs.”129 Eventually, the U.S Navy transitioned from a cautious, yet assertive,
approach in Brazil in 1893, to a systematic and persistent strategy. Ultimately, the Navy
established a naval commission in Brazil during World War I, and encouraged U.S.Brazilian cooperation during the Great War, a topic explored in the next two chapters.
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Chapter 4: Strengthening the Friendship: U.S.-Brazilian Relations in the Late
Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Century, and the Role of Navy Diplomacy
“At the outbreak of the world war, this country was more or less of a passive onlooker in
South America, calmly watching the British, and Germans absorb the cream of the
commercial opportunities.”
April 1940, from U.S. Captain W.O. Spears to U.S. Rear Admiral W. S Anders, U.S.
Office of Naval Intelligence.1
Introduction:
This chapter explores U.S.-Brazilian relations after the naval revolt of 1893-1894,
transitioning into the World War I period, while expanding the scholarship to include the
use of the American Navy as a tool to achieve U.S. goals in Brazil from the late 1890s to
1914. Specifically, this chapter explores U.S. naval diplomacy as a vehicle to enhance
American commercial influence in Brazil, while diminishing European influence in the
early twentieth century. In doing so, this case study offers a complex picture of bilateral
relations between the two countries that considers navy diplomacy and the efforts of
ordinary officers in strengthening the relationship between the U.S. and Brazil, enhancing
their state-to-state relations. As with the naval revolt of 1893-1894, the U.S. hoped to
continue using its navy to counter European influence in the Western Hemisphere while
expanding commercial relations with Brazil, and promoting regional security in the early
twentieth century. The U.S. looked to Latin American nations’ markets, which became
increasingly relevant to American aspirations, as essential to the expansion of American
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commerce overseas.2 Moreover, the U.S. successfully promoted the Monroe Doctrine in
Brazil with the aid of the American Navy, eventually changing the status quo during
World War I, swaying the country away from the powerful British and emergent German
influence.3
The U.S. Navy Attaché in Brazil, and U.S. naval officers stationed in the Pacific
and South Atlantic regions, closely followed Brazilian domestic and international
commercial interactions, often advising the Navy and State Department in Washington,
D.C. Moreover, when World War I broke out, the U.S. Navy aided the broader U.S.
government’s efforts to enhance its commercial partnership with Brazil in face of the
traditional dominant power in the country, Great Britain, and the emerging influence of
Germany. Crucial to U.S. hegemony in the Americas, the strengthening of commercial
relations between the U.S. and Brazil in the early twentieth century helped shape the two
nations’ interactions during the Good Neighbor Policy years, World War II, and Cold
War Era, topics historians of U.S.-Brazilian relations have explored more thoroughly.4
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Background and Context
U.S., 1894-1914:
As the U.S. sought to expand its economic influence in Latin America, Brazil
became increasingly relevant to American aspirations. Specifically, U.S. policy towards
Brazil during this period demonstrates a systematic U.S. strategy of limiting German and
British naval influence in the country. The U.S. government argued that British influence
in the Brazilian Navy generated pro-British sentiments throughout the country, which, in
turn, encouraged Brazilians to favor British commerce in South America. Moreover, as
Germany rose as a naval power in the early twentieth century, U.S. policymakers feared
German economic and military influence on the Brazilian Navy, especially after the
outbreak of World War I. Hence, the U.S. government believed that the Brazilian Navy
should be brought into an American sphere of influence, for the mutual purpose of
strengthening commercial relations and countering European power in the region.
American Navy officers greatly contributed to drawing Brazil closer to the United
States. For instance, U.S. officers in Brazil were instructed to represent their nation and to
promote feelings of friendship between themselves and Brazilian officers and citizens.
On numerous occasions, the U.S. Embassy in Brazil, the U.S. Navy Department, and the
U.S. State Department acknowledged the personal relationships the American officers
fostered with Brazilians as an efficient tool to achieve the nation’s early twentieth century
commercial and geostrategic goals in the country. As the U.S. government successfully
used its navy in Brazil to increase American commercial influence and lead the country

dependency of the Brazilian economy on the U.S. after the war, shaping the two nations’ unfair
relations for the rest of the twentieth century. This dissertation argues that U.S. naval diplomacy
in Brazil in the early twentieth century helped set the stage for the two nations’ alliance during
World War II, and for the continued U.S.-led modernization efforts in Brazil.
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toward hemispheric dominance over Europe, the contributions of the navy officers
deserve a further look. The Brazilian records, specifically the annual reports produced by
their navy, help illuminate the influence that U.S. officers exerted upon their counterparts
in Brazil.
Brazil, 1894-1914:
Since the republic’s inception in 1889, army leaders such as Deodoro da Fonseca
and Floriano Peixoto had ruled the country. In November 1894, however, a civilian,
Prudente de Morais was elected president, starting the Era of the “oligarchies” in Brazil.
During the period, which lasted into the 1930s, the interests of coffee farmers dominated
politics. Policies enacted during the era, known as “Café com Leite,” “coffee with milk,”
allowed the states of São Paulo and Minas Gerais in Southeastern Brazil, to thrive and
dominate the political landscape. The election of Manuel Ferraz de Campos Sales in 1898
solidified the “Café com Leite” policy, promoted further centralization of the federal
government, and worked in partnership with the states pursing policies that would benefit
one another. Coffee production and exports grew significantly in the early twentieth
century, and continued to dominate the country’s economy. Although the British still
imported more Brazilian goods than any other country, the U.S. increasingly became the
highest importer of Brazilian coffee; and as a result, Brazil sought to strengthen their
relationship with the United States. Meanwhile, political and military conflicts continued
to plague the new republic, and a series of civilian and military revolts generated
economic and political instability.5
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during the “Revolta da Chiabata,” the “Chiabata Revolt,” the Brazilian sailors in the Minas
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In addition to trade, military conditions, particularly in the naval sphere,
contributed to the Brazilian decision to seek a closer relationship with the United States.
Viewing maritime power as a symbol of regional prestige, the ABC countries, Argentina,
Brazil, and Chile, raced to modernize their navies at the turn of the century. In the
aftermath of the naval revolt of 1893-1894, however, the Brazilian Navy stagnated,
limiting the scope of Brazilian foreign policy in face of the heightened global
imperialism, border disputes, and an emerging Argentinian power.6 Thus, in the early
twentieth century, plans to strengthen and modernize the Brazilian Navy entered the
political discourse.
When Jose Maria da Silva Paranhos, known as Barão do Rio Branco, the “Baron
of Rio Branco,” became the Minister of Foreign Relations in 1902, he launched a
campaign to elevate Brazil’s regional and global prestige, which resulted in the country’s
strengthening its relationship with the U.S. Notably, Rio Branco viewed the
modernization of the Brazilian Navy as essential to achieving his goals. In 1904, the first
Brazilian Ambassador to the U.S., Joaquim Nabuco, pursed stronger bilateral relations
with the U.S. government. In 1906, Admiral Alexandrino de Alencar, who fought
Gerais, São Paulo, Deodoro, and Bahia ships, protested the corporal punishments they were
subjugated to, revolting against the navy officers, killing several Brazilian officers. See Eduardo
Bueno, Brasil Uma Historia, Cinco Séculos de Um Pais em Construção (São Paulo: LeYa, 2012),
pages 271-301, (translated by author).
6
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Politica Internacional, 57 (2014), 9-28. Alsina explains that, “the consequences of the revolt
would be felt for many years.” Adding that, Joaquim Nabuco, the first Brazilian Ambassador to
the U.S., “would point out that the most worrying byproduct of the revolt would be found in the
military camp- in addition to the ruin of the naval force and its resentment of the army-because of
the subversion of hierarchy resulting from the Iron Marshal’s,” Floriano Peixoto, “decision,” 12.
The Brazilian government’s relunctance to strengthen the navy after the revolt contributed to its
stagnation as well. In fact, the Navy Department became increasingly centralized in the early
twentieth century, which allowed the Brazilian government to modernize its navy in order to
achieve its foreign policy goals, while also keeping the lower ranks in the navy department in
check.
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alongside the insurgents during the naval revolt of 1893-1894, became the Minister of
Marine and pushed for the modernization of the Brazilian Navy. To the Brazilian
government, a stronger relationship with the U.S. promised to increase Brazil’s regional
power through the modernization of its navy, enhanced trade, particularly coffee exports,
and promotion of Brazil’s global status.
U.S.- Brazil, 1894-1914:
In the early twentieth century, as technological innovations, better transportation,
and a more powerful naval fleet facilitated movement and enhanced global trade, U.S.South American interactions also increased.7 Historian Joseph Smith points out that,
“between 1900 and 1910 trade and investment with Latin America more than doubled
and grew at a faster rate than with other regions of the world.”8 According to Brazilian
historians Amado Luiz Cervo e Mario Rapoport, after the American Civil War, the U.S.
“decidedly entered in a tenacious competition with the European nations to obtain, here,”
in Latin America, “advantageous positions.” In fact, Cervo and Rapoport argue that at
that point, “Latin America started acquiring its identity as such, within this complex
process of confrontation between the powers...”9 Importantly, Latin American nations
increasingly saw themselves through the prism of globalization, finding common
experiences first in their fight for independence, and later in their internal political
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struggles and their strategic economic and political value to the world powers, which
included the United States starting in the late nineteenth century.10
As the ABC nations expanded their naval power in the early twentieth century,
the U.S. recognized the opportunity to enhance its hemispheric cultural, social, and
political dominance through military contracts, naval commissions, and training of the
South American navies.11 As it had done in the 1890s, the U.S. Navy continued to serve
as a tool to expand American influence in Latin America. Although still used more
frequently and aggressively in Central America and the Caribbean, the U.S. government
used navy diplomacy in South America in a subtler manner, mirroring the future Good
Neighbor Policy tactics of the 1930s.12 In fact, the U.S. Navy’s use of diplomacy to
exercise soft power in South America prior to the well-known Good Neighbor Policy was
successful in carrying out the American civilizing mission in Brazil in the early twentieth
century.13
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Historian Thomas O’Brien discusses how the U.S. dealt with South America
differently from the Caribbean and Central American regions. O’Brien asserts, “U.S.
officials never seriously considered using interventionist tactics to extend their civilizing
mission in South America.”14 In fact, “since the 1880s the United States had pursued its
diplomatic interests in South America through a series of regional conferences designed
to seek consensus on key issues and of course to promote U.S. economic interests. This
relatively benign policy of Pan Americanism stood in stark contrast to imperial endeavors
in Central America and the Caribbean”15 In “A Politica Externa da Primeira Republica e
os Estados Unidos: A Atuação de Joaquim Nabuco em Washington,” historian Paulo
Pereira also explains that despite some internal opposition in the U.S., “acting towards
projecting itself in the hemisphere, politically and commercially,” the U.S. relied on panAmericanism and the Monroe Doctrine to help achieve its objectives in South America.16
Cervo and Rapoport also viewed the U.S. push for pan-Americanism as part of the
nation’s broader strategy of weakening European presence in the region.17 The U.S. Navy
was essential to this soft diplomacy approach.
Exploring how Brazilians perceived the U.S. at the turn of the century helps
illuminate the America Navy’s role in bringing Brazil into the U.S. sphere of influence.
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Both sides sought to strengthen their relationship but there was still much Brazilian
skepticism about U.S. goals. Nonetheless, the U.S. Navy’s action during the revolt
facilitated pro-U.S. sentiments in Brazil. For instance, shortly after the end of the naval
revolt, the U.S. Legation representative in Brazil, Thomas L. Thompson, wrote U.S.
Secretary of State, Walter Gresham, that a Brazilian committee in Rio de Janeiro had
decided to build a monument in honor of U.S. President James Monroe. Thompson wrote
that the effort was “in honor of the great American statesman and the doctrine that bears
his name,” adding, “it is also their desire to bring about the solidarity of the American
republics, carrying them from without European influence or interference.”18
The American Solidarity Monument Committee in Brazil also wrote to the
representatives of the other American nations, “‘in commemoration of the attitude
assumed by the government of the United States of North America during the deplorable
insurrection of September 6,” the naval revolt of 1893-94, “the undersigned committee
purposes erecting with popular aid a monument to American solidarity, chiefly
represented by Monroe.”19 The enclosure in Thompson’s correspondence to Gresham
also included Brazilian General J.W. Avery’s speech praising U.S commercial expansion,
as well as the U.S. desire to “pursue an unchangeable neutrality to all foreign countries,
seeking the friendship of all and incurring the hostility of none…” Influential Brazilian
citizen, Dr. Trajano de Medeiros gave a speech during the ceremony which was also
18
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revealing of U.S.- Brazilian relations after the naval revolt. Medeiros wrote, “we are not
governed at this moment by narrow feeling of Americanism; on the contrary, it is because
we are intensely interested in the spread of universal fraternity that we are now led to
proclaim the necessity of nonintervention of Europe in the peculiar affairs of American
republics.” Medeiros continued, “it was the noble attitude of Monroe, advised by
Jefferson, and the resolute manner in which his doctrine has been interpreted that have
created for America an almost privileged position among the other parts of the earth in
relation to the degrading intervention of the European nations.”20
Two instances in 1895 and 1898 also illustrate Brazil’s increasing support for
U.S. foreign policy in Latin America. Upon the U.S. involvement in the Venezuela
border dispute with Great Britain in 1895, Brazilian Consul General in the U.S., Salvador
de Mendonca wrote to U.S. Secretary of State, Richard Olney, “both houses of Congress
of the United States of Brazil passed unanimously a motion of congratulation on the
subject of the message of President Cleveland of the 17th instant…” The motion
congratulated Cleveland, “who so strenuously guards the dignity, the sovereignty, and the
freedom of the American nations.”21 By invoking the Monroe Doctrine, Olney had
requested that Great Britain resolve the border dispute through arbitration. Although
Great Britain initially resisted the request, pressure from President Cleveland and the
American Congress, convinced Great Britain to honor the request.22 Brazil’s support was
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relevant at a time when U.S. policymakers feared Great Britain would threaten the
Monroe Doctrine.23 Importantly, historian E. Bradford Burns also observes that during
the Spanish-American War, Brazil “was the only Latin American nation sympathetic to
the United States.”24
However, many Brazilians also grew weary of American expansionism. An 1899
incident involving the USS Wilmington at the Amazon River highlights the Brazilian
government’s concerns with an increasingly assertive American military presence in
Latin America. A misunderstanding between the Commander of the USS Wilmington and
local authorities regarding a permission to navigate the Amazon River to evaluate its
commercial potential resulted in a diplomatic issue between the U.S. and Brazil. The
Brazilian Legation representative in the U.S., J.F de Assis, wrote the U.S Secretary of
State, John Hay, expressing his concerns for the disregard of Brazilian rules on the part of
the American Commander.25 Although the incident stemmed from what the U.S.
Commander believed was a misinterpretation of the instructions provided by the local
and federal governments, Brazilians had long been concerned with the American quest
for new territory in Latin America expanding into the Amazon region; therefore, the
Brazilian government remained cautious. As Smith explains, “anti-American feeling was
especially aroused by reports that American business interests were intriguing to seize
territory in the remote rubber-producing region of Acre.” Consequently, “ugly scenes
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occurred in 1899 when an angry mob attacked the American Consulate in Manaus,” in
northern Brazil. Moreover, “the incident was provoked by the news that the American
warship Wilmington had ignored local regulations and sailed up the Amazon.”26
Later, in 1902, when Brazil and Bolivia engaged in a border dispute in Acre,
northern Brazil, Bolivia, hoping the U.S. would intervene in the conflict, leased the
territory in question to a foreign syndicate, led by a representative from New York. As
Burns explains, the “syndicate’s contract gave the entrepreneurs power to administer,
police, and exploit Acre.” Brazil disapproved of the arrangement, and many Brazilian
accused the U.S. of expansionist aspirations in the region.27 The Brazilian government
eventually bought the syndicate in a diplomatic maneuver to keep the U.S. out of the
conflict, eventually settling the border issue with Bolivia. However, this episode is also
revealing of Brazil’s suspicions of America’ motives in northern Brazil.28
Despite some tensions, the United States and Brazil continued to strengthen their
commercial rapport, and friendly hemispheric relations in the early twentieth century.
Although Brazil maintained closer commercial ties with Great Britain, Brazilians
observed as the “Colossus of the North” continued to strengthen its economic, cultural,
and political systems. In 1901, an article in the Brazilian newspaper Correio da Manha,
revealed public opinion towards European impact in Brazil, as well as the growing
influence of the U.S. in South America. Correio da Manha had a large circulation in
Brazil at the time. The article criticized the resemblance that the Latin American nations’
political, social, and economic structures shared with Europe. Furthermore, the article
26
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mentioned the U.S. as the exception in the Americas for successfully breaking away from
the corruption of the Old World and effectively protecting liberalism and democracy,
while excelling in the fields of arts and science.29
Another article published in 1901 in the Correio da Manha praised the
organization and transparency of the American political organization, criticizing the
corruption in the Brazilian system where the current President was choosing the future
presidential candidate.30 In 1902, former Brazilian Minister to the U.S., and key player in
the Brazilian naval revolt of 1893-1894, Salvador de Mendonca, wrote Brazilian
President Campos Salles urging him to “adopt a policy of frank friendship with the
United States based on understanding and cooperation.” Mendonca also suggested that
Brazil “become a link between the United States and Latin America.” To Medonca, the
Monroe Doctrine “really benefited Latin America,” and that a “friendly United States
would be an advantage to Brazil in solving her numerous frontier problems.”31
Defending American efforts in Central America and the Caribbean, a 1903
Brazilian article in the Correio da Manha, asserted that gaining the contract to build the
Panama Canal was imperative to the U.S. quest for hegemony in the hemisphere, and to
preventing a potential future enemy from threatening American national security.32
Brazilian public opinion also applauded the U.S. in response to a 1903 European naval
29
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blockade of Venezuela, a response to Venezuela’s debt crisis. The U.S. initially refused
to interfere, garnering praise from Brazilians who interpreted the U.S. position as a
defense of the Monroe Doctrine while also sending a message to Latin Americans that
they would have to count on their own internal forces, and international laws as well. The
U.S. did pressure the European powers to reach a deal with Venezuela and withdraw their
forces, but the article in the Correio do Manha claimed that it was due to the blockade
hindering American commerce, rather than a desire to intervene. Furthermore, historians
Cervo and Rapport argue that this incident signified the U.S. intention to replace Great
Britain as the dominant power in the region.33 Importantly, the Venezuelan crisis and the
U.S. position prompted the Brazilian public to recognize the need to strengthen its navy,
as the Brazilian Minister of Foreign Affairs had already proposed.34 Later, in 1905, the
Correio da Manha also published an article on Germany’s recent expansion, claiming
that Germans would look to Brazil as the most desirable transatlantic territory. Viewing
the U.S. as an emerging power, the article asserted that the U.S. would fight German
territorial expansion in Brazil based on the principles laid out in the Monroe Doctrine.35
Economic and political ties increased between the two nations as well. By the
early twentieth century the U.S. was the largest importer of Brazilian coffee, while the
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U.S. exported items such as wheat flour to Brazil.36 Brazil and the United States also
exchanged embassies in 1905, raising their diplomatic status from legations to embassies,
while also complicating the regional balance of power between Brazil and Argentina.37
The pro-U.S. Brazilian politician Joaquim Nabuco, became the first Brazilian
Ambassador to the U.S., contributing to the strengthening of relations between the two
nations in the early twentieth century.38
As another example of the early manifestation of friendship towards the U.S., in
1906, newly elected Brazilian President Afonso Pena, included U.S.-Brazilian ties in his
inauguration speech, claiming that the traditional friendly relations between Brazil and
U.S., “has in recent times received a great impulse.” The U.S. Ambassador to Brazil at
the time, Lloyed C. Griscom, noted that the U.S. was the only foreign nation that the
President mentioned in his speech.39 Later in 1906, during the Pan American Conference
in Rio de Janeiro, “the first official travel by a Secretary of State outside the United
States was by Elihu Root,” who chose Brazil as his first stop.40 Root’s visit was very
beneficial. As Burns explains, “those days marked the apogee of Brazilian-American
36
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friendship…” Moreover, “the new Brazilian tariff preferential granted 20 percent
reduction on flour, rubber, manufacturers, dyes, varnishes, watches, clocks, condensed
milk, typewriters, pianos, scales, windmills, ink, and ice boxes from the United States,” a
decision that was made upon Root’s visit.41 In fact, in a speech in Kansas City, Root
“called for closer commercial relations between the United States and Latin America and
an improvement in transportation and communication between the two areas.”42
Most notably, the Brazilian Minister of Foreign Affairs from 1902 to 1912, the
Baron of Rio Branco, who sought to elevate Brazil’s regional position and international
prestige, played a significant role in facilitating a closer relationship between Brazil and
the United States. Rio Branco’s policy of “approximation,” aimed at aligning Brazilian
foreign policy to that of the United States. Antonio Carlos Lessa in “Barao do Rio Branco
and the International Insertion of Brazil,” explores Rio Branco’s politics of
approximation to the U.S. and its impact on Brazilian foreign policy. Lessa explains the
prestige Rio Branco sought by aligning the nation’s foreign policy with the U.S., and its
benefits to the Brazilian coffee industry. Lessa notes, “under this perspective, Brazil
would be irrevocably inserted in a new hegemony system, which would be confirmed in
the following decades…” However, “the fundamental problem of the Barao’s legacy, is
the intensity of the relations with the United States: ever since, Brazil would be
essentially aligned to the hemispheric power’s vision of the world, with the central
question over this aspect being to find the balance between automatic alignment and
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pragmatic alignment,” with the U.S., which posed challenges to Brazilian foreign
policy.43
Earlier in his career, Rio Branco was appointed chief of the special mission to
Washington to negotiate a Missions territory dispute with Argentina in March 1893. Rio
Branco won the dispute for Brazil, elevating his prestige in the country.44 A few years
later, he also successfully negotiated a border dispute with France regarding a region
called Amapá in northern Brazil, which bordered French Guiana. In 1900, the Swiss
President, who was the mediator in the conflict, decided in favor of Brazil, awarding the
disputed region to Brazil, a decision that once again increased Rio Branco’s reputation as
a diplomat.45 Once Rio Branco assumed the post of Minister of Foreign Relations in
Brazil, boundary disputes, such as the Acre region in the Amazon in 1902, which caused
conflicts between Brazil and Bolivia, continued to present a problem to the republic.46
Rio Branco’s foreign policy marked the apogee of U.S.-Brazilian relations since
the inception of the Brazilian republic in 1889. Specifically, Rio Branco hoped that
forging a closer relationship with the U.S. would facilitate the expansion of the Brazilian
economy and modernization of the country’s military.47 First, the U.S was the largest
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importer of Brazilian coffee by the turn of the century, and as Burns points out, “of the
many changes wrought by the overthrow of the empire, perhaps the most fundamental
was the recognition of coffee as the principal crop in the Brazilian economy.”48 Rio
Branco asserted in 1905 that the U.S. was “‘the principal market for our coffee and other
products.’”49 In fact, the steady rise of Brazilian coffee exports fueled the political
prestige of three Brazilian states in particular, São Paulo, Minas Gerais, and Rio de
Janeiro, where the land was suitable for coffee growing. It also encouraged immigration
to the region.50 Moreover, “by 1912, New York had become the world’s largest rubber
market and nearly 60 percent of the rubber traded there was Brazilian. Likewise, the
United States consumed more Brazilian cocoa than any other country.” In fact, these
trade balances favored Brazil in the early twentieth century. According to Burns, “the
Brazilian tariff policy was unfavorable to North American imports and in no way
reciprocated North American generosity.”51 In fact, as Joseph Smith also points out,
“during the 1890s Argentina had displaced the United States as Brazil’s principal supplier
of wheat and flour.”52 Second, Burns also notes that, Rio Branco “believed that only a
well-armed nation capable of self-defense could negotiate for peace. In his opinion,
peaceful coexistence within South America, as well as within the world community of
nations, required a strong and self-reliant Brazil.”53
Rio Branco, who supported the Monroe Doctrine and the Roosevelt Corollary
during a time when many Latin Americans were skeptical of American interests, saw in
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the relationship between Brazil and the U.S. an opportunity to achieve his regional and
global aspirations. As an example of growing skepticism of U.S. foreign policy, Gil Vidal
in the Correio da Manha, warned South Americans that the new Roosevelt Corollary
would extend a U.S. protectorate to Brazil. Adding that U.S. foreign policy towards Latin
America was due to self-interests.54 As Burns notes, “recognizing a general trend under
way,” the Baron, “used his powerful office to complete the change of emphasis in
Brazilian diplomacy from Europe to the United States.”55 Rio Branco praised the Monroe
Doctrine, claiming that its greatest contribution “‘is the liberty guaranteed to each nation
to develop freely.’” Moreover, according to Smith, “in contrast to most of his SpanishAmerican colleagues, Rio Branco regarded the United States as a benevolent guardian,
and even gave tacit approval to the Roosevelt Corollary that justified U.S. intervention to
punish Latin America wrong-doing.”56 When Panama, supported by the U.S., fought for
independence from Colombia, Rio Branco “gave every indication of using the incident as
a means of revealing his friendly intentions towards the United States.”57
Hence, Rio Branco sought to align Brazilian foreign policy closely to that which
U.S. foreign policymakers had been practicing abroad, hoping to seize an opportunity to
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build an alliance that would aid the Brazilian economy and military, and launch Brazil as
the leader in the Southern hemisphere. Smith explains that, “Rio Branco reasoned that
American assistance would be reassured if Brazil aligned its own foreign policy closely
to that pursued by the United States.” To Brazilian historian Clodoaldo Bueno however,
the quest for a strong alliance was unilateral on the part of the Baron of Rio Branco.
Although Brazil had pursed friendly relations with the U.S. in the past, “the Baron’s talk
of shifting the ‘axis’ of Brazil ‘s foreign relations from Europe to the United States
sounded different and justified the new popular description of his policy as the strategy of
rapprochement or ‘approximation.’”58 Other examples of the policy of approximation
rhetoric Rio Branco promoted during his tenure as Minister of Foreign Relations, were
seen during the U.S-Mexico crisis 1914, with the U.S. invasion of Veracruz that year.59
As Smith points out, “in marked contrast to the Spanish-American republics, Brazil was
traditionally less critical of U.S. diplomacy in Central America and Caribbean regions.
This accommodating attitude reflected the strategy of approximation and the historical
fact that Brazil had relatively little political or economic contact with the area.”60
Although Brazil had been seeking closer relations with the U.S. prior to 1902, Rio
Branco's strategy was crucial to redirecting Brazilian foreign policy towards the U.S., and
away from Europe. In fact, his critics were “opposed to the shift of Brazil’s diplomatic
axis from the Old World to the New.”61 According to Burns however, Rio Branco
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believed that “Brazil’s future was in the New World, not in Europe.”62 As the twentieth
century unfolded, and as Brazil became more relevant to U.S. hegemony in the
hemisphere, Rio Branco’s policy was on par with U.S. interests in Brazil. Although the
U.S. did not seek a formal alliance with Brazil, Burns explains that, nonetheless, it was
Rio Branco’s guidance where the “‘traditional’ friendship can be dated.”63
While Rio Branco formulated Brazil’s foreign policy, Elihu Root, who became
U.S. Secretary of State in 1905, “urged officials in the State Department to show Latin
America diplomats much more attention than they had experienced in the past.” In fact,
in 1905, Root warned, “the South Americans now hate us, largely because they think we
despise them and try to bully them.’” Importantly, Root wrote, “‘I really like them and
intend to show it. I think their friendship is really important to the United States, and the
best way to secure it is by treating them like gentleman. If you want to make a man your
friend, it does not pay to treat him like a yellow dog.’”64
Root’s approach coincided with Rio Branco’s policy towards the U.S., facilitating
the strengthening of U.S.-Brazilian relations between 1902 and 1912, and beyond.
Moreover, in 1905, the Brazilian Ambassador to the U.S., Nabuco, wrote Rio Branco
that, “Root suggested an arrangement by which the United States, with the assistance of
Mexico and Brazil, would take responsibility for affirming the Monroe Doctrine
throughout the hemisphere.” Later, Nabuco also added, “President Roosevelt wished to
see Brazil rather than Argentina or Chile exercise the preponderant influence in South
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America.”65 According to Smith, “the policy of approximation upset the balance of power
in South America and intensified the historic rivalry between Argentina and Brazil.”66
One year after the success of the Pan-American Conference held in Rio de Janeiro
in 1906, which Root attended and reaffirmed U.S. friendly relations towards Latin
America, the Hague peace conference of 1907 served as reminder of the skepticism some
Brazilian officials maintained towards the U.S. growing imperialism. At the conference,
“disagreement between the American and Brazilian delegations soon emerged over
compulsory arbitration, the creation of an international prize court and especially the
nomination of judges to the proposed International Court of Justice.”67 The leader of the
U.S. delegation, Joseph Choate, had been working with the Germans and the British to
devise a plan for the formation of the International Court at the Hague conference. To the
disappointment of the Brazilian delegation, led by Rui Barbosa, who had held the post of
first Secretary of the Treasury from 1889 to 1891, Choates proposed that, “only the great
powers should have permanent representations, while lesser nations such as Brazil should
be relegated to temporary and rotating membership.”68 Barbosa promoted the equality of
nations rhetoric instead.
Nonetheless, Rio Branco’s policy of approximation was also enhanced by some
public support in Brazil for U.S. actions in the hemisphere. In 1909, an article in the
Correio da Manha, praised the U.S. goal to stabilize Cuba, an effort the article believed
promoted peace and prepared Cubans for self-government. Regarding the U.S. efforts,
the article observed, “this intervention, determined by the last revolutionary
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developments which perturbed the much needed serenity of a country who only recently
was born for independence, work, and for progress. The big North American republic,
which many thought had pretensions for a perpetual control over those active and brave
people… only work to maintain peace, harmonize the mood, and prepare the Cubans to
govern themselves.”69
U.S.-Brazil Navy Diplomacy, 1900-1914:
Regardless of the motives and long-term implications of this crucial relationshipbuilding period in the early twentieth century, when emphasizing American expansionist
ambitions, the historiography does not fully explain the connection to the American
Navy, and its part in solidifying personal rapport and friendly relations. Stronger relations
with Brazil, especially through navy diplomacy, indeed helped fulfill U.S. goals of
hegemony in South America. The U.S. Navy helped facilitate a much-needed feeling of
mutual comradeship and respect that the U.S. sought to promote in Brazil at the turn of
the century. For instance, in 1901, Charles Page Bryan, of the Legation of the United
States in Brazil, wrote to the U.S. Secretary of State, John Hay, about the visit of the
Brazilian ship Benjamin Constant, “it is a long time since any Brazilian naval officer
have had an opportunity to visit the United States and I am sincerely hopeful that they
will bring back impressions that will be of mutual advantage to both countries.”70
In 1902, Bryan once again noted the importance of naval officers in strengthening
relations between the U.S. and Brazil. Bryan wrote Hay about the visit of the U.S. Navy
69

29 January 1909, “Cuba,” Correio da Manha, edition 02754, page 1, part of the series
“Biblioteca Nacional Digital Brasil,” http://bndigital.bn.br/hemeroteca-digital/ (translated by
author); accessed on 10/20/16.
70
2 April 1901, Charles Page Bryan to Secretary Hay, United States Department of State/papers
relating to the foreign relations of the United States, with the annual message of the President
transmitted to Congress December 3, 1901, Section 43, page 27, Foreign Relations of the United
States; hereafter, FRUS, Section 43; accessed on 10/20/16.

121

ship Iowa on the President’s inaugural day in Brazil, “I have the honor to report that the
presence of the Iowa in the harbor of Rio de Janeiro during the ceremonies connected
with the inauguration of the new President has created an altogether favorable impression
among all classes.” Bryan continued, “the American naval officers appeared at a ball
given by myself at the Legation and at all the functions of these days of celebration,
representing the navy of our country in most credible manner and gaining golden
opinions for their fine act and handsome bearing.”71 Moreover, in seeking to modernize
its navy school, machinery, and arsenal, Brazilians increasingly looked to the United
States for guidance, especially after World War I.
U.S. Navy officers, often in close contact with Brazilians, served as advisors to
the American government, helping shape U.S.-Brazilian relations in the twentieth
century. For instance, in 1911, as the U.S. government looked to expand commercial
relations and diminish British influence in the Brazilian military, a U.S. Navy Captain
serving as the Naval Attaché reported to the U.S. Chief of Intelligence Officer on the
Brazilian government’s plans to build a naval station. The Captain explained the
opportunity this posed for the U.S., “it is the intention of the government to let the
contract for a complete station, including fortification to some one firm…British firms
are strongly entrenched in public works contracts, but this one coming now is the most
important naval contract in South America, as it involves the spending of millions of
dollars… it would be a very good thing for the American bidders to have the duplication
of whatever information is given the Minister of Marine…” The Captain outlined his
suggestions, “collect from the Bureaus of Yards and Docks in duplicate, drawings, plans
71
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specifications, for a few of the shops of type adapted to warm climates, such as at Pearl
Harbor or Olongapo, and add a general scheme showing the grouping and distribution of
the shops about the dry-dock as a center and forward one set to the naval attaché… and
hold the other set in case the Minister of Marine,” of Brazil, “requests it.” Commenting
on the indifference of the Brazilian Navy towards the U.S. at that point, the Captain
observed, “the chances are against it that the contract will go the United States, but the
one chance is in being able to show ‘samples.’” The Captain also warned the U.S. Navy
Intelligence Chief, “the Brazilians do not take us seriously. They look to England for
their ideas, and the agents of the British firms are intimate in inner official naval circles,
never losing a chance to ridicule us.” Finally, the Captain advised that the U.S. Naval
Attaché in Brazil be prepared in case the Brazilian government does seek U.S. advice of
the matter.72 This particular case exemplifies the awareness of the U.S. Navy Captain
regarding his country’s policy towards Latin America. Not only did the Captain see an
opportunity for the U.S. to benefit financially from getting involved in the building of a
naval arsenal in Brazil, he also observed that such action would serve to counter
European influence, a long-term goal of U.S-South American policy.
Fearing not only British dominance of Brazilian trade and military development
in the early twentieth century, the U.S. also factored in growing German interests and
influence in Brazil. In fact, Brazilians had also been observing not only Germany’s
growing maritime power, but also their cultural, social, and political systems. In 1909, as
the rivalry between England and Germany intensified, an article in the Correio da Manha
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criticized anti-German sentiment in Brazil, instead, praising the Germans for their
scientific developments, authors such as Frederick Nietzsche and Karl Marx, as well as
the expansion of German systems into British and American societies. The author
observed the rise of Social Darwinism in England and the U.S., as well as Nietzsche’s
“superman” theory about superiority, asserting that Latinos are different, more
sentimental. Claiming Germany was both Sparta and Athens at the same time, the article
favored German immigration to Brazil, asserting that Brazilians would learn a lot of
positive traits from Germans. The author also observes that Brazilians had already
modeled their army and education after the Germans.73
Aware of Germany’s rise in the world stage, and growing influence in Brazil, in
1910, the U.S. Ambassador to Brazil, Irving Dudley, wrote the U.S. Secretary of State
that the Brazilian Minister of War wanted to contract a German Army Mission to
Brazil.74 In 1911, the U.S. Navy Attaché in Rio de Janeiro wrote to the U.S. Secretary of
State regarding a German military mission to Brazil, “it is generally understood President
Fonseca while in Europe promised German emperor to award both missions,” army and
navy, “to Germany. Should Germany secure both missions, she will undoubtedly increase
her now powerful commercial prestige.”75
Equating foreign naval missions with foreign influence, the U.S. Navy Attaché
continued to keep a close watch on both German and British activities in Brazil, as well
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as the Brazilian attitude towards the U.S. In August 1912, U.S. Captain La Vert Coleman
of the Office of the Military Attaché warned of the continued British influence over
Brazil, pointing to the recent publication of a Brazilian book, Jacuacanga, which he
argued undermined U.S. interests in that country. As Coleman noted, “English interests
are fighting against our military and political policies in the dark and grossly
misrepresenting us.” He believed that the influential British company, Armstrong & Co.,
had paid for the publication of the book. Carrying on its nation’s foreign policy, Coleman
was cognizant of military strategy by reporting on Rio de Janeiro conditions, while also
aware of the threat the traditional dominant power, Great Britain, posed to U.S. interests
in South America.76
The monograph, Jacuacanga, written by H. Midosi with a preface by Brazilian
Captain Tancredo Burlamagui, was named after a district in Rio de Janeiro state called
“Jacuacanga,” and the author criticized the fact that Brazilian naval defenses had been
heavily concentrated in that area, as opposed to other more vulnerable regions, such as
northern Brazil. In his preface, Captain Burlamagui explained that Midosi, “fears that the
appetite of the North American will come to disturb the development of the Amazon
valley in the same way that our economical prosperity awakened the warlike spirit of the
Argentinos.” Regarding his own assessment of American interests, Burlamagui adds
however, “the reviewer here states he does not believe the U.S. cares to do harm to Brazil
in any way.”77
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In the monograph, Midosi warns, “the concentration of our forces in Jacuacanga
do not obey the first laws of naval tactics in that the forces should be grouped nearest to
the enemy,” viewing the Amazon valley as in need of protection. Midosi accused the U.S.
of thinking of Latin America as “full of vanity, as infants, and incapable of running a
good government.” He was also suspicious of U.S. interests in the Amazon as a strategic
location between Bolivia and Peru. Remembering the conflict in the Amazon, Midosi
asked, “have we forgotten the exploration of the USS Wilmington up the Amazon in 1899
made by the Anglo-American syndicate to dominate the territory in litigation between
Bolivia and Peru?” Critical of the Monroe Doctrine, Midosi stated, “we will not be
surprised at all to see divided, even more the crookedness in the already rotten and
wrinkled skin of the Monroe Doctrine.”78
Midosi also pointed out what he argued was U.S. mishandling of Mexico, Peru,
Bolivia, Honduras, Nicaragua, and the Panama Canal. Regarding the “Dollar Diplomacy”
the U.S. promoted in Latin America, the Captain observed, “the idea of the U.S. is to get
a country in debt to justify itself in absorbing it later by an interior ‘fiscalization,’
(supervision), which affects the political organization of the country.” Midosi also
advocated for a strong Brazilian Navy “to secure peace on the continent and her
inviolability against the incursions of a brutal imperialism.” As Midosi observed, “the
merchant marines of England and Germany with all their foreign commerce would never
have evolved or have attained the amazing development they now have if they had not
flourished under the protection of naval military powers strong enough to protect them in
all quarters where they carried the mercantile interests of these nations.” He also pointed
78
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out “Japan’s rise due to the fleet defeating Russia’s,” and “France’s fall and loss of
colonies due to lack of powerful fleet-also Portugal and Holland,” and that “navies are
not made to lie in port, and should be out at sea.” Midosi also believed that a strong
Brazilian navy in command of the South Atlantic was necessary to counter Argentina
military power and animosity towards Brazil.79 Brazilians’ perception of the American
military in the hemisphere was relevant, for a negative view could keep Brazil under the
British umbrella of naval influence, as well as undermine U.S. military interventions in
the Caribbean and Central America. The American Captain, Le Vert Coleman, and the
South Bethlehem PA Company, which also sent copies of the book to the State
Department, recognized the possible threat that the views expressed in Jacuacanga posed
to U.S. interests.
As the U.S. and some Brazilians continued to seek mutual interests in the
hemisphere, Brazil looked to modernize its navy, a factor that contributed to the
approximation of Brazil and the U.S., eventually culminating in Brazil contracting an
American officer to teach at their War College, a Navy Commission during World War I,
and a more permanent American naval mission to Brazil in the 1920s. A 1904 account
produced by the Brazilian Navy as part of its annual reports indicated that the RussoJapanese War of 1904, and Japan’s subsequent success, influenced Brazil’s new naval
strategy. Observing Japan ascend in the world stage due to its new powerful navy, the
Brazilian Navy proposed an expansion of their own capabilities.80 Given the Brazilian
military’s precarious condition at the turn of the century, “in 1904, the Rodrigues Alves
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administration commenced a program of increased military spending designed to
reorganize and modernize the army and the navy.”81 In 1906, Brazilian Minister of
Marine, Julio Cezar de Noronha, informed the Brazilian President of his efforts to elevate
the country’s navy, announcing the construction of three navy war ships by the British
Company Armstrong, which would also probably build the new Brazilian naval arsenal
the Minister observed.82 Later in 1906, Brazilian Rear Admiral Alexandrino de Alencar,
who favored a more heavily armored navy fleet, became the Minister of Marine in Brazil.
Moreover, as a Brazilian newspaper Correio da Manha observed in 1909, Germany had
emerged as the rival of Great Britain due to its strong new navy.83
As Brazil devised plans to modernize and strengthen its navy, a U.S. intelligence
report on the Brazilian Navy from 1908 noted, “in the event of a war, the Monroe
Doctrine being an issue, Brazil would naturally become an ally of the United States. It
then becomes highly important to the United States Navy to know that the new Brazilian
fleet is trained according to modern methods-proficient in gunnery and tactics.”
Foreseeing some challenges in obtaining Brazil’s full cooperation, the report continued,
“Brazilian pride would naturally forbid the placing of the commands of these ships in the
hands of our own officers, even should their squadrons be a part of our fleet. It becomes a
question of the future, a question in the interest of Pan Americanism, whether or not it is
the business of the United States to see that the new Brazilian fleet is always kept in a
high state of efficiency.” Recognizing the need to continue strengthening the U.S. naval
81
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presence in Brazil, the report noted, “the appointment of a Naval Attaché to the U.S.
embassy at Rio would, in an informal manner, permit the influence of the U.S.N. to raise
the Brazilian Navy to a fuller understanding of efficiency, and with the present friendly
feeling between the two countries such a step does not seem impossible.” Aware of the
traditional British influence in the Brazilian Navy, the report concluded, the early
appointment of such officer would mean a great deal. Since the foundation of the
Brazilian navy, the influence has been British…” Finally, highlighting the role the U.S.
and Brazilian Navy officers’ interactions played in providing such valuable insight,
according to the intelligence report, “this information was obtained by conversations with
Brazilian officers and by visits and personnel observations on board the Brazilian ship in
the harbor.”84
In 1910, under Marine Minister Alencar’s advice, Brazil ordered the construction
of two dreadnoughts, the Minas Gerais and the Sao Paulo. This move launched Brazil as
the leading naval power in South America. In fact, Brazil’s ambition to strengthen its
navy and acquire war ships, while devising a foreign policy of approximation to the U.S.,
caused considerable anxiety in Argentina.85 This push for a more aggressive naval policy
on the part of Brazil encouraged Argentina and Chile to also invest in the purchase of the
modern dreadnaughts. Relevant to the growing U.S. military power in South America, the
American business Fore and River Company won the contract for the Argentinian
dreadnoughts.86
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Eventually, internal economic depression and a fleet munity in 1910 led by
Brazilian officers in the Sao Paulo and Minas Gerais, set Brazil back in the South
American naval race. As U.S. Captain W.O. Spears explained in 1929, “shortly after the
delivery of the new units to Brazil there was a mutiny on board the battleships, which
resulted in the death of several officers and the dismissal of hundreds of enlisted
personnel who had received considerable training in British navy yards.” Spears added,
“the mutiny caused by the men having been educated at the level of the British seaman in
their comforts on board, and after the delivery of the vessels, the incompetent Brazilian
officers not being able to maintain the high standard of living to which they had learned
to expect. This was a blow from which the Brazilian navy had never completely
recovered.” Commenting on the internal conflicts present in the organization of the
Brazilian Navy, Spears noted, “not only were hundreds of good seaman who had been
especially trained, dismissed, but it enhanced the already existing spirit of fear of the
enlisted men on the part of the officers. It created a jealous attitude on the part of the
officers towards educating their enlisted personnel, or allowing contact with foreigners.
Under these conditions the material and morale of the Navy became in a deplorable
state.”87
Brazil’s efforts to modernize its navy in the early twentieth century pushed the
nation to seek foreign firms and naval commissions to help complete the task. This push
to modernize and strengthen the Brazilian Navy also encouraged Brazil to contract
American naval officers to teach at the War College during World War I, a factor that
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brought the two navies closer together. Alencar’s speech found in the annual Brazilian
Navy records from 1913, reveals an administration conscious of the benefits that a
powerful navy would yield, allowing Germany, Japan, and the United States, for
instance, to emerge as world powers. Alencar remarked, “the richest and most energetic
people are also the most powerful at sea, for the grandiose and decadence of nations
coincide with the grandiose and decadence of their navies.”88
Regarding commerce, Alencar noted, “commercial competence will determine
future conflicts,” also observing Germany’s powerful merchant marine as a symbol of
that nation’s greatness. Despite Brazil’s modest role on the global stage as Alencar noted,
“we should not abdicate of our maritime rights, and of the natural expansion of our
forces.”89 Indeed, as more modern and powerful navies emerged in the late nineteenth
century, Brazil’s extensive coastline had been the subject of concern to Brazilian
policymakers. More recently, this rhetoric is evident in the Brazilian Navy’s claim to
control more of the country’s long coastline, and to protect the region they refer to as the
“Amazonia Azul,” the “Blue Amazon,” an area consisting of approximately 3.6 million
squared kilometers.90
As the United States also continued to modernize its own navy in the early
twentieth century, Alencar asserted in 1913, “the American orientation confirms our
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ideas and programs.”91 The Minister of Marine also factored in the need to employ and
properly train Brazilian officers, indicating that the current Brazilian Naval War College
in Rio de Janeiro was not on par with the most modern world navies, pointing to the
organization of the British and American navies as examples. Importantly, Alencar
pointed to the high-quality curriculum at the U.S. Naval Academy in Annapolis,
Maryland, as a model the Brazilian Navy should study further.92 This appreciation for the
American naval structure drew the two nations together, and led Brazil to seek a closer
relationship with the U.S. Navy. In fact, the Brazilian government used several means to
emulate U.S. training. First, Brazil sent officers to study at the U.S. Naval Academy.
Most importantly, the country contracted U.S. Navy officers to teach at the Brazilian
Naval War College. Although the Great War would officially push Brazil towards a U.S.
dominated sphere of influence, the U.S. officers who taught at the Brazilian War College
and worked as U.S. Naval Attachés in Rio de Janeiro, helped bridge U.S.-Brazilian
collaboration once the two nations declared war on Germany.
Recognizing the need to re-structure their navy, in 1914, the Brazilian
government sought to contract two American Navy officers to teach at the Brazilian War
College, “to engage as instructors of tactics and war game at the Naval War College.” As
the U.S. Ambassador to Brazil noted of the distinguished request, “the government does
not contemplate employing officers of any other nationality.”93 On August 13, 1914,
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Brazil nominated U.S. Commander Phillips Williams to be placed in charge of strategy,
tactics, and war games at their Naval War College.94 In the Brazilian annual Navy
reports, published after Williams’ s employment, the Minister of Marine described the
improvement of the Brazilian Naval War College, writing, “the notes obtained from the
first students from the 1914 course indicates great advantages of the same and the
utilization of the recent established instructions… having in this school, a professor, an
official from the American navy and naval attaché of that friendly nation, who spread
among us war tactics from which the principal navy officers dedicate to, and substitute
the real tactical exercises.”95 Captain W.O. Spears also explained in his 1929 report that
hiring of Captain Phillip Williams to organize and teach at the War College gave a much
needed boost to the Brazilian Navy since the devastating effects of the 1910 mutiny.
Importantly, “arrangements were made for keeping four of five Brazilian junior officers
in ships of the U.S. Navy for special training,” a practice that influenced U.S. effect in the
Brazilian Navy, and the training of Brazilian officers according to American standards
for many years.96
Between 1894 and 1914, although the U.S. and Brazil strengthened their
relationship as a result of a convergence of interests pertaining to commercial expansion
and regional security, there was still skepticism among some Brazilians regarding
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stronger bilateral relations. In 1914, growing American concerns about the traditional
British influence, and increasing German influence over Brazil and Argentina, reveal a
continuation of American foreign policy thought at the outbreak of World War I, with the
South American nations becoming even more relevant to the U.S. in face of a regional
security threat. Although Woodrow Wilson’s interventions in Mexico, Haiti, and the
Dominican Republic exemplify American policy in the hemisphere during the period, a
closer look at U.S. policy towards Brazil during the Great War expands the
historiography by factoring in naval diplomacy, and U.S. awareness of South America’s
relevance in the geopolitical framework of the war. As Europe descended into chaos,
World War I represented a turning point for U.S.-Brazilian relations. Specifically,
American influence in Brazil through the use of the navy as a tool to pull the Brazilian
Navy towards the U.S., undoubtedly helped shape U.S. policy towards Brazil.
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Chapter 5: The Role of the U.S. Navy in Strengthening U.S.-Brazilian Relations
During the Great War
Introduction:
The outbreak of World War I had a major impact on Brazil’s relationship with
England, Germany, and the United States. This chapter explores Brazilian and U.S. goals
during World War I, highlighting the strengthening of bilateral relations between the two
countries. Specifically, this case study builds on previous studies by factoring in U.SBrazilian naval relations during the Great War, particularly considering how the U.S.
Navy served as a tool to diminish European influence, and promote American businesses
and regional security. Since U.S. Navy diplomacy increasingly supported the nation’s
foreign policy in the early twentieth century, analyzing American policy in South
America during the Great War through the prism of naval relations helps us better
understand the nation’s World War I strategy. U.S. policy, in part, through naval
diplomacy, shifted the balance of power in the Western hemisphere from Great Britain to
the United States.1 Specifically, this chapter explores the work of the U.S. Navy
Commission during World War I, which taught at the Brazilian Naval War College,
acknowledging the continuing work of American naval officers in solidifying the
relationship between the U.S. and Brazil.
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In This People’s Navy, Kenneth J. Hagan explores the U.S. Navy strategy in the early twentieth
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Britain.1 The U.S. War College was also aware of Germany’s growing naval power and the threat
it posed in the Western Hemisphere. As the War College report noted, “when Germany’s
accelerated (shipbuilding) program is completed, she will still be unable to meet England
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Most of the scholarship on World War I has focused on U.S. interactions with
European powers, and the decision to declare war in 1917.2 However, as the U.S. moved
from neutrality to intervention, South American nations’ policies towards the allies and
Germany was of great concern to U.S. leaders.3 Historian Joseph Tulchin’s explains that,
“the basic features of the Latin America policy in the United States after 1918 were
determined by American experiences during World War I.”4 As the one hundredth
anniversary of the U.S. declaration of war approaches, historians should use the
opportunity to continue offering new perspectives on the U.S. position in global affairs in
the early twentieth century, beyond the traditional interpretations of an isolationist nation
that only reluctantly joined the European powers in 1917. A further evaluation of the use
of the American Navy as a tool of a more assertive, yet less invasive U.S. strategy in
South America during the war, will help diversify the World War I historiography.
2

A collaborative article, “Interchange: WWI,” on the Great War’s place in U.S. history,
published by the Journal of American History, discusses the challenges faced by historians in not
only exploring other less well-known aspects of the war, but also the lack of connection between
the American public and the memory of the war over the years. As Stephen R. Ortiz observes, “it
is important to show both our students and our public that the old narratives of American
isolationism are simply not correct. Moreover, that conception allows an interpretative, quasimoralistic position about the United States as a reluctant belligerent dragged into the world’s dark
affairs only as a last resort (an as saviors of sorts).” See Christopher Capozzola et
al.,“Interchange: WWI,” the Journal of American History, 102, (September, 2015), 465. As Chad
Williams also observes, “I think the narrative of American exceptionalism can be read in different
ways. Adopting a global view of the war inevitably decenters the United States, which can be a
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Journal of American History, 468.
3
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4
Tulchin, The Aftermath of War, v. Tulchin also observes in regards to U.S.-Latin American
policy that, “there was a strong sense within the Department of State that past relations between
the United States and Latin America were not an ideal prologue to close cooperation in wartime.
Officials gave considerable thought to winning the sympathy and friendship of the nations in the
hemisphere. They were sensitive to the fact that the nations in South America objected to the
subordination of the sovereignty of independent nations in the Caribbean,” 20.
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Background and Context
U.S., World War I:
Scholars of U.S. foreign relations have explored how World War I opened Latin
American markets to the United States. Historian Emily Rosenberg notes the financial
advantages the war brought to the U.S., especially as the weakening of European
commercial influence allowed American investors and products to fill the demand for
consumer goods.5 For instance, the War Trade Board (WTB) established by President
Woodrow Wilson in 1917, which sought to control imports and exports during the war,
“became the most important war emergency agency, and it, too, promoted economic
expansion.” In fact, “the State Department urged the WTB to ‘collect information that
will be useful in our fight for foreign trade after the war,’ and the WTB’s Statistical
Division provided the government with its first comprehensive data on world economic
conditions.”6
Even before a formal declaration of war, Wilson’s administration factored
economic concerns into their strategy. For example, “in 1915, Wilson’s second Secretary
of State, Robert Lansing, wrote that ‘commercial expansion and success are closely
interwoven with political domination over the territory which is being exploited.’ He
suggested the extension of economic influence over Latin America as the best way to
strengthen America’s strategic position.”7 After the U.S. officially declared war on
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Germany on April 6, 1917, its South American policy was integral to the nation’s broader
military strategy, beyond military victory in Europe.8 As Rosenberg explains, “the war
weakened competitors yet stimulated America’s own industrial plants and enlarged its
supply of investment capital.”9 Historian Thomas O’Brien also recognizes that U.S.
banks were ideally positioned to engage Latin America after “World War I fractured the
financial links between Latin America and Europe.”10 Tulchin also argues that the war
provided the U.S. with commercial opportunities in Latin America, since European
nations’ financial and commercial strength was shattered by the war’s prolonged
devastation.11 Although the temporary European collapse facilitated American
commercial advantage in South America, the U.S. government had been developing and
implementing a strategy of commercial expansion into Latin American, aided by naval
diplomacy, well before the Great War.

Brazil, World War I:
For a variety of reasons, primarily economic and cultural, Brazil initially remained
neutral after the outbreak of World War I. Trade between Brazil and Germany had
8
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increased since the early twentieth century, particularly German imports of Brazilian
coffee, and there was a large diaspora of Germans living in Brazil.12 However, on April
6, 1917, after the sinking of the Brazilian ship Panama by a German U-Boat, Brazil
severed its relationship with Germany. Despite recognizing that Germany’s use of
submarine warfare threatened Brazilian sovereignty and trade, and a U.S. declaration of
war on April 6, 1917, Brazil did not enter the conflict until later in the year. Brazil’s
declaration of war against the Central Powers, on October 26, cited unrestricted
submarine warfare as the casus belli. Historian Joseph Smith suggests that Brazil
declared war on Germany for two reasons; German submarine warfare, and the Brazilian
desire to continue pursuing the policy of approximation that Minister of Foreign Affairs
Rio Branco had pushed for during his tenure as Brazilian Minister of Foreign Affairs
from 1902-1912.13
In January 1918, the “Divisão Naval em Operações de Guerra” (DNOG), the Naval
Division for War Operations, was created in Brazil. The DNOG was deployed to patrol
the Dakar-Sao Vicente- Gibraltar off the coast of Africa under the command of the
British Navy.14 To the Brazilian government, the country’s participation in World War I
exposed Brazil’s military unpreparedness, as well as vulnerability to outside threat,
prompting the nation to push for military contracts, including naval commissions,
purchase of military equipment, and modernization of its naval arsenal and Naval War
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College. Upon entering the war, Brazil desperately needed to modernize its navy to
develop a cohesive security strategy.
Brazil’s economic relationship with Great Britain, Germany, and the U.S. also
changed because of World War I. The war weakened Britain and Germany’s commercial
power in Brazil, while the U.S. increased its economic ties to the country, and throughout
Latin America. Brazil accepted increased U.S. investments, as well as importation of
products from several U.S. industries, including coal and automobiles. At the same time,
the Brazilians signed contracts with the U.S. to modernize the Brazilian Navy, and train
the Brazilian naval officers according to American methods.

U.S-Brazilian Relations, World War I
Brazil’s Initial Goals During WWI, 1914-1917:
Although sometimes skeptical of American imperialism, the Brazilian government
viewed an alliance with the U.S. in the early twentieth century as a gateway to regional
and global prestige. Hence, it is important to consider Brazil’s motives in choosing to
strengthen their relationship with the U.S. during World War I. First, as Brazil pursued
hegemony in South America, a rapprochement with the U.S. signaled the possibility of
stronger commercial ties, modernization of its navy, and the prospect of an alliance to
strengthen its position on the continent, simultaneously discouraging Argentina from
confronting Brazil militarily. Second, after World War I, Brazil hoped that its support of
U.S. efforts, and its declaration of war on Germany, would guarantee Brazil a seat in the
League of Nations and place Brazil among the world powers.
World War I created an opportunity for Brazil to attain the regional leadership and
global prestige the country had been seeking, specifically by increasing Brazil’s
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international influence relative to that of Argentina and Chile. As a commercial traveler
wrote to U.S. Navy Captain Frank Hill in 1917, “Brazil’s alignment with the United
States, the enthusiastic endorsement by the press of the country of the government’s
action in breaking off neutrality, the accounts of the reception given the American
squadron, the fact that Brazil has seemingly wrested the leadership in South American
affairs away from Argentina, all this has served to radically change the viewpoint in the
south.”15 In fact, some in the U.S. Navy questioned Brazil’s motives in fostering a
relationship with the U.S. during the war. In March 1918, a letter in the U.S. Office of
Naval Intelligence contended that, “the actual reason,” for Brazil eventually declaring
war on Germany, “was the Argentine threat against Brazil, not the sinking of the
Brazilian ship by a German submarine. By her declaration of war against Germany,
Brazil automatically acquired the United States as an ally and thus checkmated
Argentina- the later government was, and is, pro-German and thus antagonistic towards
the United States. The presence of our Naval ships however, was sufficient guarantee that
the Argentine would not attack Brazil.”16
The Brazilian government believed that to compete with its regional rivals for
leadership in Latin America, protect its extensive coastline, and elevate its global
prestige, it needed a modernized navy. In particular, since the ABC nations, Argentina,
Brazil, and Chile, often compared their power with regard to the strength of their navies,
concerns about the regional balance of power influenced Brazilian naval strategy. At the
15
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same time, the inefficiency of the Brazilian Navy in the early twentieth century exposed
the country to outside threats. For example, in 1917, as the tensions between Germany
and Brazil escalated, the Brazilian Minister of Marine, Alexandrino de Alencar,
explained in a speech the difficulties of the unprepared Brazilian Navy. “Recently,” he
states, ‘the events showed its insufficiency, given on one hand, the variables that a
modern naval war has demonstrated with the consecration of the submarine and aviation,
and on the other hand, the enemy that we have faced and the allied elements to which we
have to support.”17
In seeking to modernize the Brazilian Navy, Alencar looked positively on the benefits
from the recent experience with Commander Phillip Williams. By 1916, Williams had
been teaching at the Brazilian Naval War College for two years, and he had been highly
successful in improving the Brazilian naval curriculum. In 1916, upon the Brazilian
government’s request to continue using the services of Commander Williams, U.S.
Secretary of State Robert Lansing wrote the U.S. Secretary of the Navy regarding the
benefit of such an arrangement. Lansing remarked, “realizing the many advantages from
many standpoints of the presence of American naval instructors in Latin American Naval
War Colleges, may I venture to ask that, if not inconsistent with your plans in regards to
Commander Williams, the Ambassador’s recommendation be given favorable
consideration.”18
Moreover, in 1916, U.S. Ambassador Edwin Morgan wrote the U.S. Secretary of
State, praising Williams’s success in building a closer relationship with the Brazilian
17
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Navy towards a closer relationship with the United States. Morgan noted, “when he was
first invited to become a professor in the College, a number of officers, including Captain
Souza e Silva,” a Navy Captain and influential member of the Brazilian Chamber of
Deputies, “doubted whether an American officer would be [as] efficient as one from a
European navy.” Morgan continued, “only after the Commander had been tried out did
prejudice give way and it was recognized that his personal qualities and professional
efficiency made him the right man in the right place.” Importantly, as Morgan noted, “the
result has undoubtedly been not only to raise appreciation of the character of our navy
among Brazilian officers but to assure the request from the Minister of the Marine that
another American naval officer be detailed to succeed Commander Williams when the
latter’s term of duty ends.”19 Brazilian Captain Costa e Silva also commended Williams
for his contribution to the betterment of the Brazilian Navy in his speech to the Chamber
of Deputies. Captain Costa e Silva asserted, “in a little more than two years our navy has
reached the point which the American Navy had acquired [after] 25 years of study of war
to attain; this is made possible by the fact that the American officer brings to our College
the experience of 25 years of training in the American school…”20
Similarly, in 1917, when William was reassigned to command the USS Chester,
Ambassador Morgan again noted that he had done “a great deal to turn the current of
Brazilian naval opinion toward American methods and ideals.” Morgan advised, “nothing
would probably be more effective in keeping that current flowing toward us than the
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nomination of an American naval officer to succeed him at the said college.”21 In another
letter, Ambassador Morgan continued to observe the benefits that the American Navy
officers brought to U.S. interests in Brazil. He wrote, “the influences which we have
recently exerted over the Brazilian navy were principally due to the effective teaching of
Captain Phillip Williams, U.S.N., between 1914-1917, in the Naval War College.”
Morgan continued, “and to the favorable impressions which the Brazilian Naval Attaché
in Washington and the young Brazilian officers who have served on board our
battleships, have brought home.” As evidence that navy officers played a significant role
influencing their respective governments, Morgan noted that older officers in the
Brazilian Navy had either studied under the British Navy, or were in London during
construction of Brazilian battleships, hence the traditional British dominant influence in
the Brazilian Navy. Morgan concluded, “if she extends the invitation to a British Naval
Mission her identification with the United States and American political influence in
Brazil will diminish in proportion as that of France and Great Britain increases.”22
In 1922, a historical sketch on Brazil that the U.S. State Department sent to the
Office of Naval Intelligence during World War I, prepared for Lieutenant R.E. Sherman,
reveals the crucial role the U.S. officers played as well. The World War I report read,
“the navy department is sending a suitable officer to Brazil for service in the Naval War
College at Rio and will later send such officers as may seem advisable as the importance
of military and naval commissions to Latin America is fully appreciated in view of the
effect these commissions have on the political and commercial interests of the nation
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which have sent them in the past.”23 Moreover, as the Brazilian Minister of Marine laid
out plans for new navy equipment and reorganization, he also acknowledged the
contribution of foreign naval commissions and the teaching conducted by the American
instructors, which contributed to Brazil’s choice to hire an American Navy Commission
in 1918. As Alencar explained in 1917, “in addition, it has been recognized the efficiency
of foreign instructors, measures that we have approved, authorizing the contract of
American officials, already among us, conducting the teachings as it should be
conducted.”24
U.S. Initial Goals During WWI, 1914-1917:
Early in the Great War, the U.S. sought to build pro-U.S. sentiments in Brazil, using
navy diplomacy as a tool. Although initially the U.S. remained neutral, its policies
towards Latin American continued to focus on commercial expansion and promoting
regional security with the aid of the American Navy. Although some historians have
considered U.S- Latin American relations and commercial expansion during the Great
War, the historiography lacks a detailed evaluation of the American Navy’s role in
carrying out the U.S.’s wartime strategy in South America. The American Navy served
the dual purpose of transmitting a positive message on behalf of the U.S., while
attempting to draw Brazil into the American sphere of influence. The U.S. Navy proved
essential in the protection and expansion of American influence in South America during
and after the war. It also helped develop an informal commercial empire in the region.
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Notably, U.S. Navy Admiral William B. Caperton’s leadership during U.S.
occupations of Haiti (1915), and the Dominican Republic (1916), helped shape his views
on the role of naval diplomacy in carrying U.S. policies in South America during the war,
promoting greater control of Latin America in general. Caperton served as the
Commander in Chief of the U.S. Pacific Fleet, and was also deployed to command the
South American forces during World War I. He acquired tremendous experience, and a
nuanced understanding of how the South American nations perceived the U.S., as well as
the potential that the American Navy carried for changing U.S.-Latin America relations.
His writings are insightful and revealing of not only an officer’s personal accounts and
opinions, but also of U.S. Navy diplomacy achievements in Latin America in the early
twentieth century. Caperton wrote, “now it is the time for us to tighten the grasp on these
wavering Southern Republics, and the sooner we take a firm, positive and honest stand
with them, the better for all hands. We have no one to interfere at present, and by the time
the world is at peace again, we should have firmly established our position, and our
connections with these countries.” Importantly, Caperton urged, “from a military point of
view, we can hold them in Status Quo, but, to my mind, now is the time to encourage,
and, I might say, force them to help themselves, and by proper means, to induce them to
cooperate with us and allow us to establish good strong, and firm governments for them.”
By status quo, Caperton meant the existing limited influence that the American Navy
exerted upon the South American nations, encouraging a more active role on the part of
the U.S. Navy in the region. In 1916, Caperton had also taken command of the U.S.
Pacific Fleet, policing Mexico and Nicaragua, and the following year, he took over the
U.S. South Atlantic forces stationed in Brazil.25
25

Behind the Throne, Servants of Power to Imperial Presidents, chapter 3, “Admiral William B.

146

Once World War I broke out, the Allies factored Latin America into their wartime
strategy, exposing Brazil’s vulnerability and unpreparedness for battle, which generated
concerns about the impact of labor and economic instability on strategic resources,
factors that affected American national security and concern for regional stability. Hence,
throughout the war, the U.S. Navy continued to observe and report on Brazil’s
conditions. In 1917, the U.S. Naval Attaché in Brazil, Captain Frank Hill, wrote, “the
general internal conditions here are seemingly bad. There are many causes tending to
produce this effect, and it seems desirable to call the attention of our government to this,
as it may influence international relations and, indirectly, the war.” Specifically, Hill
reported on labor strikes in Brazil, “the latest reports state that the strike has reached the
manganese mines… This is a serious condition of affairs, because the United States is
absolutely dependent upon Brazil for its supply of this mineral.” The Captain also
reported on instabilities in Southern Brazil, “some American lumber interests are
threatened with destruction, and no relief in sight.” Regarding the connection between
economic instability and political revolution, Hill observed, “the war has produced in this
country a great increase in the cost of everything, but especially in foodstuffs. The
Caperton: Proconsul and Diplomat,” by David Healy, edited by Thomas J. McCormick, and
Walter LaFaber (The University of Wisconsin Press, 1993), 82. For more on Caperton, see
Healy’s chapter 3. Healy offers an insight into Caperton’s career, specifically his role in the U.S.
occupation of Haiti in 1915 and the Dominican Republic in 1916, prior to commanding the South
Atlantic forces during WWI. Caperton assumed a leadership role in Haitian internal affairs,
sometimes making crucial decisions prior to receiving specific orders from the U.S. State
Department. As Healy explains, “up to this time,” the U.S. had occupied Port-au-Prince and Cap
Haitien, “Admiral Caperton had largely improvised policy as he went along, receiving State
Department approval after the event,” 71. Healy observed that, “in guiding the intervention and
its political development, Caperton exercised large powers of decision… U.S. policy over the
recent past had clearly moved toward intervention in Haiti, but Caperton was left to make the
crucial early moves on his own,” 74. His actions in Haiti are reflective of the role officers played
in diplomacy. Moreover, his close involvement in Haiti allowed him to have a nuanced
understanding of Latin America. Caperton proved to be extremely significant to U.S.-South
American policy during World War I, and he continued to advise his government on how to use
the navy to carry on U.S. goals in the region.
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laboring class, already poorly paid, is unable to live on their old pay, due to these
increases, and this has produced general unrest. Paid agents are quick to seize this
opportunity to fan the flame of discontent, and the German furnish the agents.”26 The
Captain’s observations revealed how instability and unpreparedness in Brazil represented
a potential threat to hemispheric security and American interests.
As noted above, the war also brought about fears of German infiltration in South
America. The U.S. Naval Attaché continued to monitor German influence in Brazil as
part of the broader World War I American policy strategy of keeping South America
under the U.S. umbrella of influence. For instance, in August 1917, regarding the
growing German threat, Captain Frank Hill reported, “German merchants located in this
country are numerous, well-organized, and rich.”27 Hill also received reports from a
commercial traveler regarding the German activities in the country. The informant
reported, “in accordance with our conversation, I was on the watch for signs of proGerman activity, especially anything which might have to do with giving aid or
furnishing supplies to enemy raiders or submarines along the coast.” As Brazil moved
from neutrality to cutting off its relationship with Germany after the sinking of the
Brazilian ship Panama, the same report noted the change in attitude among some
Brazilians towards Germany. The traveler observed, “this change in attitude is very
apparent, and, in most instances, would seem to be sincere.” The Naval Attaché
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concluded its report by asserting that the Germans were “working to create political
unrest, and to disturb Brazilian manganese trade to the United States.”28
In addition, in 1917, a reply to the Office of Naval Intelligence on the political
situation in Brazil, considered Argentina’s position regarding Germany, Brazil, and the
United States. Argentina had reached an agreement with Germany not to sink more
Argentinian ships after the incident with the Argentinian ship, Toro. The report noted
Argentina’s stance towards the war, stating that the Argentines did not want to follow
Brazil’s lead, “the rivalry between Brazil and Argentina tends to make that country side
with Germany.”29 Nonetheless, Argentina’s reluctance to cut diplomatic relations with
Germany posed a threat to U.S. hemispheric security and World War I strategy. The
report concluded, “I have been informed that this latter event,” referring to the possibility
of the Argentine President being deposed, “may happen at any time and it is essential that
it should take place if the United States government desires the Argentine to work in
harmony with the rest of the South American Republics. Every known method of
pressure should be exerted at once and in the most forceful way.”30
In fact, U.S. fear of German influence in Argentina, was another factor which
contributed to growing collaboration between the U.S. and Brazil. In 1917, after Brazil
had cut off relations with Germany, the U.S. State Department wrote the U.S. Navy
Department regarding a possible Argentinian action against Brazil, suggesting that
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American battleships be sent to Brazil. The Secretary of the Navy also informed the State
Department of a squadron that arrived in Rio de Janeiro, “and that it is contemplated to
send this squadron in the near future to Uruguay,” adding, “this department is of the
opinion that it is not advisable at the present time to detail a battleship division on this
duty, unless the need for such ship would appear to be more pressing than at present.”31
As part of its World War I strategy, the U.S. not only worked to prevent Germany
from infiltrating Brazil, but also saw in the war an opportunity to draw Brazil closer to
the U.S. Since the establishment of the republic, Brazilian officers received training from
several European navies, particularly Britain. Moreover, Brazil purchased navy ships and
material from the British, a factor that had sustained considerable British influence within
the Brazilian Navy. U.S. Captain W.O. Spears worked with the Navy Commission in
Brazil during World War I, and with the Navy Mission in 1922, and was also a member
of the U.S. War Plan Division in 1940. Spears provided his observations in 1929
regarding the traditional British-Brazilian and the growing U.S.- Brazilian naval
relations.32 As he recalled regarding the connection between British naval influence in
Brazil and British-Brazilian commercial relations before World War I, “as there has
never been any adequate shipbuilding facilities in Brazil, all of their foreign vessels have
either been bought ready made or built to order in foreign shipbuilding plants.” Spears
added, “it is the custom to send the entire officer and crew complement to the foreign
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ship yards for instruction and training where construction is started. In fact, Vickers and
Armstrong plants in England made special features of training the personnel of the
Brazilian navy in order to insure getting the contracts.” Importantly, Spears explained,
“the principal units now composing the Brazilian navy, two battleships, two scout cruises
and ten destroyers were all constructed simultaneously and delivered in 1910 and 1911.
Over 2500 Brazilian officers and men were on duty for two years in British shipyards
watching the construction of these ships and being indoctrinated by the British as to their
operations.”33
A closer relationship between Brazilian and foreign navy officers resulted in a greater
business opportunity in the future to the country sending the officers to train the Brazilian
Navy, a tactic the U.S. hoped to use in Brazil during World War I when it decided to send
American naval officers to teach at the War College in 1918. For instance, Spears
observed the success the British had attained stemming from training and the
modernization of the Brazilian Navy. “This, of course,” he stated, “accounts for the very
pro-British feeling existing in the Brazilian navy, especially among the higher ranking
officers.” Spears concluded, “all units of the Brazilian navy were organized in accordance
with the existing organization of the British navy. The British Admiralty lent
considerable assistance for this purpose.”34 As further evidence of the U.S. goal of
diminishing the British and French military influence in Brazil, in early 1917, when
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Brazil was developing plans to build a naval arsenal at Ilha das Cobras in Rio de Janeiro,
the American Consul General in Brazil reported to the State Department that the wartime
economic pressure on France and Great Britain presented the U.S. with a considerable
opportunity to advance its interests in Brazil.
The diminishing of European influence in the Brazilian military was also closely
intertwined with the expansion of American businesses during the war. In fact, the
weakening of the European economy during the war facilitated U.S. commercial strategy
in Brazil. As evidence of the financial impact of the war on Great Britain and France, and
the consequences of this impact to their commercial relations in Brazil, the American
Consul general in Brazil explained to the Secretary of State, “it is said that the plans,” for
naval constructions in Rio de Janeiro, “would also comport the construction of dry-docks,
for which contract was awarded to a French Company some time ago, but subsequently
cancelled by reason of the financial crisis.” The Consul continued, “it is also said that the
Armstrong firm of London, was to have sent engineers here to examine into the project,
at the instance of the French Syndicate in question, but the outbreak of the war diverted
their plans.” The Consul added, “I am informed that an agent of certain promotors here is
presenting the project to the International Corporation in New York, to see if they would
contemplate undertaking it.”35 The State Department relayed the information to the U.S.
Secretary of the Navy.
After the U.S. declared war, Latin America continued to play a big role in U.S.
strategy. The American government, continuing to use its navy a tool, actively sought the
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support of the Brazilian government. For example, upon his visit to Brazil during the war,
Admiral William B. Caperton focused on navy diplomacy, participating in parades,
ceremonies, and other entertainment events, including a Fourth of July event, also
visiting Uruguay and Argentina. According to historian David Healy in Behind the
Throne, Caperton’s friendly interactions with the Brazilians produced positive results for
the U.S. According to Healy, “the Brazilians extended their revocation of neutrality from
the United States alone to all the Entente Allies, while after the squadron’s departure,
they consulted the American embassy about naval measures they might take to protect
their own waters against U-boats. The embassy gave high marks to Caperton’s public
relations campaign but was unable to say when or whether Brazil would actually declare
war.”36
Admiral Caperton had in fact contributed to the perpetuation of a positive image
of the United States in Brazil. Indeed, U.S. Navy diplomacy in Brazil, under the
command of Caperton, helped push the Brazilian government to declare war on Germany
in October 1917. Healy notes, “at the end of five weeks of goodwill visiting and
attempted diplomatic pressure, Caperton found himself famous throughout South
America, with instant access to important people everywhere. He had helped improve his
country’s image and popularized his cause. Embassy reports from all three capitals
praised his effectiveness and charm; no man, they agreed, could have done better as a
propagandist and advocate.”37 Historian Robert Scheina also observes that, “although
Brazil was on the path to war, the visit of four American armored cruisers with Admiral
B. Caperton, Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet, on board probably sped up the

36
37

Healy, Behind the Throne, 90.
Healy, Behind the Throne, 91.

153

process. Caperton went to spread U.S. influence and convince South American nations to
join the war on the Allied side, a mission his force, with its handsome armored cruisers
and smart U.S. bluejackets contrasting with the heavily used British warships and the
patrol-weary Royal Navy sailors who frequented Brazilian ports, was well suited to.”38
Explaining the value of the personal relationship American Navy officers had cultivated,
a report in the Division of Naval Intelligence asserted that it “is the consensus of opinion
among Americans in Brazil, Uruguay and Argentine that the visit of this squadron did
more to promote good feeling towards the United States than had been accomplished by
diplomacy in fifty years.”39
U.S.-Brazil, World War I Navy Diplomacy:
U.S. Navy diplomacy was particularly critical during the war, playing a key role in
Brazil formally joining the Allies. American naval officers continued fostering good
relations with the Brazilian Navy, a factor that contributed to the strengthening of
bilateral relations. For instance, upon arriving in South America with his Navy squadron
in 1918, Admiral Caperton recalled anti-American sentiments in 1917, a feeling he
believed was eventually transformed into a pro-U.S. attitude. While acknowledging the
role of diplomats, and Brazil’s fears regarding Argentina’s aspirations in the hemisphere
as important factors in bringing Brazil under U.S. influence during the war, he asserted
that the U.S. Navy played the greatest part in this positive outcome. The Admiral
contended that, “with all of these contributing causes however, it is believed that the
largest single factor in fixing public opinion in Brazil and Uruguay strongly in our favor,
has been the visits of our naval vessels.” He added that, “the government of these two
38
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countries have already determined their pro-American policies, but the presence of our
squadron has served to translate [these] policies into a strong popular friendship for the
United States, in a way which no other means could so effectively have done.”40
During the war, both the U.S. and Brazil sought to strengthen their naval relations.
Dealing with a weak navy and developing plans to strengthen their maritime defense and
prestige, Brazil was eager to work with the U.S. For instance, in July 1918 conditions
were so bad in the Brazilian fleet that one Brazilian naval officer suggested to the U.S.
commanding officer of the Cincinnati that a “naval alliance or consolidation of the navies
of the United States and Brazil,” might be advisable. His idea was “that the United States
should virtually take over the Brazilian battleships, leaving to the Brazilian naval officers
and Brazilian naval vessels of smaller types, the patrol of Brazilian rivers, harbors and
sea coast.” Adding, “the Brazilians undoubtedly look to the United States Navy for a
guidance and for their standards of performance and conduct.”41
In 1918, when the DNOG was deployed to patrol the Dakar-Sao Vicente-Gibraltar
off the coast of Africa, recognizing the opportunity that World War I and the cooperation
between the Brazilian and U.S. Navy represented, the U.S. Secretary of the Navy,
Josephus Daniels, instructed the U.S. Navy Commander in European waters to work
towards strengthening the relationship between the two navies. Daniels wrote, “aside
from any military benefit that may be desired from Brazil’s participation in the war, it is
considered most important that everything possible be done to foster cordial relations in
the country and in South America generally.” As evidence of the relevance of using the
navy officers to solidify this relationship, Daniels explained the U.S. strategy, “in
40
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accordance with this policy the Department now has on duty with the Brazilian Navy a
detail of four officers- three on shore at Rio de Janeiro at the War College and aviation
school, and one afloat the Sao Paulo in connection with organization and gunnery
training.” Noting that the Brazilian battleships Sao Paulo and Minas Gerais would be at
the Navy Yard in New York for repair, the Secretary insisted, “during the stay of those
battleships it is proposed to make every effort to train the personnel both ashore and
afloat as conditions will permit.” Finally, regarding the Brazilian military stationed at
European waters, Daniels instructed, “to each Brazilian cruiser, one gunnery officer, one
chief gunner’s mate, one chief machinist’s mate and one chief electrician; and to each
destroyer, one officer of destroyer experience, one chief gunner’s mate, and one
machinist’s mate, with instructions to indoctrinate this force in the methods and practice
of our navy.”42
During World War I, both American and Brazilian officers contributed to
strengthening naval relations between the two nations. For instance, as Scheina noted of
Admiral Caperton’s influence, “Brazil received its first formal naval mission in 1917
when she declared war on Germany and signed a contract with five members of the
British navy, one commander and four gunnery instructors. Rear Admiral Caperton, USN
persuaded the Brazilians to obtain North American instructors as well.”43 As Captain
W.O. Spears also recalled, “it was the vigilance of Admiral Caperton which discovered
and thwarted the intentions of the Brazilian navy to ask for British officers to instruct
them, when they declared war on Germany.” Explaining the opportunity that the Great
42
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War had brought to the U.S. in Brazil, Spears noted in 1929, “after the World War
started, the U.S. maintained a fleet under Caperton in South American waters.” Spears
emphasized, “no American has ever been more popular in all circles of Brazil than
Admiral Caperton. The relations fostered by him with the Brazilian naval and political
parties had a far-reaching effect.”44
Appreciating the contributions of American officers, and their interactions with
the Brazilian Navy, especially at the Brazilian Naval War College during Word War I,
requires a close look. As Spears wrote in his 1929 report, “Commander Spears was
assigned to duty afloat with the two battleships. The Captain of the Sao Paulo was
Captain Cesar de Mello and of the Minas Gerais, Captain Jose M. Penido. Both were
young, enthusiastic and very influential.” Captain Spears recalled that this new
generation of navy officers were eager to improve the Brazilian Navy. Spears wrote,
“both Captains were disgusted with the utter disorganization of the Brazilian navy and
after a few days gave commander Spears ‘carte blanche’ to reorganize both ships
according to the American standard battleship organization. The organization used in the
battleship North Dakota was placed into effect.” As a result of the American Navy’s
efficient work, “there was no trouble of convincing the two captains of the necessity of
visiting the U.S., to install a modern fire control system.”45
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Importantly, Brazilian officers also visited the U.S. As Spears wrote, “while in the
U.S. all officers had the opportunity to cruise in American ships of the same type and
gain practical experience… The navy department permitted groups of Brazilian officers
to attend all service professional schools…Aviation material furnished, flying field and
hangars constructed, and numerous aviators trained both in the U.S. and Brazil.” Captain
Spears also pointed out the improvement of naval training in Brazil, “A section of fleet
training was started in the general Staff and scheduled target practices commenced…A
new projectile was designed for the Brazilian navy and fighting rangers increased.”
Regarding commercial relations through navy diplomacy, Spears noted, “all repair work
in the U.S. was performed at cost price and all material furnished through Navy
Department Bureaus and actual cost. This saved millions to Brazilian Government.”46
Regarding the influence of the British Navy, which faced challenges during World
War I, thus allowing the U.S. Navy to work more closely with the Brazilian officers, the
U.S. Commanding Officer of the Cincinnati explained to the U.S. Secretary of the Navy,
“the enlisted personnel of the British Navy and the various naval auxiliaries in South
America waters are not up to the usual British standards of the British Navy. A large
proportion of the British sailors are young men or boys with little training… the high
character and good conduct of the enlisted men of the United States Navy in South
American waters is frequently remarked upon by the South Americans and by foreigners
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in South American ports.”47 This is another important observation of how U.S. Navy
officers played a part in representing the U.S. in foreign nations, and, in this case,
achieving the objective of luring the Brazilian Navy away from the dominating British
influence, moving the Brazilian Navy closer to the U.S. Navy instead. It is also reflective
of the opportunity that the Great War presented to the U.S. to usher out European
influence from South America. U.S-Brazilian cooperation during World War I changed
the status quo, contributing to the Brazilian navy gradually shifting towards the influence
of the American Navy, away from the British Navy.
After Brazil declared war, both the U.S. and Brazilian governments recognized the
precarious state of the Brazilian Navy, which led to the hiring of a U.S. Naval
Commission to teach at the Brazilian War College in 1918. On November 5, 1917,
Ambassador Morgan noted, “now, however, that Brazil is at war and looking realities in
the face, unconvincing arguments are swept away and the fact that both officers and men
are in need of instruction stands out in bold light.”48 In fact, the restructuring of its Naval
War College remained a part of the Brazilian naval strategy throughout the War. For
instance, in 1918, then Brazilian Minister of Marine, Antonio Coutinho Gomes Pereira,
reiterated, “it is necessary to modify the state in which the school is found, either
removing its causes, or attenuating its effects, because without elevating the naval
teaching to the standard that it should be, we cannot have the navy we desire.” Pereira
spoke of the relevance to develop consistent training, “the importance of education as
bases of technical efficiency is not a subject that needs to be further discussed, and no
one contests its influence over the morale of a military organization, in which the
47
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reciprocal trust during dangerous moments, is indispensable to the cohesion that strengths
it.”49
As Brazil continued to develop tactics to modernize and train its military during
World War I, the U.S. government feared the possibility of a permanent, organized naval
mission coming from Great Britain to guide the Brazilian Navy. Aware of the influence a
foreign naval mission would exert upon Brazil’s affairs, Ambassador Morgan warned the
U.S. State Department of the implications of a French Army Mission and a British Naval
Mission to Brazil. For instance, in November 1917, Morgan wrote to the U.S. Secretary
of State, “there is a strong movement in and out of Congress to invite a group of French
officers to instruct Brazilian army, which will further increase French influence already
unnecessarily strong.”50 Morgan asked the State Department to communicate with the
Brazilian Ambassador to the U.S. that the U.S. government “would unfavorably regard an
invitation to a British Naval Mission on account of jeopardy to our American continental
interests.”51 On a different note Morgan stated, “the department would be unwise and
somewhat selfish if it opposed a clearly expressed desire on the part of Brazil to employ a
French military mission.” Adding however, “it would be a statesmanlike act to prevent a
British naval mission from securing control of the instruction in the Brazilian navy which
is already too largely under the influence of British traditions and prestige.”52
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Morgan further explained, “if an American officer were established in the War
College a good deal could be accomplished to prevent an English Mission from obtaining
a monopoly of influence and control.” Morgan concluded, “the United States may be
surprised one day to find the new Brazilian navy being wholly constructed in English
yards upon English designs. One way to prevent it is by taking the precautions suggested
in case a British naval mission is invited to come to Brazil.”53 A week later, Morgan
insisted, “a British Naval Mission would not only assure the construction in British
shipyards of the new units of the Brazilian navy but would render it impossible for the
Bethlehem Steel Company and similar American corporations to secure contracts for
arsenals, dockyards, and costal defense.”54 Clearly, Brazil’s desire to modernize its navy,
especially while collaborating with the U.S. during the war, opened up an opportunity for
the U.S. to use naval diplomacy as a way to further U.S. commercial interests in Brazil,
while also training the Brazilian Navy according to an American naval model,
diminishing the British influence. This strategy would more assertively materialize once
the U.S. won the naval mission contract with Brazil in 1922. In early 1918, Ambassador
Morgan continued to warn of British influence over the Brazilian Navy, writing to the
U.S. Secretary of State Robert Lansing, that the appointment of American officers to the
Brazilian War College should be done as soon as possible. Morgan warned, “the
Department will be interested to learn that four British naval non-commissioned officers
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have already reached Rio de Janeiro and have begun to instruct the enlisted men of the
Brazilian navy in gunnery.”55
Morgan was also critical of what he perceived as Navy Secretary Josephus
Daniels’s indifference towards the possible contract of a British Navy Mission to Brazil.
Daniels had stated that his department would not suggest that they would not favor a
British Naval Mission to Brazil. In reply, Morgan laid out the State Department’s
ongoing naval diplomatic policy towards Latin America, reminding Secretary of State
Lansing that, “this office has understood that it was basic principle of our South
American policy that all American navies as much as possible should be brought under
the influence of the Navy of the United States.” Morgan added that, “no more practical
method could probably be devised than by accrediting American naval missions to the
navies of the leading South American Powers.” Regarding the commercial benefit to the
U.S., the Ambassador’s summary of American naval diplomacy clearly outlines the State
Department’s early twentieth century strategy. Morgan wrote, “not only would the
probability be increased of the future construction in our shipyards of their naval vessels
and of orders of naval material being placed with our steel works, but the development
and standardizing of an American continental type of naval science would facilitate the
cooperation of American naval units when either a necessity or an opportunity should
present itself.”56
On January 16, 1918 Daniels wrote the U.S. State Department, “I appreciate fully
the importance of military and naval commissions to South American states on account
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of the marked political and commercial effect that these commissions have produced in
the interest of nations sending them in the past and which they will produce in the
future.” Concerning the replacement of U.S. Captain Phillip Williams who had been
teaching at the Naval War College in Brazil since 1914, Daniels proceeded to say that the
Department intended to send more officers to the Brazilian Naval War College.57
On February 1918, the State Department answered the American Embassy in Rio
de Janeiro announcing that, “Captain [Carl T.] Vogelgesang, Naval War College,
Commander Sheer, Gunnery expert, and Lieutenant [P.A.] Cusachs, aviation instructor
have been ordered to Rio de Janeiro.” The State Department also reiterated that both the
State and Navy Department agreed that, “naval commissions desired by South American
countries should be sent exclusively from the United States,” hoping that the sending off
the three officers mentioned above would push the non-commissioned British officers out
of the Brazilian Navy.58 Secretary Lansing made the Department’s position clear
regarding naval diplomacy as a tool to exert influence in Brazil. Lansing wrote, “with
regard to the Brazilian-American naval cooperation, you will have seen from the
Department's cable of February 11, 5pm and from other cables on this subject that both
the State and Navy departments take the keenest interest in bringing about such
cooperation. In spite of some misunderstanding, caused possibly by crossing of
telegrams, it now appears settled that the Brazilian naval unit is to be regarded for
administrative purposes as part of the United States squadron now based on Gibraltar.”
The Secretary reiterated, “your understanding that it is a basic principle of our South
57
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American policy that all American navies as much as possible shall be brought under the
influence of the navy of the United States, is correct.”59 The U.S. government pursued a
policy of military cooperation with Great Britain during the War, while carefully using
the opportunity to undermine British influence in Brazil through navy diplomacy.
The U.S. Navy Commission faced several challenges upon its arrival in Brazil in
1918, though it was ultimately well-received. Captain Spears’s 1929 report highlights the
challenges the U.S. Navy Commission faced and its impact in Brazil during the war.
Spears explained, “the word ‘mission’ has an entirely different meaning to Latins,
particularly Brazilians, that it has with English speaking people. To them it suggests the
idea of dominance, power, military ports and bases, new ships, etc. In negotiating for
American officers to instruct the Brazilian navy, it was frequently stressed that these
officers were wanted in an advisory capacity only.” Explaining the challenges that the
American Navy encountered at first, Spears asserted, “whereas the civil authorities, the
President and Congress, urgently desired a new organization, the navy, who didn’t want
any mission at all, won their point to the extent of reducing the status of the American
officers to that of an advisory capacity.” In fact, Captain Spears explained that
Alexandrino de Alencar, the Brazilian Minister of Marine, opposed the contracting of
American Navy officers, “and only accepted them as a political expediency.”60 Even so,
early in 1923 the Naval Attaché wrote the director of Naval Intelligence that after a
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“luke-warm” reception, Alencar’s behavior towards the mission after it arrived was
“cordial,” and that he supported the Mission.61
Given Spears’ observations, it is evident that the American officers had a
challenging task ahead in integrating the Brazilian Navy into the American sphere of
influence. As the Captain recalled, “it was in this hostile naval atmosphere that the first
group of American officers began their work. This group was as follows: Captain C.T.
Vogelgesang, Commander W.O. Spears, Lt. (j.g.) P.A. Cusachs, Ens. O.B. James,” both
reserve aviators. Regarding the naval commission arrangements, Spears explained, “there
was nothing to indicate the scope of duties or status of these officers. No arrangements
had been made between the two governments, except that our Navy Department agreed to
furnish four officers, one for the War College, one for the fire control and two aviators.”
According to Spears, “knowing the Brazilian aversion to a mission, Captain Vogelgesang
decided to call his organization a ‘commission,’” which Brazilians accepted, an example
of Captain Vogelgesang’s political acumen.62
As evidence of the work of the American naval commission in Brazil, Cusachs
and James wrote a report to the Senior Member of the U.S. Naval Mission [Commission]
to Brazil in 1919, on the “proposed regulations for the Naval Aviation School, School
Routine Tables, Flying Department and Engineering Department organization,
Diagrammatic chart showing organization of the Brazilian Navy Department, Regulations
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for the Aeronautic Artificers School, Material list ordered by Battleship [Sao Paulo] and
Aviation Nomenclature.” Importantly, the Lieutenants noted of their work, “this duty
may be defined by the three requirements of (1) the organization of a Naval Aviation
Corps for the Brazilian Navy, (2) the furthering of friendly relations between the
Brazilian and United States Navies, and (3) the prevention of foreign interference into
Brazilian Naval Aviation matters with the main object of maintenance of control towards
State Department ends.” In their observations of foreign interference, Cusachs and James
wrote that during their service in Brazil, a captain from the Royal Navy “tried to get
himself attached to the Aviation School by the General Staff over our heads, supposedly
for the study of commercial possibilities of Aviation in Brazil for Vickers Limited, but
was unsuccessful…” The Lieutenants also noted commercial competition from the
Italians, who wanted to “break into the American control of Brazilian Naval Aviation.”
Moreover, they also wrote that the French Army Mission in Brazil had also been trying to
gain advantages in the Brazilian navy and army flying.63 The U.S. Navy’s interaction
with the Brazilian Navy during World War I operations, and the U.S. Navy Commission
teaching at the Brazilian War College contributed to bringing the Brazilian Navy under
U.S. influence in the 1920s.
Spears’s report also provides some information on what assignments American
officers received. As Spears explained, “upon request of the Brazilians for additional
officers, Commander Orr relieved Commander Spears on the Sao Paulo, and Commander
Hartigan reported to the Brazilian Minister of Marine to organize a fleet training section
in the General Staff. Lt. Burks, the engineer officer of the Raleigh, was continued on the
63

15 May 1919, from Lieutenant P.A. Cusachs and Lieutenant O.B. James to Senior Member of
the U.S. Naval Mission [Commission], RG38, E-98 NM63 HM 2006, Box #581, Subject code c10-I, Register #14794-a (14784ww-14811I), NARA I.

166

Sao Paulo. Captain Woodward was ordered to the General Staff for destroyers
operations.” Moreover, “six warranted officers were ordered for miscellaneous duties. Lt.
Commander Capehart reported for aviation duty.” According to Spears, “the result of all
these efforts was to gradually improve the situation. However, it was like building a
house by commencing the roof. There was no great difficulty in effecting improvements
at sea,” pointing to the reorganization of the Navy Department and the General Staff as
the most challenging. Importantly, Spears recalled, “for four years the Brazilian navy was
practically outfitted from the New York Navy Yard. There were no local resources
available. The naval material departments, pay departments, accounting and personnel
affairs remained in the greatest state of chaos.” As a result of these interactions and
general assessment of the conditions of the Brazilian Navy, Captain Spears asserted that
the Naval Commission suggested a “complete reorganization of the Brazilian Navy
Department.” 64 Although the Navy Commission of 1918 served in a limited capacity as
advisors, the American officers’ advice eventually materialized when the U.S. sent the
more coordinated Navy Mission to Brazil in 1922.
As further evidence of the success of the naval commission, on August 28, 1918,
Brazilian President Epitácio Pessoa addressed Admiral Vogelgesang and his crew,
remarking on the traditional friendship between the two nations. Pessoa’s speech is
evident of the importance of the informal navy diplomacy conducted by American
officers. Pessoa mentioned, “but you, the representatives of the American people, of an
American man-of-war, added to it, in these few days of our intercourse, a charm which it
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lacked; I mean that fellowship, that sweet intimacy which draws men closer together,
when they find themselves at the mercy of the whims of the ocean, immense and
mysterious… Gentleman, you may rest assured that, on returning to the United States,
you leave in Brazil’s Chief executive a friend, a true friend to your great country.”65
On November 22, 1918, U.S. Ambassador Edwin Morgan also wrote to Secretary
of State Robert Lansing about the effectiveness of naval diplomacy to U.S. interests.
Morgan noted, “Captain Vogelgesang, who served a year with the Naval War College
was highly successful and efficient and was properly appreciated both by the Minister of
Marine and by his classes.” Morgan continued, “the effect upon the Brazilian Navy of
contact with them and of the work they have performed has increased the good relations
and understanding between the American and Brazilian navies.”66 Later, during the
negotiations for a permanent American Navy Mission to Brazil in the 1920s, the
Brazilian government insisted that Vogelgesang lead the mission, a request that the U.S.
first denied, but eventually conceded in order to win the naval mission over the British.
Understanding what strategy would work in Brazil, the U.S. Commander in Chief of the
Pacific during the war also wrote to the Office of Naval Operations, “to be successful
with Brazilians, officers must be carefully selected, irreproachably efficient, and of great
tact. Vogelgesang and [W.O.] Spears ideal.”67
In 1922, a report from then Brazilian Minister of the Marine, Veiga Miranda, also
sheds a light on the significance of the U.S. Navy Commission. As he recalled, “‘when a
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contract mission had resolved,” the Navy Mission contract of 1922, “it was not difficult
to opt between the two navies capable, according to general opinion, to furnish us: the
English and the American. The latter were and are much more familiarized with our
officials… the North American influence had already been felt thanks to teachers called
to the Naval War College, teachers that, naturally, propagated methods from their
country, through practical patterns of organizations, which has been useful and helpful to
us.” Miranda acknowledged the American influence on the Brazilian Navy, “the fact that
we already have, [since 1918] a kind of American Mission,” referring to the American
Navy Commission in Brazil during the War, “consisting of the officials who work at the
Naval War College, was sufficient reason for us to only chose another nationality if
urgent reasons prompted us to do so. Dispensing of them would not only be a
discourtesy: it would be an injustice against those who have always showed themselves
up to their tasks and functions.’”68
Fear of German power in South America continued to influence American policy
once Brazil declared war. As the U.S. World War I strategy revealed, victory depended
on a successful military campaign, as well as weakening German financial influence in
Latin America. In January 1918, U.S. Captain Frank Hill sent a communication from the
British to the U.S. Commander in Chief regarding German influence among the Brazilian
Navy officers.69 Moreover, a report enclosed in a letter sent to Hill from the American
Naval Cable Censor in March 1918 read, “unless moral and economic pressure is brought
68
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to bear by the Allies upon the Brazilian Government, the Germans in this country are
bound to regain the same position after the war that they had before.”70 The American
Naval Cable Sensor also wrote to Hill about their suspicions of pro-German sentiments
among some of the Brazilian officers in Pernambuco, northern Brazil. The
communication read, “I wish to bring to your attention that during my assignment in
Pernambuco as sensor of international cables, I found that the attitude of some of these
officials that was decidedly pro-German, and that this sympathy for German is having a
considerable effect upon the facilitating of business and financial transactions among the
big German firms in Brazil.”71 They also noted that the German “have succeeded
remarkably well in their scheme of “’peaceful penetration.’”72 Doubting Brazilian
motives and accusing the country of inconsistent policy towards Germany, a report in the
Office of Naval Intelligent stated, “in my opinion, Brazil requires some strong reminder
that she owes something to the cause of war. That she cannot feather her own nest, while
pretending to be a belligerent! And that unless she does do something to assist, she will
not receive any commercial benefit from the United States, or have a voice in the peace
negotiations.”73 On November 1918, The U.S. Commander in Chief of the Pacific fleet
reported to the Navy Operations on German access to Brazilian crystal quartz. The
Commander reported, “American vice consul in charge at Rio made full written report to
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the State Department upon Brazil Quartz Crystal situation. Suggest Navy Department get
injunction.” The Commander ended his note inquiring as to what action he should take.74
This is revealing of an American World War I strategy that went beyond a military
victory against Germany, highlighting the nation’s concerns with the post-World War I
European influence in South America.
There was also continued concern about the relationship between Argentina and
Germany. As Admiral William B. Caperton observed, “there was, and still is, a very
strong anti-American sentiment.”75 Undoubtedly, Argentina’s relationship with Germany
and the country’s reluctance to fully support the U.S. during World War I brought the
U.S. and Brazil closer, as they found mutual interest in countering Argentina’s power and
potential collaboration between the Argentines and Germany in South America.
The observations about German influence in South America above reveal two
important aspects of U.S.-Brazilian naval diplomacy, as it relates to geopolitical security
and economic strategy. First, Brazil’s extensive coastline and location in relation to the
West African coast were factored into naval strategy. For instance, in 1936, the Senior
Member to the U.S. Naval Mission to Brazil, C.C. Gill, explained, “Brazil therefore,
occupies an important strategic position in the mid-Atlantic overlooking sea and air
routes of growing interests to foreign countries. Both to enforce recognition of her rights
if neutral and to safeguard her interests if a belligerent, Brazil is, to an unusual degree,
dependent on naval power.” Therefore, Gill urged, “for these reasons, from the United
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States point of view, a weak Brazilian navy is cause for anxiety, and a reasonably strong
and efficient Brazilian navy would be cause for satisfaction.” Gill believed that a stronger
Brazilian Navy would prove to be an asset to the U.S. in case of a conflict in the region.
As Gill noted, “on the basis of reciprocal benefits to be derived and, without making any
concessions at variance with this basis, it would appear logical for the United States to do
all it can to improve the material strength and personnel efficiency of the Brazilian navy
commensurate to that country’s limited resources.” Gill added, “to cooperate in building
up the navy now might prove much less expensive to both countries than would be the
case if the exigencies of an emergency were awaited. In regards to the attitude of
Argentina, it also appears that country has cause for anxiety in the present weakness of
Brazil and might well view with satisfaction the strengthening of her fleet.”76 Second,
Hill’s note and the American Naval Cable Sensor reports highlights the connection
between naval relations and commercial advantages that European powers, such as
Germany, could gain in Brazil. Hence, naval diplomacy could indirectly facilitate
American economic interests in Brazil considering European influence.
In 1931, also highlighting the broader World War I American foreign policy
factoring in the German influence, U.S. Captain Dudley W. Knox explained, “soon after
the United States entered the world war, Admiral [William B.] Caperton was sent to
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South America with a squadron of United States cruises, not merely to protect allied trade
against the occasional German raider, but principally to overcome the menace of
continual German propaganda and influence which had been a source of great anxiety to
the Allies since 1914.” As Germany expanded its influence into Latin America especially
since the 1900s, Knox noted, “the Germans had large groups of colonists in South
America, besides strong commercial connections, and the known pro-German proclivities
of Spain had further reactions of great value to them throughout Spanish America.”
Acknowledging the impact that the American Navy had in challenging European
influence, Knox continued, “Admiral Caperton’s diplomatic success was immediate and
remarkable. He was received with ovation in every capital which amounted not only to a
personal triumph, but also a national achievement, the importance of which was too little
recognized at the time, overshadowed as it was by the griping course of the Great War.”
In addition, “no American ever matched the popularity of Admiral Caperton in the
southern continent, nor made a greater contribution to our prestige and friendships there.”
Explaining the impact of Caperton’s naval diplomacy during the war, Knox noted, “it
was largely in consequence of his good-will cruise that the first group of American naval
officers, headed by Captain Vogelgesang, were sent as advisors to the Brazilian navy in
March, 1918.”77
As the U.S. engaged in direct military conflict in Europe, American strategy
towards Brazil continued to focus on building up trade relations to the benefit of
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American businesses, while expunging European commercial influence. Reports from
December 1917 from the U.S. Office of Naval Intelligence also reveal the Navy
Department’s awareness of Brazil’s relevance in the broader World War I strategy. The
Office of Naval Intelligence reported that, “this office has tried in several ways to assist
in establishing relations with Brazil in a commercial way so that after the war we could
build up on the foundation thus laid, foundations not only of trade but of good will
established on which trade could be expanded.” Regarding the opportunity that the Great
War presented the U.S. to strengthen its relationship with Brazil, the report continued, “it
is not so much the trade we would have gotten nor the profit in these cases but friendly
relations and trade links would have been established and the ultimate result would have
been fine.” The naval report concluded, “I hope the above remarks will call attention to
the commercial war which is being waged in South America. The United States can win
out and establish our trade if conditions are realized and actions are decisive. She can lose
by letting her [American] merchants run wild with no aid or direction from the
government.”78
The U.S government also collaborated with American businesses to expand U.S.
commercial dominance in Brazil, while achieving the objective of diminishing European
influence. Naval contracts provided an indirect way to achieve these goals. For instance,
in May 1919, the Navy Bureau of Ordinance requested that the Bethlehem Steel
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Company furnish military equipment to the Brazilian Battleship Sao Paulo.79 American
companies undoubtedly benefited from increased U.S. involvement in the modernization
of the military in Brazil. As an August 1919 memorandum to the U.S. Chief of Navy
Operations informed, “U.S. Commander Orr was approached by Brazilian officers to
ascertain what the attitude would be if a formal request for the purchase of destroyers
from the U.S. Navy were made.” The U.S. State Department approved the request,
adding that such transaction would benefit U.S.-Brazilian Relations.80
Continued concern with British influence in the Brazilian Navy, also helped shape
U.S.-Brazilian naval relations after Brazil and the U.S. had declared war. In 1918, aware
of the Brazilian government’s intentions to continue their plans to modernize and train its
navy, the U.S. Naval Attaché in Rio de Janeiro wrote to the Navy Intelligence Office
regarding the possible threat the British naval influence could pose to the U.S. pertaining
to military equipment contracts, and, consequently, to American commercial expansion
in general. The Navy Attaché warned, “if the proposal is accepted,” regarding a shipbuilding plant contract between Brazil and Great Britain, “the British will have exclusive
rights to manufacture all government and private vessels, munitions of war, etc, as well
as exclusive control of the iron and steel industries in Brazil, including the necessary
water power, coal and contingents.”81 Hence, the Brazilian government’s naval plans
affected the U.S. World War I strategy in South America.
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As Ambassador Edwin Morgan also explained, “at the time the Brazilian
squadron left Rio de Janeiro, in dispatches and telegrams to the department, I urged that
the American naval officers who encountered their Brazilian comrades abroad should pay
special attention to them and that they should not allow their professional sympathies to
be wholly absorbed by the British.” Morgan also noted the opportunity that World War I
brought to the U.S. to strengthen its naval relations with Brazil. As Morgan recalled, “I
also recommended, when the suggestion was first made that the Brazilian squadron
should co-operate with the Allies in European waters, that the squadron should be placed
under an American rather than under a British Admiral.” Importantly, Morgan explained,
“the purpose of these recommendations was to avoid the very incident which has
occurred, namely the opportunity for the exercise of strong British influence upon the
personnel of the Brazilian squadron, the result of which cannot fail to be that British
naval methods will be preferred to those of any other foreign nation and that orders will
be placed with British manufacturers for naval equipment and in British shipyards for the
construction of new units of the Brazilian fleet.”82
The American Navy Commission in Brazil during World War I was also very
significant in bringing the Brazilian Navy under the American Navy’s tutelage, away
from the British influence. An undated historical sketch in the U.S. Navy Attaché reports
described the significance of the interactions between the officers during World War I,
“there was in the Brazilian Navy a decided pro-British sentiment, particularly among the
officers of high rank.” The sketch noted that, “in a large matter, this was due to the fact
that most of the ships of the active navy had been built in England where a large number
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of Brazilian officers had been stationed during the construction of the vessels,”
suggesting a connection between naval construction contracts and training of officers.
Hence, the navy officers were important liaisons in informal naval diplomacy, and
consequently, they helped promote corporatism and trade. The sketch also noted, “pro
British sentiment probably would have led the Brazilian government to accept only the
services of the British Navy officers, had not Admiral Caperton, who commanded the
United States fleet in South American waters, believed that American Naval officers
should be employed on this duty.” In fact, Caperton pressured both the State and Navy
Departments to deploy American officers to Brazil.83
Among American naval officers there continued to be concern about Brazil’s
need to modernize its navy and the possible commercial influence of the British. On July
22, 1918, U.S. Captain Frank Hill wrote to the U.S. director of Naval Intelligence on
possible British commercial expansion in Brazil. Regarding the British proposal to build
an arsenal in Brazil, Hill commented, “this proposal confirm my many letters dealing
with the commercial situation in this country, to the effect that the English backed by
their government are endeavoring to gain commercial control here, by rather unethical
methods.”84 The Naval Attaché in Brazil remained cognizant of British commercial
influence in Brazil. As Hill reported to the Director of Naval Intelligence, “there have
been for some time numerous complaints made by American businesses men in Brazil
that, although they were unable to obtain certain articles from the United States because
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export license was refused, nevertheless English Firms here were able to supply their
customers in Brazil, and they were able to obtain the same goods, made in the United
States, and shipped to Brazil via England.” Hill added that such conditions threatened
U.S. commercial interests in Brazil.85
British naval influence remained strong in Brazil, and Captain W.O. Spears
recalled, “the greatest obstacle to overcome was the British Propaganda, the reluctance of
the Minister of Marine, and the hostility of the higher ranking officers.” Highlighting the
American Navy’s role in countering British influence, Spears explained, “before the
Brazilians decided to shift to Americans, they had actually made a contract with one
British Commander, a mine expert, and four chief petty officers, gunnery instructors, who
were in the British Navy and veterans of the Battle of Jutland.” Spears noted the
importance of American officers working with the Brazilian Navy during World War I,
“the British trained senior officers of the Brazilian navy had to bow to the expediency of
the political leader, who were following American movements in the World War, and
against their will, accept a group of American naval officers as their instructors. The
American trained junior officers were an influence in easing the situation.” Once again
noting the challenge the American Navy encountered, Spears asserted, “it is desired to
emphasize that American naval officers were forced on the Brazilian Navy against the
will of practically all the high ranking officers and the majority of junior officers except
the group that had been American trained.”86
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According to Spears, “the British commander under contract did not report until
after the American group had arrived. He was dull, pompous and arrogant. There was no
trouble relegating him to the scrap heap. The Brazilians stationed him on a small island in
the harbor as a mine expert. He remained two years and gave up his contract in disgust.”
As the American officers worked closely with the Brazilians, Spears pointed out that,
“the four British gunnery sergeants were very intelligent and excellent drill masters.”
However, “after a few weeks, when they realized that the sentiment of the Navy was
turning to the Americans, they cooperated in a highly satisfactory manner and were of
great value in putting the new system into effect. They remained four years until the
expiration of their contract.”87
The British government recognized the consequences of this approximation
between the Brazilian and American navies. As Spears recalled, “the British Ambassador
exerted himself considerably to prevent the visit of the battleships to our shipyards. He
used the argument that they had been built by the British and should be repaired by the
British. He even went so far as to tell the Minister of Marine that the British government
objected [to] the U.S. Naval authorities learning the secrets of the double bottom
construction.” Pointing out the support the American Navy received from some of the
Brazilian officers, Spears noted, “Captain [Jose M.] Penido presented personally and
privately to the President the American estimate of the fighting value of the battleships,
with the material required to renovate them and succeeded in convincing him of the
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necessity of repairs on a large scale.” However, Spears observed that Alencar and some
other high ranking officials were not on board with the plan. Spears recognized the
contributions of the American officers, “it was only after Admiral Caperton, the
Ambassador, and Captain Vogelgesang had used all resources,” making some promises
in regards to cost and transport to the Brazilian government, “would they consent to the
visit to a U.S. shipbuilding plant rather than to a British plant.”88 Allowing the Brazilian
ships to be repaired at the American shipbuilding plant represented a victory for U.S.
commercial and strategical interests in Brazil. The connection between navy diplomacy,
foreign policy, and commercial relations in Brazil towards the end of the war was also
evident in a correspondence from July 1918, from U.S. Captain Frank Hill to the U.S.
Director of Naval Intelligence. Referencing Brazil’s secret communications with the
British to build a naval arsenal, Hill wrote, “this proposal confirms my many other letters
dealing with the commercial situation in this country, to the effect that the English,
backed by their government are endeavoring to gain commercial control here, by rather
unethical methods.”89
Towards the end of the war, the U.S. government sought to use the tightening of
U.S-Brazilian relations to continue strengthening its influence in Brazil. For instance,
after a British Commission visited Brazil to sign a potential peace treaty and make
commercial arrangements, a report from the U.S. Navy Attaché in Brazil to the U.S.
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Office of Naval Intelligence noted, “I am of the opinion that unless the British offer some
very attractive features, no Treaty of any real moment will be drawn up between the two
countries. Brazil is partially inoculated with ‘American solidarity,’ and ‘Monroe
Doctrine,’ and unless she sees real advantages for herself, nothing will be done.”90
Also recognizing the opportunity that World War I had provided, on October
1918, the U.S. Director of Naval Intelligence wrote the Naval Attaché in Rio de Janeiro,
“with a view to giving the Brazilian government priority after the war, the War Trade
Board has requested to be furnished with a comprehensive report as to the supplies of
every nature which it may reasonably be expected Brazil will require for the use of its
navy.”91 As the Brazilian government had hoped, the alliance with the U.S. during the
war produced the desired result of moving the country closer to the U.S. In the Brazilian
Foreign Relations Ministerial reports of 1919, the Brazilian President thanked the United
States for its contributions to Brazil during the war, including “for the incessant increase
in exports to Brazil, for importing our products; for the caring embrace of our navy and
army who were educated in your military means, or are there in a commission of buying
of armaments; for the presence among us of various officials in the development of
technical commissions.” Highlighting navy diplomacy, the President continued, “for the
contest of your squadron, under the command of Admiral Caperton, for two years,
remained in constant contact with us, its officials and crew, collecting the sincere
friendship from the Brazilian people.” The President also thanked the U.S. for providing
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coal to Brazil during the war, and for helping Brazil manage the chartering of its ships
into the Brazilian ports.92
Moreover, the American Navy Commission, which served in Brazil during World
War I, paved the way for the U.S. government to win the naval mission contract over the
British in 1922. Reflecting on his experience, Spears summarized the accomplishments of
the Navy Commission: “increased friendly relations resulting from the personality and
high prestige of Captain [Carl T.] Vogelgesang. By constant association a majority of the
Navy were made pro-American instead of pro-British. This eventually made the Naval
Mission possible.”93 On October 4 1922, prior to the start of the Navy Mission, the Jornal
do Brasil also acknowledged the personal esteem Brazilians had towards Vogelgesang,
“in spite of the short time he has been here has already made many friends not only in
naval circles but also in Rio de Janeiro society.”94 As further evidence of the crucial work
the American Navy had been conducting prior to the signing of the naval contract in
1922, the Brazilian newspaper, O Jornal, explained why the Brazilian government chose
an American Navy Mission to guide its navy. The article asserted, “the relations between
the navies of Brazil and the United States were always very intimate in the last ten years,
and the American instructors and technicians, one way or another, have been constantly
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serving in Rio de Janeiro…”95 Moreover, as a memorandum prepared for the U.S. Chief
of Naval Operations in 1935 noted, “from the time of Lord Cochrane, the first Brazilian
Admiral, until the arrival of Captain C.T. Vogelgesang, as Chief of the U.S. Naval
Commission to Brazil, in March 1918, the Brazilian navy had been exclusively under
British tutelage. The two battleships, two cruisers, and eleven destroyers comprising the
effective portion of their navy fleet were all British built, and the 2500 and men manning
them had been indoctrinated in British naval methods and organization.” Importantly,
“the Naval Commission under Captain Vogelgesang undertook the conversation of the
Brazilian navy methods and organization, with a high degree of success.”96
Spears also pointed out the structural changes in the Brazilian Navy due to the
American commission’s work, “the enlargement and extension of the Brazilian War
College…The reorganization of the Brazilian ships in every department. Complete
changes in watch, quarter, and station bills, routine, etc…The complete modernization
and repair of the two Brazilian battleships Minas Gerais and Sao Paulo in the New York
Navy Yard. This cost about $10,000,000.00 of which only about half has been paid to the
American government to date.”97 Importantly, Spears noted, “it will thus be seen that the
gaining confidence of the Brazilian Navy, the molding of opinion and the receptivity of
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American ideas was very gradual. It might be added here, that Admiral Caperton stated to
the Navy Department, that due to the success of this group of officers he was able to
persuade the Peruvians to also accept an American Naval Mission.”98
During the naval revolt of 1893-1894, the U.S. government wanted to support
pro-U.S. elements in Brazil ensuring not only the survival of the new republic, but also
making sure that American interests, such as trade agreements and hemispheric security,
were protected. As the New Navy grew stronger, the U.S. joined the great powers on the
world stage after the Spanish-American War, Panama Canal, interventions in Mexico,
and World War I. Thus, the early twentieth century reveals a much more assertive,
tactfully prepared U.S. Navy. The goal remained the same; using the U.S. Navy as a
mechanism to strengthen U.S. trade in Brazil, and to usher European influence out of
South America. World War I also exposed the vulnerability of the South American
nations to domination by extra hemispheric actors. Of particular interest to the U.S.,
German cultural, economic, and political influence in Brazil became a liability during the
War. Similarly, Argentina’s reluctance to declare war on Germany, coupled with U.S.
suspicions about Argentina’s motives, also made a U.S.- Brazilian alliance during the war
more significant to U.S. foreign policy.
World War I was a decisive moment in U.S.-Latin American relations, and to
U.S-Brazilian relations specifically. As Europe dealt with major physical, economic, and
social destruction, the U.S. seized the moment in South America, replacing Great Britain
as the major trading partner in crucial nations such as Brazil and Argentina. As U.S.
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Navy Captain H.G. Sparrow remarked in 1922 of the post-World War I world,
“Brazilians are turning more towards the U.S.” … “seeing the sorry mess Europe has
been in…”99 Importantly, until World War I, the Brazilian military had closer ties to
France and Great Britain than it did with the United States. As Europe sank into military
chaos, the U.S. stepped in, offering training for the Brazilian and Argentinian navies, as
well as military equipment and financial assistance so the two nations could modernize
their navies. Eventually, the U.S. won a crucial navy mission contract with the Brazilian
government, displacing the traditional role of the British Navy in that country, a topic I
will explore in the next two chapters.
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Chapter 6: The Navy Mission: Navy Diplomacy as an Instrument of U.S.-Brazilian
Foreign Policy
“However much we of the military services may strive to strengthen our hands in war
operations by making proper strategic dispositions, our efforts are weakened and
sometimes nullified if diplomacy and statesmanship do not work hand in hand with us,
particularly during peace time, to support our national strategy. Sound national strategy
builds up during times of peace a structure that will strengthen in the future sea and land
forces when policy passes from the realm of persuasion by minds to the operations of war
where decisions are obtained by force.”1
Commander George J. Meyers, USN, 1923-1924 course, Army War College
Introduction:
Scholars of United States-Latin American relations have explored the
establishment of an informal U.S. empire in Latin America in the early twentieth century,
but have not fully appreciated the ways in which navy diplomacy served as a tool to
strengthen U.S. influence.2 This chapter explores U.S. naval diplomacy in Brazil after
World War I, considering geopolitical factors such as the continuing German, French,
and British influence in Brazil, and the regional dynamics between the ABC nations,
Argentina, Brazil, and Chile, in South America. After the Great War, the U.S. continued
using its navy in Latin America to help carry out the nation’s foreign policy in the region.
Specifically, this case study continues to explore the contributions of American officers
in strengthening U.S.-Brazilian relations, culminating in the first U.S. naval mission to

1

Russel F. Weigley, The American Way of War, A History of United States Military Strategy
andPolicy (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1973), 206.
2
While broad historical works tend to neglect the role of navy diplomacy, some specialized
studies make important contributions toward advancing an understanding of the subject. See: Joel
C. Christenson “From Gunboats to Good Neighbors: U.S. Naval Diplomacy in Peru, 1919-1942,”
PhD Diss., West Virginia University, 2013.

186

Brazil in 1922, which lasted until the 1970s, with a brief one-year interruption during the
1930s coup d’état in Brazil.3
Between the 1890s and the 1920s, U.S. military interventions in the Caribbean
and Latin America increased substantially. Historian Alan McPherson points out that,
“depending on how one defines interventions, there were from 40 to 6,000 south of the
Rio Grande between the Civil War and the 1930s.”4 This new U.S. military commitment
meant that the U.S. Navy became more powerful with regards to the implementation of
U.S. foreign policy. From occupations in Haiti, Nicaragua, and the Dominican Republic,
to navy missions in Brazil and Peru, the American Navy aided in the expansion of the
nation’s businesses and influence overseas. In doing so, the U.S. Navy contributed to the
ongoing American foreign policy in Latin America, which was grounded on efforts to
diminish European influence, safeguard the physical security of the U.S. and regional
governments from military threats, and expand American commercial relations in South

3
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America first through Dollar Diplomacy, and later, through Corporatism.5
Acknowledging the role of the U.S. Navy in the 1920s in Brazil further challenges the
1920s rhetoric of U.S. isolationism, while enhancing the discourse on Americanization
and internationalization of American cultural, political, and economic values in Latin
America.
As Brazil continued to modernize its navy, Brazilian military planners and
policymakers cultivated a naval relationship with the U.S. in the early twentieth century
to enhance Brazil’s physical security, expand its role as a regional leader, and to help lay
the groundwork for Brazil’s entrance on the global stage, which helped lead to a
convergence of interests between the two nations. Since the ABC nations often compared
their power in relation to the strength of their navy, concerns about the regional balance
of power influenced Brazilian naval strategy. As the previous chapter discussed, the
Brazilian Navy had been developing plans to reorganize and modernize its navy since the
early 1900s, and from the Brazilian perspective, a foreign Navy Mission would help
achieve this objective. Moreover, World War I exposed the Brazilian navy’s
shortcomings, particularly its inability to effectively respond to an international crisis.
Historian Robert Scheina notes that, Brazil’s “principal warships were in such poor
5
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condition” at the outbreak of the first world war “that they had difficulty just putting to
sea, but at the start of the second they were able immediately to go on patrol.”6 This
expanded capability was, in part, a result of the work of the U.S. naval mission. This
chapter discusses the establishment of the Mission from both U.S. and Brazilian
perspectives, briefly reviewing Brazilian political, economic, and diplomatic history
during the decade after the end of World War I, and both nations’ regional goals during
that era. Ultimately, this chapter argues that a convergence of interests underlay
cooperation in the endeavor.

Background and Context
Brazil post-World War I:
Politically, the coffee oligarchies from São Paulo, Minas Gerais, and Rio de Janeiro,
continued to exert the greatest power within the Brazilian government. Their influence
was not unchallenged, as factions in Rio Grande do Sul competed for power during the
1920s, and a series of rebellions rocked the country, including army revolts against the
oligarchical elite in 1922, 1924, and 1925. The oligarchies’ strength was based on coffee
exports, which continued to thrive after World War I, strengthening the financial
relationship between Brazil and the U.S. Exports rose in other sectors of the Brazilian
economy as well, such as tobacco and metal products, while textile production declined.
Regionally and globally, there were popular appeals for international cooperation,
collective security, and disarmament after World War I. Brazil was a founding member
of the League of Nations, joining the League in 1920; however, the country withdrew its
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membership in 1926, after failing to obtain a permanent seat in the Council of the League
of Nations. As part of the post-war effort to avoid armed conflicts in the future, the
Washington Naval Conference of 1921-1922 advocated for the limitation of naval
expansion among the world’s naval powers, including the U.S., Great Britain, and Japan.
Similarly, the Pan American Conference of 1923, in Santiago Chile, discussed matters of
naval disarmament, particularly between the ABC countries, pushing for cooperation and
accountability in limiting hostilities between American nations.
Despite the rhetoric of naval disarmament, the Brazilian government continued to
promote the modernization of its navy. World War I exposed the country’s military
weakness, and proponents of a stronger navy argued that Brazilian naval capacity was
disproportional to the country’s vast coastline and population. Hence, the Brazilian
government sought to contract a foreign naval mission to help train and modernize its
navy. However, Brazilian sources demonstrate that the public held conflicting views
regarding the nation’s naval strategy. Some Brazilians feared that the mission and
enhanced cooperation with foreign armed forces, would increase the militarization of
South America and cede the country’s sovereignty to foreign powers. Others thought the
collaboration was necessary to secure the nation’s coastline, and that the Brazilian Navy
required training to effectively utilize the new military technology at their disposal.
U.S. post-World War I:
In the 1920s, the U.S continued pursing a foreign policy of cultural, political and
economic expansion in Latin America. Thomas O’Brien explores the role of what he calls
the “Agents of Americanization,” in the 1920s, discussing the role of labor unions,
corporations, professionals, and missionaries in carrying out the U.S. civilizing mission

190

in Latin America.7 Emily Rosenberg also adds depth to the scholarship by examining
U.S. commercial expansion in the 1920s, noting that the U.S. deepened its economic
connections to the region through auto sales, machinery, telephonic equipment, and oil,
for example.8 Rosenberg also acknowledges the contributions of missionaries and
professionals, such as the YMCA, and private businessmen.9 As Rosenberg explains, “for
the most part, the internationalism of the 1920s implicitly assumed the superiority and
inevitable spread of American techniques and values. Expansionism, national interest,
and international betterment were fused.”10
Similarly, Joseph Tulchin explains that, “the expansion of United States economic
influence outside the Caribbean was a fact, and one not displeasing government officials.
It behooved the Department of State to fix priorities to guide relations with the rest of the
hemisphere.”11 More recently, Akira Iriye encouraged historians to consider nations’
collaboration in establishing order in international affairs, rather than focusing on conflict
between states. Motivated by cooperation, common interests, and a desire for
international order, he argues, transnational cooperation has helped shape global affairs.12
Adding the U.S. Navy’s role in perpetuating collaboration, in Americanizing the
Brazilian Navy, and in promoting regional security and American commerce in Brazil
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through a naval mission to the discourse, offers yet another example of the versatile
expansionist American foreign policy in South America in the 1920s.
The Navy Mission contract to Brazil, signed in 1922, preceded the 1930s Good
Neighbor Policy, where the U.S. pledged not to interfere in Latin America’s internal
affairs, and served as an effective “behind the scenes” instrument for American foreign
policymakers in the 1920s. Even though the U.S. officially eschewed direct military
intervention with the Good Neighbor policy, the origins of that strategy of indirectly
pursuing American interests were present well before the formal adoption of that
approach. Few scholars, however, have looked at how U.S. leaders exerted indirect
influence before the 1930s, through the innovation of the military, including naval
missions such as the ones in Brazil and Peru.13 Rosenberg, for one, recognizes this
dynamic, noting, “the [U.S.] government was involved in expansion in the 1920s, but it
preferred to operate behind the scenes, encouraging, guiding, or even delegating to
chosen instruments those functions that policymakers deemed crucial.”14 Tulchin also
argues that the relationship between the U.S. and South America differed from that of the
U.S. and the Caribbean. As he notes, “South of the Caribbean, trade and investment
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would facilitate more intimate relations, eliminating the need to exercising more direct
forms of influence.”15
Historical scholarship also illuminates the commercial opportunities arising
because of the Great War. For instance, U.S. investment and export to Brazil grew
significantly after World War I. As Smith points out in Brazil in the United States,
“American trade and investment made significant inroads into Brazil. Lucrative export
markets were developed in coal, petroleum, and automobiles. Substantial investments
were also evident in Brazilian cable communications and the new meatpacking
industries.”16 Tulchin also explains that, “the economic foreign policy of the United
States after WWI can be considered a form of dollar diplomacy;” adding, “dollar
diplomacy in this sense was extended after the war from particular reference to the
Caribbean to include all of South America.”17 In fact, William Howard Taft’s dollar
diplomacy was an early example of the corporatism of the 1920s. The strategy behind
dollar diplomacy relied on the use of American private enterprise and banks to invest in
foreign nations and advise foreign governments, promoting stability while safeguarding
American commercial interests. Dollar diplomacy had two different strands, one of which
was a heavy-handed approach wherein U.S. military force was used to ensure a pro-U.S.
stability, which would also ensure that payments on debt were maintained. U.S.
occupations in Dominican Republic, Haiti, and Nicaragua are examples of this aggressive
approach.18 There was also a less-coercive type of dollar diplomacy, where U.S. officials
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attempted to foster good trade and investment relations with the South American nations.
As Emily Rosenberg explains of Taft’s dollar diplomacy foreign policy strategy, “he
would spread stability and progress into critical areas by substituting ‘dollars for
bullets.’”19
In the 1920s, U.S. foreign policymakers relied more heavily on corporations to
protect American commercial and geo-strategic goals overseas through corporatism, and
by actively promoting the use of supervised American loans in Latin America as
leverage. In 1925, a correspondence from the Brazilian Ambassador to the U.S., Sylvio
Gurgel do Amaral, to the Brazilian Minister of Foreign Relations, Dr. Felix Pacheco,
explains the recent role that the American banker had taken in expanding overseas loans.
Commenting on an article in the New York Times, the letter explained the “intimate
connection between the loans and international politics,” which increasingly affected the
relationship between the U.S. and Latin America.20 The U.S. had pursued this policy
more aggressively in the Dominican Republic, Nicaragua, and Haiti, through the aid of
the U.S. Navy. The U.S. Navy Mission to Brazil in 1922 enhances the discourse by
inserting naval diplomacy as a strategy to expand American commercial interests in
Brazil as well, in the 1920s and beyond. For instance, American officers in advisory
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capacities promoted new standards in naval training and materials, benefiting American
corporations, instead of European businesses.
In the aftermath of the Great War, American policymakers also continued to focus
on ushering out the dominant European influence in South America. The State
Department was eager to diminish British influence, in particular, while simultaneously
promoting American businesses. Tulchin explains that, “in the years immediately
following the war, business and government had been equally anxious over British trade
competition in Latin America.” Later however, “businessmen grew less fearful and more
willing to work with the British if it was to their advantage.” However, the American
government continued to pursue its strategy of expanding American influence to surpass
the European influence.21 Tulchin adds, “trade and investment could also be the means of
eliminating unwanted competition from European powers, as when department officials
took advantage of a state visit by Brazilian President Elect Epitácio da Silva Pessoa, in
June 1919, to help Charles Schwab of the Bethlehem Steel Company discuss terms of a
large arsenal contract. The department was anxious to prevent the British Vickers, Ltd.,
from getting the business.”22 Historian Joseph Smith suggests that U.S. interests in
eventually signing the Navy Mission in 1922 with Brazil were to “prevent the contract
from falling into the hands of Great Britain.”23 However, the mission did more to U.S.Brazilian relations than simply keep the British from exerting greater influence in the
Brazilian Navy. It laid the groundwork for further collaboration between the nations’
armed forces during World War II. Nonetheless, U.S. aspirations to supplant European
influence in the Americas shaped U.S. policy towards Brazil immediately after the War.
21
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U.S.-Brazilian Relations, Goals for the Navy Mission
Brazil’s Goals:
Although Brazil had been contracting foreign officers to teach at their Naval War
College, and had negotiated contracts to build a naval arsenal prior to the end of the Great
War, in the 1920s the Brazilian government committed to a long-term agreement that
would influence every aspect of the Brazilian Navy. Explaining Brazil’s aspirations in
contracting the Navy Mission, a 1922 article in O Jornal explained, “as to us, desirous of
the military and naval progress of our country, we shall consider an American mission as
good for that purpose as an English one. We desire it as the only means of making the
navy what we want it; something which lone experience has shown we cannot do for
ourselves.”24
Brazilian historian Henrique Marques Caminha also explains the evolution of the
Brazilian naval strategy in the Historia Naval Brasileira, which led to the decision to
contract a foreign Navy Mission. Caminha argues that, in the 1920s, the “Second
Alexandrino Reform (1923-1934),” named after Admiral Alexandrino de Alencar, helped
guide the Brazilian naval strategy. Alencar had become Brazilian Minister of Marine in
1906, and continued to hold the position intermittently, influencing the Brazilian Navy
until his death in 1926. Alencar had reclaimed his title as Minister of Marine in 1922.
Regarding the decision to sign the naval mission contract in 1922, Caminha explained,
“since 1906, the need to contract foreign officials belonging to a big naval power to
‘instruct our navy,’ had been recognized. This idea was reinforced by two factors: the
good results obtained by the army after the contracting of the French Army Mission in
24
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1920, and the growing complexity of the ships and engines of war as consequence of the
experience acquired by the naval powers during WWI (1914-1918).”25
From the point of view of the Brazilian government, the signing of a Navy
Mission in 1922 promised to elevate Brazil’s regional and global prestige. Brazilian
policymakers also hoped that a stronger, more modernized navy would fulfill Brazil’s
ongoing aspirations for regional prestige considering Argentina’s and Chile’s growing
regional power. Moreover, Brazil’s efforts during World War I, although limited by a
weak navy, proved to be productive in the short term, as Brazil earned a seat in the
League of Nations. A stronger, more efficient navy would continue to increase Brazilian
global prestige.26
The decision to strengthen the country’s naval power through cooperation with
the United States was welcomed in some of the nation’s largest newspapers. As an article
in Gazetta de Noticias, explained in 1923, “steadily decreasing in efficiency, our war
material almost became obsolete, and its renewal was found to be of urgent necessity. We
obtained a new squadron without, however, succeeding in obtaining other fundamental
basis for a complete naval organization.”27 In 1922, O Jornal also explained the benefits
that Brazilians hoped to achieve with the American Navy Mission, noting that, “the
arrival of the American Naval Mission destined to instruct our navy is perhaps the first
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step towards the position which she should maintain on the seas, due to her extensive
coast line and to the necessity of assuring freedom to her maritime communications.”28
Although some Brazilians did not know exactly how the mission worked, the
article in O Jornal asserted, “we do not know what the mission will endeavor to do. Will
it merely instruct the navy to make the most of its few old ships, or will it consider the
broad aspect of the problem, and endeavor to make our navy department realize the
necessity of adopting a strategy of peace? By this we mean, to decide in time of peace
what should be our tactics in case of war, and to make preparations accordingly.” Those
who supported the mission believed that keeping up with modern military equipment and
hiring officers was not sufficient to prepare the Brazilian Navy. The article continued,
“for years we have paid for a navy which really does not exist. A navy is not a group of
departments filled with officers and employees, but a fighting force, of which these
departments are the administrative elements.” The article also explained the lack of a
cohesive strategy and modern tactics in the Brazilian Navy, concluding that, “the Naval
Mission is now about to begin its work. Its task of demolishing errors of a century will be
a hard one. However, we are very hopeful. We trust that the government will understand
and do all it can to build up a navy so necessary to Brazil.”29
The Brazilian government also sought to modernize its navy in order to continue
increasing its regional prestige. A 1927 letter between the Brazilian Minister of Marine
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and the Brazilian Minister of Foreign Relations on “the position of Brazil among the
South American Republics,” also illuminates some of the tensions in South America. As
the Pan-American 1928 Conference meeting in Havana approached, the Brazilian
Minister of Marine predicted a Chilean-Argentinian alliance during the conference,
whose agenda, he believed, included a hostile stand against President Calvin Coolidge
and the U.S. at the Conference. The Brazilian Minister of Marine asserted that Argentina
would assume a leadership position of the Hispanic people, “placing Brasil in a difficult
position.” Hence, Brazil would face a dilemma, “abandon the old friendship with
America, which has been very useful, or disconnect with the South American block.” The
Minister of Marine emphasized that Brazil would have to make their position clear at the
Conference.30 Historian Thomas O’Brien also observed the increasing criticism of
American imperialism as the Havana Pan-American conference approached. Looking at
the Sandino revolt in Nicaragua, for example, O’Brien asserts that the “U.S. effort to
crush the Sandinista movement prompted bitter criticism of U.S. interventionism by
delegates from several Latin American countries at the 1928 Pan-American Conference
in Havana.”31 In fact, according to O’Brien, “by the early twentieth century there was
already growing concern throughout Latin American societies that the American project
contained within it the goal of U.S. domination.”32
However, there were divisions among the South American nations. Regarding
Chile, the Brazilian Minister of Marine remarked, “our friendship with Chile is
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something of the past,” arguing that although the general population in Chile showed
sympathy towards Brazil, elites acted with indifference. The Minister also observed, “the
Brazilian situation in South America seems to be of complete isolation…” The main
causes for this isolation according to the Minister were, “the Brazilian weak military, and
inferior press.” Regarding the Argentinian naval power, the Brazilian Minister on Marine
observed that in 1930, the country’s naval power would be enhanced by two new torpedo
purchases. The Minister noted that the immediate purchase of these torpedoes was an
indication of the position Argentina hoped to assume in the conference.33 The Minister’s
observation is illuminating, for it highlights how the more powerful South American
nations, Argentina, Brazil, and Chile, viewed their naval power as an indication of
strength in comparison with one another. The Minister of Marine also pointed out that the
railroad system being constructed in Argentina in 1930 would be very efficient. In fact,
the Brazilian Minister of Marine believed that Argentina’s military strength, and its
contemporary financial position, attracted other Hispanic nations towards that country.34
As the regional aspirations of ABC nations helped shape their foreign policy,
Brazil looked to the U.S. as a possible ally in strengthening Brazil’s position in South
America. The Navy Mission contract not only promised to modernize the country’s navy,
increasing its regional prestige, but it also served as a symbol of U.S.-Brazilian
collaboration, perhaps discouraging Argentina and Chile from engaging in a conflict with
Brazil. According to the Brazilian Ambassador, “the political friendship between Brazil
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and the United States leaves considerably fortified after the [1928 Pan-American] Havana
Conference.”35 On February 23, the Ambassador explained that Secretary of State
[Frank] Kellogg praised Brazil’s attitude at the Havana conference, stating that, “Brazil
has been a tower of strength to us.”36 When Brazil withdrew from the League of Nations
in 1928 (it had announced its withdrawal in 1926), claiming that its membership could
force Brazil to get entangled in future European conflicts, some accused the U.S. of
persuading Brazil to leave the League, though U.S. officials denied the claims. Although
Brazil did not have a permanent seat on the Council, the Brazilian President of the
Committee of Foreign Affairs, Augusto Lima, explained the Brazilian government’s
decision, suggesting that “its action means Brazil’s closer relations with the American
republics, especially the United States. All the nations support Brazil’s withdrawal. It
became inevitable when it was seen that Latin America would not secure a seat in the
league council. Woodrow Wilson’s peace deals are our ideals, but as a nation we cannot
see how they can be attained by League membership.”37
The dynamics described above, as well as Brazil’s regional aspirations,
contributed to Brazilian policymakers’ decision to pursue the naval relationship with the
United States in a manner that was paradoxical. For instance, in 1924, the Brazilian
Ambassador to the U.S., Sylvio Gurgel do Amaral, wrote to the Brazilian Minister of
Foreign Relations, Dr. Octavio Mangabeira, in response to a question regarding what an
article called, “Backward British Guyana.” Amaral wrote, “I was of the opinion that
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Brazil should expand and prosper so as to have the priority of acquisition of British,
Dutch, and French Guyana, when the time comes that these European colonies would
have to belong to other owners, as a consequence of war or as a result of diplomatic
negotiations.” He added that, “the growing power of the United States will determine,
sooner or later, in one way or another, the disappearance of European sovereignty in the
Americas.” Amaral continued, “It would not be convenient for Brazil, to the United
States as their neighbors in the Guyanas, and I don’t believe that the Americans already
have established plans to install themselves there.” The ambassador hoped that “the
Guyanas would be transformed in Brazilian territory, as a result of negotiations,” and he
warned that if Brazil did not expand, in the future, the European Guyanas would be
transformed in “new center of activities, of formidable activities, of the United States,
their owner.”38
Similarly, in 1925, a correspondence between the Brazilian Ambassador to the
U.S., and the Brazilian Minister of foreign affairs, Felix Pacheco, also revealed the
Brazilian government’s concerns with the U.S. acquiring European colonies in South
America. As the French negotiated the payment of war debts to the U.S., the Brazilian
Ambassador believed that France could offer French Guyana as a form of payment.
Although the Ambassador did not believe President Coolidge would sign such an
agreement, he feared that newspaper articles, such as the one published in the New York
Times in 1925, which raised the possibility of such exchange, would persuade the
American public to believe that the U.S. would eventually take over all the former
European colonies in the region. He also asserted that American “expansion, dominion,
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and power do not truly have any limits,” adding that, “it is not that the Americans are
thirsty for territories, but its feeling of greatness.” “Americans considered their role in the
world very active and insatiable,” he continued, noting that expansion of the U.S. domain
was a symbol of strength. The Ambassador viewed the possibility of the U.S. domination
of French Guyana as extremely threatening to Brazilian interests.39 Thus, some Brazilian
policymakers encouraged cooperation with the United States in strengthening the
Brazilian Navy in part to protect against potential American expansion in the future.
In its drive to strengthen and modernize its navy in the early 1920s, Brazil
challenged the ongoing global disarmament efforts. The Brazilian President’s speech to
Congress in May 1923 highlights the government’s concern with Brazil’s lack of a
stronger navy given the country’s population and substantial coastal territory. His speech
also reveals the direction that he thought the Brazilian Navy should take in the 1920s, a
factor that influenced the decision to contract the U.S. Navy Mission. President Artur
Bernardes explained the weakness of the Brazilian naval power, “this means that Brazil,
in relation to the number of her inhabitants and area, has the smallest army of any in
South America.” Moreover, he noted that the League of Nations had “recognized that it
was necessary that the amount of armament to be determined should be the minimum
compatible with national safety, and in compliance with international obligations relating
to common action, always remembering the geographic situation and the special
conditions of each State.” According to President Bernardes, “with a naval organization
inferior to the requirements of her safety and to her geographical position, Brasil had
nevertheless, as a member of the League of Nations, to participate in the discussion
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which followed the signature of the convention, the object of which was to reduce the
naval resources of the Great Powers, excessively increased by the demands created by
war.” Although a member of the League of Nations, Brazil did not fall under the same
category as a naval strength, relative to global powers. Regarding Brazil being treated
equally with other Latin American nations, the President stated, “how can one tonnage of
battleships be fixed upon for all the nations of the American continent, when among them
are some, such as the Republic of Central America, that have agreed already not to have
any navies capable of making war; how can an invariable rule be applied to countries
with such unequal geographical conditions, without violating the principle of Article 8 of
the League of Nations.”40
Brazilian Minister of Marine, Admiral Alexandrino de Alencar also spoke of the
impracticality of a single rule governing the question of naval armament in Latin
America. Alencar explained, “the question of the limitation of the South American
armament initiated during the meetings of the League of Nations, and transferred to the
Pan American Conference in the Chilean Capital, deeply interests the whole of the navy.”
Alencar criticized the current state of the Brazilian Navy, “in both assemblies, where the
matter was discussed with fresh international goodwill, Brazil, in consideration of the
forces upon which she could count in comparison with those of the other powers of the
continent possessing naval armaments, decided that it would be impossible to accept even
the status quo, as it would place her in an inferior position in relation to the other two
friendly republics, Argentina and Chile.” Regarding the Brazilian Navy’s effectiveness,
40
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Alencar continued, “the Brazilian battleships moreover are inferior on account of lesser
speed- factor of great importance in naval strategy-the range of their guns, their thinner
steel plates and longer service.”41 Moreover, it was not in Brazil’s interests to join in the
League of Nations’ push for disarmament, Alencar warned in 1924, since it was a
“certainty that Brazil, in order to maintain its continental and international prestige,”
could not afford to maintain a disarmed seapower.42
To Brazil, World War I clearly exposed the weakness of the country’s navy.
Brazilian historian Hélio Leôncio Martins notes Brazil’s struggles during the War in
Historia Naval Brasileira. Martins explains that once the Brazilian Navy started
patrolling the country’s coastline, “the Brazilian navy regretted their material deficiency,
their obsolete ships (even though the majority of the units were relatively new), and
especially the lack of a support base in the north and south.”43 Martins also concludes,
“our participation in WWI, was the scream that alerted us to the importance of
maintaining a permanent naval force, prepared and trained, even if modest…”44
Captain W.O. Spears was also critical of the Brazilian Navy’s lack of
preparedness during the war. As he wrote, “after many delays, mutinies and
embarrassments, this squadron finally arrived in Dakar in August. The influenza
epidemic carried away about 20% of officers and crew. After reinforcements had arrived,
the squadron, under the command of a Brazilian Admiral, finally got underway from
Dakar with destination Gibraltar.” Spears also noted that on “on Armistice day,
41
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November 11, 1918, while entering Gibraltar, the Brazilian Squadron opened fire on and
American sub-chaser mistaking it for an enemy submarine. This was the extent of the
Brazilian participation in the World War.” Moreover, according to Spears, “before their
departure from Brazil, their hopeless state of unreadiness was pointed out to them, but
their pride was too great to delay the expedition at the instigation of American officers.
For instance, the fact that the guns had never been bore sighted, that there were no
boresights in the Navy, that the ammunition was out of date and dangerous to handle, was
of small moment.” Spears concluded, “the hopeless failure of this expedition helped
considerably to open the eyes of the Brazilians to the necessity of foreign help to a much
greater degree they originally intended.”45
As the Brazilian government contemplated the hiring of a naval mission, opinions
in Brazil varied regarding the impact of such an agreement, as well as to whether Great
Britain or the U.S. should win the contract. As Historian Robert Scheina notes, “Great
Britain and the United States competed intensely for Brazil’s attention.”46 From some
Brazilians’ perspective, Great Britain was a strong contender to lead the Brazilian navy’s
efforts to modernize its institutions. In 1922, O Jornal, explained the dilemma the
Brazilian government faced in choosing either a British or an American contract. The
article stated that, “it is not yet known from what country the naval mission will come.
Opinions and prejudices among our naval officers’ body are divided between England,
the United States…England has behind her an incomparable naval history, and epic of
wars on the seas, a prestige as queen of the oceans, a maritime consciousness, a
45
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marvelous shipbuilding industry; the United States has more method, a better scientific
basis in their naval methods.” Hinting at the importance of pan-Americanism, the article
concluded, “choice between the two is difficult. It is thus possible that, given the high
degree of perfection of the two navies, sprung from the same race, the decision will be
governed by considerations of international policy. Then we shall probably have in this
choice one more manifestation of continental solidarity.”47 Given that Brazil had already
contracted an army mission from France, a traditional European power in the region, and
the British had traditionally held influence in the Brazilian Navy, winning the naval
contract in Brazil was a difficult task, yet critical to the U.S., which sought to counter
European influence in South America.
Many Brazilians also recognized the power that foreign navy officers would have
on the Brazilian military and politics, thus understood the critical nature of the decision
between selecting U.S. or Great Britain to run mission. For instance, O Jornal reflected
on the impact that a naval mission would have in the reorganization of the Brazilian
Navy. The article explained, “the position of the Chief of the Mission, attached to the
General Staff, shows that the nature of the services consists in establishing in the navy a
Brazilian organization which will make the navy a war weapon; in implanting the spirit
of this organization in all the officers; in creating in them the ways of feeling, of thought,
the knowledge of the modes of action which will make them bear fruit.” The article also
noted that the mission would impact all aspects of the Brazilian Navy; “thence will flow
the development and organization of material afloat and resources ashore, without which
the navy cannot live; the proper direction of naval instruction; the organizing and
47
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selecting of personnel; the drills and activities- the strength of the Navy.” Recognizing
the tremendous impact the officers would have in carrying out the mission’s goals, the
article noted, “this most important work of indoctrination will fall to the officers who
compose the Mission and will be carried on either in the naval schools, war college and
professional schools, either by lecturers or by advisers attached to the commanders of
forces who will then, it is to be expected, have an organization different from the present
one…”48
U.S. Goals:
U.S. objectives in South America were grounded in the pursuit of security for
North America, stability for the hemisphere, and the expansion of U.S. economic
interests in the region. Achieving those aims required increasing U.S. influence relative
to that exerted by European nations, a goal advanced through developing commercial,
diplomatic, and military ties with regional governments. Enhancing the positive
disposition of regional governments and militaries toward the United States, therefore,
was a means of achieving key U.S. objectives, as was the promotion and expansion of
U.S. cultural influence.
In 1923, a correspondence in the Division of Naval Intelligence from U.S. Navy
Commander W.W. Galbraith highlights what the U.S. hoped to achieve with the
indoctrination of the Brazilian navy:
“The navy department is committed to a policy with regard to the
countries of South America which involves doing what can be done
to educate, indoctrinate, guide and train the personnel and to
encourage them to use material of U.S. Navy standard pattern,
making in so far as may be practicable their material like that in use
by us, so that we may use their vessels in time of war by taking them
48
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over by purchase without their crews or, in case we allied with them,
with their crews if these crews are sufficiently trained. There are
several officers from different South American republics in this
country at the present time receiving instruction.”49

In order to understand the U.S. decision to send a navy mission to Brazil, it is
important to consider the conditions of U.S.-South American relations in the 1920s. For
instance, a 1922 letter in the Division of Naval Intelligence reveals several variables at
play when the U.S. decided to send a naval mission to Brazil. First, the letter illustrates
how the U.S. Navy Mission would continue aiding the U.S civilizing mission in Brazil.
The U.S. government, accused of imperialism, faced harsh criticism in South America in
the 1920s. As the note explained, “there are many reasons why we should send Naval
Missions to Latin America. During the last five years there has developed a sentiment
among the great progressive countries of South America that they have outgrown the
necessity for the protection of the Monroe Doctrine and that the time has come for each
to contribute its share towards the preservation of the common integrity of the Western
hemisphere.”50
In “In the Name of the Americas: The Pan-American Redefinition of the Monroe
Doctrine and the Emerging Language of American International Law,” Juan Pablo Scarfi
explores how some South American nations aimed at re-defining the Monroe Doctrine,
and how the U.S. adapted its policy in the early twentieth century. According to Scarfi,
“in the context of Pan-Americanism, U.S. hemispheric hegemony entailed the use of
policy power and interventionism in Central America and the Caribbean, and more
49
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importantly, a cooperative approach towards the ABC countries (Argentina, Brazil,
Chile) and Uruguay based on hemispheric intellectual exchanges and the assistance and
mediation of South American jurists and politicians…” Scarfi also points out that in the
1920s, the U.S. encountered challenges however, when trying to balance PanAmericanism, and the increased pressure from South American nations to amend the
unilateral rhetoric of the Monroe Doctrine.51
In 1923, the Dallas Morning News offered insight into how the South American
representatives in Chile were interpreting the Monroe Doctrine. According to the article,
the delegates urged a change in the Monroe Doctrine’s strategy. As the article explained,
“it would be established that the association (of American Republics) considers it
dangerous for its case and security that any attempt be made by any Nation of another
continent to extend its domination, either in the form of colonization, mandate or
protectorates, to any region of the American hemisphere; also that any infringement of
the right of a member by any country of another continent would interest the association,
which would try to find a solution of the question.” The newspaper also observed that the
American Ambassador to Chile noted “that the Monroe Doctrine was the doctrine of the
United States and that the United States preferred to look upon it as a unilateral
stipulation of the United States.” The Ambassador was also alarmed by the proposal’s
emphasis on regional autonomy. The article argued however, that Mr. [Henry P.]
Fletcher’s position would not stop countries like Brazil, Argentina, and Chile from seeing
the reimagined doctrine implemented. Fletcher was the diplomat in charge of the U.S.
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delegation in Chile. The article concluded, “it is inconceivable that they should continue
indefinitely as potential wards of the United States.”52
As the U.S. developed its post-World War I South American strategy, the
American Navy officers aided in their nation’s goal of strengthening U.S.-Brazilian
relations without resorting to direct military intervention, as the U.S. had previously done
in Central America and the Caribbean, particularly through military occupations, and the
“gunboat” diplomacy methods of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century.53 As
U.S. Secretary of State Charles Evans Hughes remarked in his speech about the Monroe
Doctrine in 1923, “it should be constantly recognized that the most influential and helpful
position of the U.S. in this hemisphere will not be that of possessor of physical power but
that of an exemplar of justice.”54 Hughes’s remarks called for peaceful resolution of
conflicts or disagreements based on an appeal to law or legal precedent. Naval
diplomacy, in the form of the mission, allowed the U.S. government to influence internal
affairs in Brazil by persuading the Brazilian Navy to adopt American methods,
transferring practices, establishing personal relationships, and integrating weapons
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systems. This policy of indirectly influencing Latin America, including through military
aid, would be a prominent part of U.S. relations with the hemisphere during the Good
Neighbor Era in the 1930s and beyond. Much of the academic literature focuses on
regional militaries’ abuses, connecting them to prior U.S. training.55 This work highlights
another part of the story, that of the U.S. military helping professionalize regional armed
forces, and simultaneously using those relationships to strengthen state-to-state relations
between the U.S. and Brazil.
Although U.S. naval personnel acted as informal diplomats in Latin America prior
to the Navy Mission, the initial four-year contract with Brazil represented a more
coordinated and comprehensive approach to indirectly influence Brazilian domestic and
foreign policies than during past efforts. Historian Thomas O’Brien argues that, “U.S.
officials never seriously considered using interventionist tactics to extend their civilizing
mission to South America,” despite the fact that, “direct intervention in the nearby,
relatively small nations of Central America and the Caribbean had proven quite
manageable with costs of the Haitian and Dominican occupations running between one
and one-half million dollars annually.” Conversely, O’Brien notes that the cost of
intervention further south was likely to be substantial.56 The soft power diplomatic
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approach of the early 1900s continued into the 1920s in Brazil with the aid of the
American Navy.
Military missions had also served as a gate for European powers to influence the
region politically. As a 1923 correspondence in the Division of Naval Intelligence
explained, “the Argentine and Chilean armies were both trained by German missions; the
Peruvian and Brazilians by French missions. British missions have trained the Chilean
and Argentine navies, and formerly the Brazilian navy. In this way Old World influence
and animosities have been transplanted to the Western Hemisphere, doing much harm.”57
The Brazilian military class had traditionally exerted considerable influence in the
nation’s politics. In fact, many U.S. policymakers and Brazilian officials had accused the
insurgents of the 1893-1894 Navy Revolt of working with the British to restore monarchy
in Brazil. Moreover, given Brazil’s record of internal military conflicts, the training of the
Brazilian Navy could potentially lead to a greater U.S. impact on Brazilian politics in the
future. Also recognizing the mission’s potential for influencing Brazilian domestic
policy, a U.S. Division of Naval Intelligence August 1922 report explained, “in South
America the influence of the military class is very great. The general or Admiral of today
is very apt to be the President of tomorrow. It is only natural that officers and men should
feel strongly influenced in business dealings as well as in politics to favor the country
under whose tutelage they have been brought up.”58 In December, Captain H.G. Sparrow
also noted the relationship between the navy and Brazilian politics, “any sentiment which
is held in the Navy is quite likely to find reflection in the administration of the Republic,”
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due to armed forces traditional influence in politics. Hence, “if the bonds between the two
countries,” U.S. and Brazil, “can be strengthened, there is likely to be a more immediate
effect upon the political relations of the countries than would be the case in the countries
where the armed classes have less influence in the Government.”59 Thus, the training of
the Brazilian Navy, in which American officers were directly involved, represented a
crucial aspect of U.S. naval diplomacy, and was particularly significant because of
traditional influence of the Brazilian military on Brazilian politics.
On May 12, 1919, as the U.S. developed its post-World War I foreign policy,
Admiral William B. Caperton wrote to the U.S. Chief of Naval Operations on the vital
role the U.S. Navy played in diplomacy and projection of American power overseas. As
he meticulously noted, “the primary mission of the navy is to be prepared for war. A
secondary mission is to be in all the important seacoast countries of the world a visible
and active manifestation of the friendship, and when necessary, the power of the United
States.” Admiral Caperton continued, “with the growth of the navy, and the concentration
of most of its strength into an Atlantic fleet, the war mission has become predominant,
and relatively little thought and effort have been spent on the diplomatic use of the
navy.”60
Regarding a more permanent presence of a navy squadron in the Caribbean,
Central and South America, Admiral Caperton believed it to be essential to diplomacy.
As he stated, “the presence of the ships in harbor and the appearance of the officers and
men mingling with the inhabitants on the street and at entertainments focus popular
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attention.” As the officers are seen more like a common man, their persona is truly
indicative of that nation’s character. Caperton asserted, “the personal friends made by the
officers and men of the visiting squadron are equally friends made for the country.”61 It is
important to note that not everyone agreed with Caperton’s views on naval diplomacy. As
historian David Healy observes, “the end of the European war would bring a general
redeployment of naval forces, and the seagoing admirals feared any tendency toward
dispersion of the fleet to scattered geographic stations. They demanded that the navy’s
ships be largely concentrated in a single fighting force and dedicated to preparation of
war.”62 Moreover, the Navy Planning Committee post-War rejected the Admiral’s advice.
As Healy explains, “the peacetime mission of the navy, said the committee’s report, was
to prepare for war.” Healy continued, “diplomacy was the business of the State
Department, not the navy, while expanding foreign trade was a task for private banking
and commercial interests.”63 However, the State Department did utilize the navy to
achieve both goals, diplomacy and to expand commercial interests.
Regarding the commercial benefits for the U.S., Caperton also explained the
relevance of the navy diplomacy. The Admiral asserted, “the economic development of
our country has reached the point where we must extend our foreign trade. The navy can
render enormous aid in this work by creating and developing a feeling of liking and trust
of the United States.” Regarding strategy he noted, “the officers will obtain familiarity
with foreign waters which might be invaluable in war operations, and a grasp of
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international affairs which will assist in fitting them for positions of trust when they attain
high rank.” Admiral Caperton strongly advised that these officers should acquire naval
intelligence from the nations they were deployed to, and report to their government. Such
interaction would mean that the U.S. would be better prepared in case of war.64
Fostering friendly relations after World War I, however, was complicated by an
increase in the ever-present anti-American sentiment in the country. The degree of antiAmerican sentiment varied over time, and it should not be misunderstood to have been
predominant, but it was persistent, and at times influential. Regarding a growing antiAmericanist faction, Agent Perdomo also reported on January 31, 1919 that a Brazilian
newspaper criticized the Allied nations, and Woodrow Wilson’s League of Nations
rhetoric for generating labor unrest in England.65 Moreover, anti-U.S. sentiments in
Brazil sought to bring attention to Wilson’s double standards. As Perdomo reported, the
Brazilian newspaper Estado de Sao Paulo wrote, “the United States, by the mouth of
Wilson, preach the rights of the small countries to govern themselves. They preach those
rights but forget that the Philippines and Cuba are yet under North American domination,
and that Mexico, only due to the energy of its people, is not even now invaded by North
American forces, for the satisfaction of ‘Yankee’ Imperialism!”66 The article also
criticized U.S. imperialist aspirations towards the Amazon region in Brazil, and the
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Panama Canal. Although the U.S. had made tremendous progress during World War I in
Brazil, anti-American sentiment still posed a threat to U.S. post-War policy.
The Office of Naval Intelligence continued to report on the growing antiAmericanism in the 1920s, transmitting an article from the Brazilian newspaper A União,
in 1923. The newspaper’s editor had criticized U.S. policies, “the attention of the
government had been repeatedly called to the great danger of Brazil becoming politically
dominated by the United States.” The author was particularly concerned with the
exploration of the Amazon region by the U.S., affirming that Brazilians would not enjoy
the profits. Moreover, it accused the U.S. government of seeking to send African
Americans as the source of labor in the Amazon, with the double purpose of evicting
them from the U.S, and to use them to convert the Brazilian black population to
Protestantism. The article viewed U.S. investment in the Amazon as a part of a larger
scheme to expand American imperialism into South American. The report noted
however, that anti-Americanism in Brazil was not prevalent, and that the government of
Brazil is actually supportive of the U.S.67
Concerns over possible radicalism in the Brazilian Navy also grew after World
War I. The Red Scare, which infiltrated American domestic policy in the 1920s,
manifested itself in the nation’s foreign policy as well. For instance, in 1919, Captain
Spears wrote Captain Frank Hill regarding a Bolshevik threat in the Brazilian Navy.
Captain Spears observed that the enlisted men on Brazilian destroyers “were being
reported by the police authorities on shore as being in constant attendance at Bolshevik
anarchistic meetings.” Moreover, “one of the officers on the Minas Gerais discovered a
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signal that had been sent from one of the destroyers privately to one of the supposed
leaders of the Bolshevik movement on the Minas Gerais.”68 An American Navy Mission,
serving in an advisory capacity and closely involved in officer training, could reduce
these perceived threats. Like the naval revolt of 1893-1894, when the fear of a monarchy
conspiracy within the Brazilian navy helped guide U.S. strategy in the conflict, the
possibility of a Bolshevik infiltration within the Brazilian navy in the 1920s also alarmed
the U.S., who understood the political influence that Brazil’s Navy yielded in domestic
policies.
In addition to concerns about Bolshevik influence that might have political
repercussions in Brazil, the U.S. maintained interest in a strong Brazilian Navy as a
means of promoting U.S. security. Although German submarine warfare in the Atlantic
had threatened South American waters, and the U.S. and Brazil worked together during
World War I, U.S. forces in the Pacific reported on Brazil’s military shortcomings to the
Office of Navy Operations. This observation would later prove crucial in persuading the
U.S. to send a naval mission to Brazil in the 1920s to better prepare Brazil to collaborate
with the U.S. if another major conflict broke out. The Commander of U.S. naval forces in
the Pacific wrote, “believe the Brazilian Navy will do nothing further without pressure
and without assistance to extent of furnishing nearly all required material and in order
achieve efficient results, probably necessary to send more personnel to train and assist
them.” World War I exposed the vulnerability of Brazil to attacks and invasions by U.S.
enemies, threatening U.S. hegemony in the hemisphere not only during the war, but also
in possible future conflicts. Recognizing the opportunity for the U.S. government, the
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Captain continued, “in view of the British interests will do whatever necessary if we do
not but also will leave matters to us if we act. Manifestly we should take initiative and
assume entire job.”69 Thus, lessons learned during World War I were the catalyst for
further U.S.-Brazilian naval cooperation.
World War I also marked a turning point in U.S.-Brazilian economic relations.70
A 1927 article in The World observed, “the outstanding impression an unbiased observer
is likely to receive while traveling in Latin America today is that of the overwhelming
predominance of American trade throughout the Southwest continent. A field which
before the war was almost exclusively controlled by European finance and commerce is
now gradually being conquered by the United States.”71 According to the U.S.
Department of Commerce, the commercial relationship between the U.S. and Latin
American grew significantly in 1923; “in the list of products imported from 1923, based
on the value of the purchases, coffee occupies first place…” with Brazil receiving about
63% of the profits. Meanwhile, the primary U.S. exports to Brazil were gas, wheat, cars,
coal and lubricants.72
Increased economic and military ties, and U.S. financing for some of those
ventures, gave the United States a degree of influence in Brazilian politics. As Brazil
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modernized its navy in the 1920s, the country borrowed money from the U.S., and bought
modern equipment from American companies. The U.S. government used this
arrangement to promote American interests in Brazil. As Spears explained in 1929, “the
debt owing to the U.S. for modernization of the Sao Paulo and Minas Gerais,” the two
Brazilian battleships, “has always been excellent leverage for producing results. That has
been worked by the embassy several times to gain commercial and political advantages.
It has assured the permanency of the Naval Mission as it has always been cheaper to keep
the mission than pay this debt with interest.” Spears also noted that Chief of Navy
Mission used this leverage to “prodcue results in the Brazilian Navy.”73 Robert Scheina
also emphasized that, “one benefit of sending naval missions to Latin America was that it
significantly influenced the purchasing habits of the host navy.”74 While Joseph Smith
demonstrates in Unequal Giants that “the mission was not designed to assist Brazilian
militarism,” and that “the naval mission did not mark a special relationship or militaristic
conspiracy between Brazil and the United States,”75 the mission was nonetheless
significant. Even though the U.S. did not intend to form a military alliance or strengthen
Brazil militarily to the point of disturbing the regional balance of power in South
America, specifically with Argentina and Chile, Spears’ observations of how debt could
be used as leverage illuminate one way in which American commercial influence through
the mission could promote Brazilian economic dependency on the U.S. Moreover,
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Scheina’s point about influencing the purchasing habits of the Brazilian Navy also shows
how the Navy Mission strengthened U.S.-Brazilian relations in the long-term.
The U.S. continued to seek ways to strengthen its relations with Brazil. After the
war, the acting U.S. Director of Naval Intelligence provided the following report from a
reliable source in Brazil to the Bureau of Foreign and Domestic commerce, “we have
made very serious mistakes in the past in Brazil, which are not easily forgotten. Our firms
and their representatives left a bad impression. We can overcome this however, because
the Brazilian really likes us and wants to do business with us.” The report followed with
recommendations: “we must sell them goods on the basis of friendship… they do not like
to have us boast of our merits of our goods, or of our prices or the fact that these goods
sold well in China or Chile.” Highlighting the emphasis that Brazilians placed on
personal rapport, the report explained, “they prefer to buy from us because they are our
friends…” Encouraging American commercial expansion, the report suggested,
“concerning banks, we need several more American banks in Brazil with branches in all
important cities, who will do business according to the Brazilian method and allow their
manager to stay long enough to get acquainted… I wish to repeat- he must know the
language thoroughly…” Cognizant of the traditional British influence, the report also
urged, “at the present time, the British manufacturers and exporters are doing business in
Brazil along the same methods employed by the Germans… they are also taking
advantage of our lack of shipping at the present time to attempt to get control of the
Brazilian markets.”76 Moreover, in April 1920, the U.S. Assistant Secretary of the Navy

76

17 January, 1919, George W. Williams, Captain U.S. Navy, Acting Director of Naval
Intelligence to the Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce, War Trade Board, M.I.D., RG45,
Subject File 1911-1927, Entry#520, Folder: WA-7: Brazil no date- March 1918, Box 725, NARA
I. Although the report does not specify what it means by “serious mistakes in the past in Brazil,”

221

approved the sale of seaplanes, propellers, and other military equipment to Brazil, writing
to the Chief of Bureau of Supplies and Accounts, “with a desire to foster the development
of aviation in South American countries, as there has been a Naval Commission in Brazil
to advise on aviation subjects, and in view of the excesses on naval materials now on
hand.”77
U.S. efforts to expand commercial relations in Brazil faced stiff competition from
the British. The connection between naval influence and commercial expansion had
already been clear during World War I. As concerns with British and German influence
continued to impact U.S. foreign policy towards Brazil, the U.S. increasingly used navy
diplomacy to expand American power in that country. As U.S. Ambassador to Brazil,
Edwin Morgan, explained of the Brazilian Navy’s participation during World War I, “in
spite of its inability to make a practical contribution toward the ally victory, the fleet
received and accepted an invitation to visit British waters,” adding, “they have also been
entertained by the firm of Armstrong, which built the two Brazilian dreadnoughts, and in
conjunction with Messrs. Vickers seeks a concession for constructing a marine arsenal
and a shipbuilding plant.” He also noticed that the Brazilian press recognized the cordial
reception in Great Britain. Morgan continued, “I have the honor to call the special
attention of the Department to this editorial since it appeared in a journal which hitherto
has not been pro-British…” Morgan noticed however, that “since it began to receive the

its suggestion to approach their dealings with Brazilians using a more personal tactic perhaps
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to expand their business.
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press services of the ‘United Press” has printed many articles favoring an increase in the
political and commercial relations between ourselves and this country.”78
As the British continued competing with the U.S. economically after the war, the
U.S. Navy continued to aid its government in their policy towards Brazil. On May 20,
1919, Captain Frank Hill reported to the Office of Naval Intelligence on anti-U.S.
propaganda in Brazil coupled with pro-British propaganda, concluding, “the British
undoubtedly investigated anti-American propaganda in order [to insure] that Americans
cannot interfere with their proposition.”79 The British Company Armstrong Witworth &
Co. had been negotiating for a contract to build a navy arsenal in Brazil. Rear Admiral
A.P. Niblack, Director of the U.S. Naval Intelligence, informed the International General
Electric Company in New York, of the British Company’s intentions.80 On May 17,
1919, Niblack informed the Bethlehem Steel Company in Pennsylvania regarding the
Brazilian government’s possible contract with the British. Niblack wrote, “English
government has permanent commission in Rio de Janeiro. Negotiations will undoubtedly
begin with the new administration immediately after inauguration end of June. Our
proposal must be submitted as soon as possible. Suggest immediate action through
Washington.”81

78

5 February 1919, Edwin Morgan to the Secretary of State, Records Relating to Internal Affairs
of Brazil, 1910-1929, 832.34/3-834, 348/2, RG59, Microfilm 519, Roll 19, NARA II.
79
20 May 1919, from Frank Hill to Navintel, RG45, Subject File 1911-1927, Entry#520, Folder:
WA-7: Trade in Brazil, 1919- 1920, Box 725, NARA I.
80
14 May 1919, From A.P. Niblack to the International General Electric Company, RG45,
Subject File 1911-1927, Entry#520, Folder: WA-7: Trade in Brazil, 1919- 1920, Box 725, NARA
I.
81
17 May 1919, From the Naval Attaché in Rio de Janeiro to the Bethlehem Steel Company,
RG45, Subject File 1911-1927, Entry#520, Folder: WA-7: Trade in Brazil, 1919- 1920, Box 725,
NARA I.

223

The personal interaction that the American officers fostered with Brazilians
served an important strategic purpose to diminishing British influence as U.S. concern
with British impact in the Brazilian Navy continued to be validated by discussions about
British naval prestige in Brazil, even after the signing of the American Navy Mission in
1922. A newspaper clipping from a correspondence from the U.S. Naval Attaché in Rio
de Janeiro to the U.S. Director of Naval Intelligence on January 1923, contained remarks
by the Brazilian Minister of Marine, Alencar, given during a reception held on November
1922 in his honor. Alencar asserted, “as we imitate the English in their uniforms under
the supposition that the ‘habit makes the monk,’ with even more reason we should keep
in mind the English navy, the typical example of order and of quiet and collective force
under a discipline of duty done, in the aspirations of common ideas, clear and well
defined.” Alencar praised the British Navy, “there we find modesty joined to courage.
There we find no empire of calumny, no unedifying spectacle of a disunited and
backbiting class, showing in its defects the weakness of its military virtues.’”82 Alencar’s
comments help illustrate the difficult task the U.S government and officers faced in
acquiring the contract and implementing structural changes within the Brazilian Navy.
Also in 1919, U.S. Lieutenant P.A. Cusachs wrote, “at the time of leaving there
had arisen a great deal of anti-American propaganda. Backed chiefly by the English and
French commercial people and to some extent, also by some Italians.”83 In 1920, Captain
Frank Hill wrote the U.S. Director of Naval Intelligence about the British desire to
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undermine American interests in Brazil, specifically British efforts to impede the growing
U.S.-Brazilian naval relations after World War I. According to Hill, a series of antiAmerican articles published in Brazil were encouraged by the British to “discredit work
done in the United States on the Sao Paulo,” a Brazilian battleship, “2nd to prevent the
Minas Gerais,” also a Brazilian battleship, “being sent to the United States for repairs, 3rd
to obtain a contract from the Brazilian government for the H.P. Shells.” The article from
the Brazilian newspaper Noite, had criticized the work that the U.S. did on the Sao Paulo,
specifically the fire control installations, which were allegedly “installed for firing with
projectiles that are not used by the guns of our dreadnoughts.”84
Moreover, in 1925, as negotiations to renew the mission for another four years
took place, Ambassador Morgan explained, “the political reasons which made it desirable
that there should be a Naval Mission to Brazil and that it should be of American officers
appear as active now as it was four years ago. Eventually a British Mission would be
substituted for our own, should our own be withdrawn. Of that there can be no doubt.”
Noting the threat to American regional hegemony, Morgan warned, “a British Mission
has recently been established in Chile and British builders have active representatives in
this country always keen on securing orders.”85
Later, after the Brazilian government decided to terminate the American Naval
Mission contract in the aftermath of the 1930 coup, citing financial difficulties, concerns
in the U.S. grew as to the true motives behind the cancellation, particularly as how it
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related to the British presence in Brazil. In 1931, a memorandum to the U.S. Chief of
Naval Operations observed, “on the heels of the withdrawal of the U.S. Naval Mission, it
is interesting to notice the following: acceptance by Sir Otto Niemeyer (Bank of England
affiliations) of an invitation to proceed to Brazil to advise the government on its banking
and monetary problems. The Prince of Wales on his visit to Brazil is to be the guest of
the government, notwithstanding its financial situation.” Moreover, “various press items
emanating from London have been noted stating that England would furnish a Naval
Mission to Brazil. This has been neither confirmed nor denied. It would appear from the
above that the official Brazilian sentiment is now anti-American.” The observations also
included the withdrawal of Brazilian officers who were taking courses in the U.S.86 Thus,
the U.S. government continued to view the navy mission as a useful tool of diplomacy in
Latin America, pointing to the threat its absence caused in relation to U.S.-British balance
of power in the region.
Moreover, in April 1919, a telegram from Morgan to the U.S. Secretary of State
warned, “British government has offered to present to Brazilian government thirty sea
planes which will be turned over to and accepted by senior Brazilian Naval Aviation
officer in England.” Morgan explained the purpose behind this strategy, “the object of the
gift is to introduce British material and ultimately British personnel into Brazilian Naval
Aviation, which at present we control. Suggest that before there is time for the acceptance
of British offer, United States Navy Department to present Brazilian Navy with
equipment for small air base.” Regarding Great Britain and Italy, Morgan also warned
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that both, “are trying to capture Brazilian naval aviation and only through prompt and
decided counter steps can our present dominant position be rendered secure.”87
In April 1919, Acting U.S. Director of Naval Intelligence, Captain George W.
Williams, forwarded a note from someone he referred to as a reliable source in Brazil to
the U.S. War Trade Board Operations, which discussed ways to improve the two nations’
commercial relations. The correspondence noted, “there seems to be a good future for
commercial intercourse between the Brazilians and the U.S. but which is heavily
handicapped by the lack of Mercantile Marine under Old Glory, as the British ship
owners always have, and always will in the future give better freight rates from England
to Brazil against the same class of merchandise from the U.S.” The note urged, “if there
is not something done within the next six months, in the way of establishment of a
permanent line of steamers under the American flag between the U.S. and South
America, a great commercial opportunity will be lost.”88 About a month later, the U.S.
Naval Attaché in Brazil wrote the Director of Naval Intelligence, A.P. Niblack, in order
to provide information for the Bethlehem Steel Company on the Brazilian government’s
plan to build a naval arsenal. The Navy Attaché wrote, “Brazilian Government proposes
undertaking development along lines chosen strong proposal of last year. English
government has permanent commission to Rio de Janeiro. Negotiations will undoubtedly
begin with the new administration immediately after inauguration end of June. Our
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proposal must be submitted as soon as possible. Suggest immediate action through
Washington, signed Jungling.”89
After the Great War, the U.S. also grew increasingly concerned about German
influence and anti-U.S. sentiment in Brazil. Strengthening naval relations could continue
to counter German influence, drawing Brazil and the U.S. closer together. In 1919, an
American agent in Brazil reported on the anti-U.S. sentiment in the country. Back in
1893, a Brazilian author, Antonio Prado, published a book, A Illusao Americana, “The
American Illusion,” harshly criticizing the U.S. Although the Brazilian authorities
confiscated the book in 1893, the U.S. agent reported that a fourth edition of the book
was republished in 1917. Specifically, the American Illusion criticized U.S. policy
towards Latin America, the Monroe Doctrine, the American Civil War, and the lynching
that took place in the U.S. as evidence of American betrayal of the principles of freedom
the country claimed to promote. According to U.S. agent Perdomo, a German managed
the printing company that re-circulated the copy in 1917. Perdomo asserted, “in previous
reports, have given that I believe abundant proof of both, the unfriendly deceitful attitude
of the government of Brazil towards the United States; their domination by German
influences.”90
A confidential bulletin from the Office of Naval Intelligence written in 1918 also
exemplifies the U.S. government’s concern with German influence in Latin America, and
89

17 May 1919, From the Director of Naval Intelligence to the Bethlehem Steel Company,
Folder: “Trade in Brazil-1919-1920,” RG45 Entry#520, Box 725, WA-7 Allied Countries-Brazil,
Attitude on War, Subject File 1911-1927, NARA I.
90
29 January, 1919, Report from Agent Perdomo, E-98 NM63, Box #531, Subject code c10i
Register #11405, RG38, NARA I. The American Illusion is criticizing the double standard of the
U.S. promotion of freedom principles abroad as part of their civilizing mission foreign policy,
while at home, acquiescing to lynching, a public execution by a mob mostly by hanging, and
other acts of violence against African American represented a failure of Reconstruction and of the
promise of expansion of freedom in their own nation.

228

the perpetuation of anti-Americanism in the region. Moreover, as the European powers
and the U.S. factored in the ABC nations as part of their geopolitical strategies, U.S.Brazilian navy diplomacy served as a tool which U.S. policymakers could use to counter
the perceived anti-Americanism in Argentina, specifically. As the bulletin explained, “the
fact that Argentina denied that there existed any treaty between it and the other neutral
nations to fight American influence, interested the Germans too. They admit that no
written treaty exists, but firmly believe that President Irigoyen of Argentina had a verbal
understanding to this effect with Chile, and for this reason Chile would never admit
Wilson as an arbitrator of its issue with Peru.” The bulletin also revealed South
America’s geopolitical value to both the U.S., and the European powers. As the bulletin
noted, “the Germans hope that America will interfere in South American affairs, for they
feel that the more trouble there is in the world, the sooner will Germany be able to regain
her fleet. They also believe that such a war could not fail to have an effect on AngloAmerican relations, and any differences which might arise between the British Empire
and the United States would be to Germany’s advantage.”91 Concerns with German
influence in Argentina continued well into World War II.92
Thus, during the 1920s, a multitude of variables were at play in Brazil, which
shaped U.S.-Brazilian relations. Americans foreign policymakers sought to curtail
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European influence, expand American businesses, and cement a relationship with the
Brazilian Navy. In Brazil specifically, German and British influence had been of
particular concern to the U.S. In fact, the U.S. desire to supplant British and German
power was a significant factor in convincing U.S. policymakers to pursue a contract for
the naval mission to Brazil in the 1920s, a concern that grew in the mid 1930s, as the
German threat to American interests became more prominent. As Scheina points out in
Latin America, “as the world moved closer to WWII, the United States increased her
efforts to dominate military affairs in Latin America, and ultimately she beat Great
Britain at the game of influence in all the significant navies there except those of
Argentina and Chile.”93
As they had since the 1890s, American foreign policy makers continued to use the
navy as an instrument to diminish European dominance in South America and advance
broader U.S. hemispheric strategy. Moreover, the traditional view of the Good Neighbor
policy is that U.S.-Latin American relations were deteriorating between 1898 to 1933,
when Franklin Roosevelt decided he needed to push a major policy change to reduce antiU.S. sentiment in the region. As McPherson points out, “resistance to these occupations
proved effective at bringing about an official U.S. policy of non-intervention, the Good
Neighbor Policy.”94 However, as this chapter shows, in the 1920s, the U.S. military,
especially the navy officials, were quietly working behind the scenes to improve U.S.
relations with key South American nations, such as Brazil. As such, this case study helps
scholars understand the Good Neighbor Policy in a more nuanced, complicated, and
interesting way.
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Meanwhile, Brazilian policymakers cultivated military ties with the United States
for various reasons, including expectations that doing so would aid in the physical
defense of Brazil, and a stronger, U.S.-trained navy would facilitate the country’s taking
on a broader regional role over time. The U.S. Navy Mission and the officers entrusted to
represent their nation in Brazil played a crucial role in transforming their nation’s foreign
policy into action. The Brazilian officers’ interactions with the American officers helped
change the status quo from the dominant British naval influence in Brazil to the
American sphere, culminating into the signing of the mission in 1922. As Spears pointed
out, “the establishment of naval missions in Brazil and Peru were additional concrete
evidence of our expanding political relations with those countries.”95 The next chapter
will look at the specific contributions of the American officers, and the methods that the
U.S. Navy Mission used to influence the Brazilian Navy.
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Chapter 7: The work of the Naval Mission in Brazil, 1920-1930
“The purpose of the Mission is to cooperate with the Minister of Marine and with the
officers of the navy in whatever may be necessary to secure a good organization of the
navy ashore and afloat; in improving the methods of work in the shore, in the shore
establishments and on board ships; in training and instructing personnel and in drawing
up and executing plans for the improvement of the navy, for fleet exercises and for naval
operations.”1
November 1922, “Agreement Between the Governments of the United States of America
and the United States of Brazil,” Article I “Purpose and Duration.”
Introduction:
In order to strengthen U.S.-Brazilian naval relations, the U.S. government sent a
naval mission to Brazil in 1922 for the purpose of reorganizing and modernizing the
Brazilian Navy following U.S. naval teaching methods, and incorporating American
naval materials. Although American officers had been successfully interacting with the
Brazilian Navy prior to 1922 through port visits, collaboration during World War I, and
through the naval commission that worked at the Brazilian Naval War College during
World War I, the Navy Mission signified a commitment to an increasingly systematic
approach to naval diplomacy. This chapter examines the U.S. Navy mission in Brazil in
the 1920s, focusing on American and Brazilian Navy officers’ activities and their
observations, as well as the mission’s impact on bilateral relations. Although the
American Navy Mission in Brazil went through some structural changes throughout its
existence, it lasted until 1977. Analyzing the mission in its formative years, specifically
how the American officers facilitated the U.S. strategy in Brazil, adds depth to the better-
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known Good Neighbor Era, the two nations’ collaboration during World War II, and U.S.
Cold War Era efforts in Brazil.2
Brazil’s Goals:
Brazilian sources reveal what the Brazilian Navy hoped to achieve with the
contracting of the U.S. naval mission in 1922. First, as previous chapters have explained,
the Brazilian government had been devising a plan to modernize its navy since 1906. In
fact, like the U.S., the Brazilian government hoped modernizing its navy would
“counterbalance the weight of the European influence,” while aspiring to “get support for
the maintenance of its regional position.”3 Moreover, World War I exposed the weakness
of the country’s navy. By contracting the U.S. Navy Mission, the Brazilian government
hoped to modernize its navy, while also re-structuring their Naval War College. Second,
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Brazil hoped to strengthen its regional status in relation to other powerful South
American navies, such as Argentina and Chile, and the mission was viewed as an
important means to that end. Finally, a strong, modern, and prepared navy was seen as a
way to increase Brazil’s prestige in the global arena.
U.S. Goals:
As the previous chapters emphasized, prior to 1922 American naval officers had
been acting as informal diplomats in Brazil, helping to solidify the relationship between
the two navies, and contributing to Brazil’s decision to sign the contract with the U.S.
instead of the well-established British Navy. Commenting on the relationship between the
American and Brazilian Navy, a 1922 correspondence in the Division of Naval
Intelligence explained, “during this time,” referring to the 1912-1922 period, “American
officers have been constantly on duty with the Brazilian Navy, assisting in their War
College, on their General Staff, in their Aviation School, and with the fleet.”4
In 1922, the U.S. Division of Naval Intelligence noted that the Navy Mission
would continue this policy more assertively. The correspondence noted, “the proposed
mission will undertake methodically and systematically what has been attempted
heretofore only partially and incidentally.”5 To help achieve this task, the U.S. Navy
Mission assigned sixteen officers and nineteen chief petty officers to aid the Chief of the
naval mission in Brazil, Rear Admiral Carl T. Vogelgesang, in the reorganization of the
Brazilian Navy, and to teach at the Naval War College. In negotiating the terms of the
naval mission with Brazil, the U.S. acquired a copy of the French Army Mission contract
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with the Brazilian Army. The plan was to draft the deal for a U.S. naval mission, which
was similar to the contract signed with the French for an army mission. In 1922, the U.S.
Special Board on the Brazilian Mission wrote, “the Judge Advocate General’s attention
should be invited to the fact that our possession of the French Mission is secret and that it
is important that the language of the tentative contract should not indicate a knowledge of
its contents.”6
As a measure of influence, American policymakers also factored in the military
privileges given to a prominent European country. U.S. Captain W.O. Spears recalled in
1929, “the State of Sao Paulo, in Brazil, has maintained French officers for instructors in
their state forces for years.” These troops “are by far the most efficient of all the Brazilian
Army,” he remembered. The Brazilian government later negotiated a contract with the
French Amy Mission to instruct the federal army as well. Spears noted how the French
Army contract impacted the U.S. decision to send a navy mission to Brazil, “the apparent
ease with which the French put over this mission encouraged the Naval Commission,”
whose officers had been teaching at the Naval War College since World War I, “to
greater efforts to do the same thing for the navy,” to pursue an American naval mission.7
The Navy Mission contract was signed on November 9, 1922, and the American
Navy arrived in Brazil on December 21. American Ambassador to Brazil Edwin
Morgan’s reported, “the Naval Mission began the preparation of exhaustive reports
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looking to the reorganization of the various sectors and departments of the Brazilian
navy, such as the Naval War College, the Naval Academy and the Navy General Staff of
that country…”8 Upon the arrival of the Navy Mission, the Chief of the Mission, Carl T.
Vogelgesang, gave a speech highlighting key moments of the two nations’ relationship,
placing the mission within the context of an ongoing unwritten alliance. Vogelgesang
explained:
“Our country has always received great honors and courtesies from the
people and government of Brazil. Thus on the occasion of the onehundredth anniversary of our independence in 1876, Brazil was the
only country in the world who sent to the United States of America, as
its representative extraordinary His Majesty the Emperor Don Pedro
II. It was moreover, on the 4th of July, 1776, in the Bay of Delaware, a
Brazilian warship which saluted for the first time our flag. When the
United States of America announced to the world the Monroe
Doctrine, Brazil was the only country of America which accepted this
doctrine, proposing at the time an alliance with the same object in
view. We feel that the acceptation on the part of Brazil, of the
American Mission is still another proof, not only of the traditional and
loyal friendship which has until today united the two people and
governments, but likewise of the reciprocity of interests between the
two countries.”9
U.S. Captain W.O. Spears’ 1929 report further reveals the complexities of the
mission. Spears noted that “the purpose of the Naval Mission as defined in Paragraph 1 of
Article I of the contract” was ‘to cooperate with the Minister of Marine and with the
officers of the Brazilian Navy in whatever may be necessary to secure good organization
of the Navy afloat and ashore, etc.’” However, as Spears recalled, “on November 17,
1924, the Secretary of the Navy, Mr. [Curtis D.] Wilbur, stated to the sub-committee of
8
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the House Committee on Appropriations that the object of the U.S. Naval Mission to
Brazil was as follows: ‘first, to educate, indoctrinate, guide and train the personnel along
the lines of the American navy. Second: to encourage the use of material of standard
pattern. Third: to foster friendly relations. Fourth: in addition to instruction by naval
missions certain South American Republics have sent officers to this country to receive
instructions in radio, gunnery, marine engineering, aviation, etc. This instruction has been
given in civil as well as in government institutions.’”10
Regarding how the actions of the American officers furthered their government’s
goals with the mission, Spears explained, “the first Chief of Mission had a paramount
policy of fostering good relations with a view of eventually, by contact, precept an
example to so direct the actions of the Brazilian naval personnel as to obtain naval
efficiency.” Later, “the second Chief of Mission, Admiral [N.A.] McCully, in letter file
A-639 of 6 August 1927, stated that he construed the Mission to be ‘to assist in
increasing the efficiency of the Brazilian navy.’ As a matter of fact, there was
considerable difference in the interpretation and execution of the basic motive of the
Mission.” Highlighting the complex motives guiding the mission, Spears noted, “it is
believed that Admiral McCully chose a Mission that was too narrow in scope. The object
in view as held by the U.S. government would seem to be first, to cultivate friendly
relations; and second, to further commercial and political interests; and third, to assist the
Brazilian navy to become efficient.” According to Spears’s report, “the obtaining of naval
efficiency in the Brazilian navy is a means to the greater end in view of furthering our
10

3 April 1940, from Captain W.O. Spears to Rear Admiral WS Anders, Office of Naval
Intelligence, RG38 Entry #48 (Chief of Naval Operations) Division of Pan American Affairs,
Correspondences with Naval Missions in Latin American Countries, 1922-1942, Box 2. A145/ef12 (cont) (old), NARA I.

237

political and commercial relations.”11 Although Secretary Hughes wrote the Argentine
government in 1922 that, “‘the purpose of the Mission is merely to cooperate with the
Brazilian Minister of Marine and with the officers of the Brazilian Navy ashore and
afloat; improving methods of work in training and instructing the personnel,”12 Spears
offers a more complex underlying long term goal of the mission.

The U.S. Navy Mission in Brazil
Purpose and Activities:
The Navy Mission, through the work of navy officers, allowed for an increasingly
coordinated and organized channel for the U.S. to project its foreign policy in the region
in the 1920s. Getting the Brazilian Navy to adopt U.S. methods, following the American
naval system, a task highly dependent on the work of American officers, simultaneously
promoted American trade, diminished the traditional European influence in the region,
and enhanced regional security. Policymakers might have also viewed the personal aspect
of the mission as an effective tool to secure American interests in Brazil. A 1922 report
in the U.S. Division of Naval Intelligence records noted that Latin Americans were more
“sentimental” than Americans. The letter articulated, “Latin American people are
governed to a much greater extent than Americans in all their relations, political and
economic, as well as personal, by sentiment. This factor has been too long forgotten by
our practical, hardheaded people.” As an example, the report pointed out that, “the
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manager of an American bank reported that due to enthusiasm for Americans during the
visit Caperton’s squadron in 1917, his deposits increased over fifty percent.”13 Captain
H.G. Sparrow, of the U.S. Naval Attaché in Brazil, also pointed out Brazilians’ emphasis
on personal relations, offering important insights into how the U.S. should deal with the
reorganization of the Brazilian Navy. In 1922, regarding possible changes occurring at
the Brazilian Naval War College, Sparrow advised, “one absolutely vital point must be
kept in mind. Brazilians in their dealings with others are actuated by personal friendship
and feeling, not by any cold proposition of the best bargain they can get. I have
constantly had this told to me by men of long residence here and now I realize it myself.”
In addition to fostering a closer relationship with the Brazilian Navy, the
American officers’ understanding of Brazilians’ methods was crucial to the success of the
Navy Mission. As Sparrow added, “they much resent action being taken without
consulting them. I think they will always accede to any proposal we make them,” urging
the U.S. government to include Brazil in the decision making at the Naval War College.14
Given the perceived notion that Brazilians were more “sentimental,” the Navy Mission
could facilitate the personal interactions that would potentially foster trust in the U.S.
among the Brazilian Navy, improving overall U.S. relations with Brazil.
As further evidence of the U.S. Navy potential for influencing the Brazilian
Navy’s role in domestic politics, according to Captain W.O. Spears in 1929, “it was the
influence of the Naval Mission, to a great extent, that kept the Navy loyal to the Federal
government when the Brazilian Army revolted in Sao Paulo in 1924.” Regarding the
13
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potential that the mission had to use its influence in the Brazilian Navy to promote
American ideology, Spears also wrote,
“But most important of all is the necessity of the South American
countries to become self-governing. Democracy and Republicanism
are only high-sounding terms to delude the people. Practically all these
governments are in the hands of dictators; openly, as in Peru or
screened, as in Brazil. The Brazilian President always nominates his
successor and the office usually rotates between the three most
powerful states like Minas Gerais and Sao Paulo. There has never been
a real opposition party. As Brazil comprises about half the territory,
population, and natural resources of South America, it is natural that
that country is the most important. It has been repeatedly stated to
officers of the Naval Mission to Brazil, that if the Mission were
withdrawn, the Navy would probably disintegrate, either before or
after a revolution.”15
Continuing to highlight the purpose of the mission, Spears’s 1929 report offered
valuable insight into the overarching U.S. foreign policy goals in South America. Spears
remarked, “recent events have emphasized the importance of our South American
relations both politically and commercially. With Europe practically solid against this
country,” the U.S., “in our endeavors to expand commercially, there is evidence that our
greatest future lies in South America.” Factoring in the U.S.-European balance of power
in the region in 1929, Spears continued, “it is believed that the navy personnel generally
have failed to visualize the important role that the navy must play in our future relations
with South American countries.” Recalling the more dominant British commercial
influence prior to the Great War, Spears noted, “this was shown by the immense amount
of British capital invested in Brazil and Argentina, the ownership and control of public
utilities and docks, the British merchant marine carrying practically all our commerce,
15
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even to America, and British shipyards constructing practically all naval units.” Finally,
regarding the German influence in Brazil, Spears noted, “the Germans had actually
established a colony in the State of Rio Grande do Sul, where German was the only
language known or taught in the schools. German commercial houses competed strongly
with the British in Rio de Janeiro.”16
In a revealing statement about the role Spears believed the U.S. Navy had played
in South America in the early twentieth century, particularly after World War I, as it
relates to European influence, he asserted:
“As a result of the Spanish American war this country became an
Asiatic power. We took over the Philippines and enforced the open
door policy in China. Our commercial and political relations in Asia
have been increasing by leaps and bounds ever since…Likewise, as a
result of WWI, our political and commercial relations with South
America have assumed new importance. We have gradually
supplanted the British and Germans in commercial ventures. We have
our own American owned and operated steamship lines to carry our
commerce with South America. We have kept them with us in our
controversies with Europe. We have, in fact, formed a league of the
Americas to offset the League of Nations. We have numerous
scientific, philanthropical and financial missions in practically all
South American countries. In all these activities the American Navy
has played a very important role.”17
The contributions of the American Navy officers were imperative to the
fulfillment of the goals outlined above. As the first Chief of the Navy Mission to Brazil,
Carl T. Vogelgesang, who served as an advisor to the Brazilian navy, played a defining
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role in the formative years of the mission. Rear Admiral Vogelgesang’s impressive
credentials included:
“Served as an officer in European and Asiatic stations in both the
Pacific and Atlantic oceans; he was executive on the battleship
[Wyoming]; he commanded the cruiser Des Moines; he was Vicedirector of the Naval War College; Chief of Staff of the Asiatic
Squadron; Professor of Strategy, Tactics and War Games in the Naval
War College of Brazil; Commander of the Superdreadnought [Idaho];
Chief of Staff of the combined Atlantic and Pacific squadron;
Commandant of the Third Naval District, New York. And of the
Brooklyn Navy Yard.”18
One can learn of Vogelgesang’s contributions, starting with his role in the naval
commission in Brazil during World War I. Spears praised his achievements in 1929,
commending “the high prestige of Admiral Vogelgesang and the success of the
modernization of the two Brazilian battleships,” which he argued, “aided greatly in
advertising North Americans to our southern neighbors.” Spears continued, remarking
that, “the establishments of naval missions in Brazil and Peru were additional concrete
evidence of our expanding political relations with those countries.” He also noted that,
“as senior member of the ‘commission’ he,” Vogelgesang, “made all negotiations
regarding pay, emoluments, etc. There was only an informal agreement. No contract was
made. Most important of all, Captain Vogelgesang obtained no increased rank and took
precedence with Brazilian Captains in accordance with the date of his commission.”
According to Spears, “the Brazilians were astonished at the modest salary request from
them, which was $300 per month for Captain Vogelgesang and $250 per month for the
other members.” Spears explained Vogelgesang’s strategy, “due to our previous contacts
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afloat, where we had been in advisory capacity only, but actually had assumed executive
authority, Admiral Vogelgesang thought that by using sufficient tact, the same conditions
could be brought about in the shore departments.” He added that, “this is what finally
decided him to accept the contract in the present form.” In fact, Spears noted, “the
Brazilians considered themselves fortunate in securing the services of the American
Mission as cheaply as they did.” Spears also asserted that, “it was only due to the
unforeseen collapse of the franc that the French Army Mission was not receiving
considerably greater amount of money than the Americans.” Acknowledging
Vogelgesang’s acumen, Spears asserted that, “Admiral Vogelgesang had the collapse of
the franc in mind when he insisted in the contract that the American members be paid in
U.S. currency.”19
Vogelgesang’s interaction and work with the Brazilian Navy, both during his
appointment to the Navy Commission, and later, as Chief of the Navy Mission,
undoubtedly helped determine the fate of the mission, and consequently U.S.-Brazilian
relations in the 1920s. Shortly after Vogelgesang and his crew arrived in Brazil, the U.S.
Ambassador to Brazil, Edwin Morgan, wrote the U.S. Secretary of State concerning
reports that Brazil was seeking contracts for naval material, explaining that the United
Press was reporting that the British and Americans had both, “been active in Rio de
Janeiro past several months talking contracts with Brazilian Admiralty.” Morgan
continued, noting that, “acting upon this press announcement chief of mission sought
interview with the Minister of Marine to ascertain what steps had been taken in regards to
19
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contracts for construction (of) new vessels.”20 Moreover, the U.S. State Department
Division of Latin American Affairs wrote to the U.S. Under Secretary of State about the
possibility of submarine construction in Brazil. Referring to Morgan’s letter from April
19, the Division of Latin American Affairs wrote, “a reply, dated April 19, from the
Embassy, stated that the Minister of Marine had informed the Chief of our Naval Mission
in Brazil that he had been interviewed by agents of shipbuilding firms, but that it was not
his government’s intention to negotiate for the construction of new vessels at present.”
Importantly, “he promised to advise and consult Admiral Vogelgesang as soon as the
matter should be considered.”21
Regardless of the Brazilian Navy’s flexibility to acquire naval materials from
other nations, the Chief of the American naval mission, working closely with Brazilian
Navy, could exert a considerable influence upon the Minister of Marine. For instance,
regarding reports about Brazil possibly negotiating with Italy, Great Britain, and the
United States, Morgan’s advice highlights the crucial diplomatic role the U.S. naval
mission was to play. Morgan wrote, “negotiation between the Fiat Company,” the Italian
Company, “and the late federal administration reached such a point in October last that
for the protection of the American shipbuilders I felt it necessary to represent to the
Naval Advisor of President Pessoa [President of Brazil] that in view of the approaching
arrival of the American naval mission, it would be wise to defer placing orders until the
mission had been consulted.” Morgan concluded, “this advice was appropriate, because a
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clause of the mission’s contract provided that the mission should be consulted regarding
additions to the naval force.”22 Morgan also added, “I am justified in stating that Rear
Admiral Vogelgesang believes that the Brazilian government should place no orders to
increase the fleet until officers and men shall have acquired more experience in handling
the existing material.” Moreover, Morgan suggested that “by placing such orders, Brazil
would open herself to serious charges of disloyalty to the disarmament principle, in
which she has alleged an interest, and would arouse the active suspicion and jealously of
Argentina.”23 Vogelgesang’s advice highlights the counseling role the Chief of the Naval
Mission had upon the Brazilian Navy.
Like U.S. Captain Henry F. Picking’s experience in 1894, an incident in 1924
reveals the potential misunderstanding between policy development and implementation.
While Captain Picking had argued with the U.S. Legation in Brazil about the State
Department’s instructions pertaining to the line of fire of the insurgents during the
Brazilian Naval revolt in 1893-1894, Vogelgesang’s plan for building the Brazilian Navy
in 1924 seemed to differ from his government’s strategic motives for signing the mission.
According to historian Robert Scheina, “the U.S. naval mission submitted a ten year
rearmament proposal to the minister of marine calling for seventy thousand tons for
battleships, sixty thousand tons for cruisers, fifteen thousand tons for destroyers, and six
thousand tons for submarines.” Scheina added that the cost of such plan would be very
high, “even by prewar standards,” and that “the ships would certainly have to be built in
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foreign yards, probably the United States.”24 A telegram from the U.S. Department of
State to the American Embassy in Brazil warned, “the Department is most disturbed by
the proposed naval building plan submitted by Rear Admiral Vogelgesang. While this
program may be justifiable from a purely naval technical point of view the outlay appears
exorbitant and out of all proportion to the necessities of a country like Brazil that is
menaced by no one.” Explaining the larger goals of American policy, the State
Department continued, “the cardinal policy of this Government in Latin America is peace
and the promotion of the most friendly relations among all the Latin American
countries.” Finally, the note clarified, “this government’s naval mission to Brazil had
been severally criticized. The mission was sent out of friendship to Brazil because if an
American mission were not sent a similar mission from some European country would
have been contracted for and this government would thereby have lost the opportunity to
exert its influence for moderation in armaments.”25 Scheina adds that, “Secretary of State
Charles Evans Hughes conveyed to the naval mission that the State Department ‘would
rather recall (it) than assume the responsibility for a naval program that the mission had
proposed.’”26
Such a proposal, Hughes feared, would disturb the regional balance of power
between the ABC nations, and could be met with resistance from Argentina and Chile as
well. It is important to continue evaluating the presence of the Navy Mission in Brazil
within the context of regional balance of power between the South American nations. For
instance, Brazil called a preliminary meeting, the Santiago Conference, to the Pan-
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American Conference, hoping to discuss disarmament with Chile and Argentina;
however, both Argentina and Chile declined the invitation. Argentina accused Brazil of
imperialist aspirations, given the contract with an American naval mission. As U.S.
Captain W.B. Fletcher noted in 1922, “the Argentines feel themselves superior to the
Brazilians, on moral and efficiency, and apparently resent any efforts on the part of the
Brazilians toward improvement and efficiency.”27 Later, explaining how the mission
continued to fit within the regional dynamics, Spears also warned,
“We should not lose sight of the fact that Argentina and Chile have not
been completely won over. There is large anti-American element in
Argentina. There is a British Naval mission in Chile. There is a
growing sense of indignation in all Americans at the condition of the
Guianas, the only part of continental American owned by foreign
powers. The fate of French Guiana, which is used by the French
government to dump their transported criminals and degenerates, is a
disgrace to them and an affront to our idea of the purposes to which
the lands of free America have been dedicated.”28
Although Vogelgesang’s plan did not materialize, this is a good example of how
policy was sometimes interpreted differently between bureaucrats and military officials,
creating misunderstandings between those designing strategy, and those involved in
transforming policies into tactics on the ground. From a modernization standpoint, the
ten-year plan promised to strengthen the Brazilian Navy; from a policy standpoint, such
an ambitious plan threatened regional dynamics, and steered away from the purpose of
the mission as envisioned by the State Department.
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The U.S. naval mission engaged in all aspects of training and modernization of
the Brazilian Navy, directly influencing its reorganization after World War I. As a
memorandum prepared for the U.S. Chief of Naval Operations in 1935 noted, under the
successful command of Admiral Vogelgesang, Admiral McCully, and Admiral Irwin, the
mission “carried on the work of organization, instruction, training, and upkeep until
January, 1931 when unsettled internal conditions in Brazil resulted in its withdrawal.”29
Acting as advisor, Vogelgesang wrote the Chief of Naval Operations in 1923, “the
material inspections of vessels of the Brazilian Navy, as referred to in my report of 1
March, 1923, have been in progress throughout the month.” Vogelgesang continued,
“pressure brought to bear on the Navy Yard at Rio de Janeiro, in an effort to expedite the
completion of ship repairs revealed the fact that the administrative organization of the
yard was not in accord with the best modern practices; reorganization is in process of
accomplishment and will eventually result in centralization and increased efficiency.”
Highlighting the interactions between American and Brazilian officers, Vogelgesang
explained, “the reports submitted by the board of inspections, which is composed of
Brazilian officers, assisted by officers of the naval mission, fully confirm our original
impression. As a result of conditions revealed and in accordance with recommendations
submitted, determined effort is being made to restore the vessels of the active fleet in
condition of material readiness.”30
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Amidst financial instabilities in Brazil in 1923, some American companies shut
down their businesses in Brazil. The U.S. Naval Attaché in Brazil cautioned the U.S.
Director of Naval Intelligence of the implications of such actions. The Naval Attaché
wrote, “this condition will react against American business during the future year, for
with improved exchange it will be difficult to establish themselves again after having
closed their offices.”31 Later, in 1928, the U.S. Navy Department sent an extract from
Vogelgesang’s undated letter (probably written between 1922 and 1924) to the U.S.
Department of State. Vogelgesang was concerned that if the Brazilian Navy were unable
to obtain ammunition from the U.S., it would turn to Europe instead. Vogelgesang
warned that even though the orders would be relatively small at the moment, they would
increase over time, suggesting that it would be in the best interest of the U.S. government
and businesses to supply Brazil with their request for ammunition. Vogelgesang
explained, “to some of the Brazilians, it is impossible to comprehend why it is that with
the Mission here and with American guns they cannot purchase proper ammunition in the
States. It is a tough proposition for us to overcome and does not engender the feeling for
the Mission, which should prevail.”32 Both Vogelgesang’s assessment of the ammunition
supply issue, and the Naval Attaché’s concern with the implications American businesses
would suffer for shutting down their businesses, are examples of the navy officers’
valuable insights to American policy and businesses.
An undated report in the Brazilian Navy Archives also reveals the duties that the
Chief of the Mission undertook. The report explained, “the Chief of the Mission will be
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attached to the General Staff of the Brazilian navy. It shall be duty of the Chief of the
Mission to advise and to cooperate with the Chief of General Staff of the Brazilian Navy
as his technical assistant in all matters relating to organization, equipment, operation,
instruction and training in the Brazilian navy.” Moreover, “it shall be the duty of the
Chief of the Mission to advise in regards to all technical matters relating to contracts for
war material for naval purposes, and to this end he shall be kept fully advised on all
matters preliminary and pertaining thereto by the Minister of Marine.” Additionally, “the
several members and subordinate of the Mission shall, under the direction of the Chief of
the Mission, cooperate in their particular and recognized fields of naval activity with the
appropriate officials of the Brazilian navy in all matters pertaining to organization,
equipment, instruction, training and operations.”33
At the Brazilian Naval War College, Captain L.M. Overstreet oversaw the unit,
Commander W.M. Baggaley was assigned as the tactical officer, and Commander C.C.
Gill assumed the strategical officer position. Regarding reorganization of the curriculum,
the Chief of the Mission explained:
“The regulations for the Naval War College, Naval Academy Aviation
Service are in process of revision. A communication Service is in
process of creation and necessary code and tactical signal books are
being compiled. Continued study is being made of existing laws and
regulations preparatory to the reorganization of the Navy Department,
and a revision of the general regulations of the Navy. The organization
and course of study of the Naval War College has materially changed;
extraneous matter heretofore included in the course of study has been
eliminated and on 13 of March formal opening exercise for the class of
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1923 were attempted by the Minister of the Marine, Chief of Naval
Mission, and other high officers of the Brazilian navy.”34
On the one-year anniversary of the mission, Vogelgesang’s speech continued to
place the Navy Mission and the contributions of the officers involved within the larger
context of an unwritten alliance between the two nations. Vogelgesang asserted, “but now
after a year of intimate official and personal association we feel that our relations have
become those of comrades with the same hopes and the same aspirations, all centering in
a single purpose, a single ambition- to make of the Brazilian navy a more efficient
exponent of the greatness of this country.” Explaining the importance of training, he
continued, “Brazil’s navy must be the navy of her policies. To keep pace with her
policies it is not enough to create ships and aircraft, and supply them with all that is
necessary in a material sense.” Highlighting the crucial role of navy officers,
Vogelgesang explained, “it is the task of the personnel of the navy to see to it that the
implements that are provided are cared for and maintained at all times in the highest state
of efficiency with a minimum charge of the treasury of the country and used for
purposeful and continuous training both as units and in groups so that the country may
safely rely upon naval strength.” Vogelgesang concluded, “in collaboration with the
officers of your navy, and with the cordial support and cooperation of that great pioneer
and protagonist of naval reform in the Brazilian navy, the brilliant and illustrious Minister
of Marine, Admiral Alexandrino de Alencar, the naval mission has during the past year
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outlined and started much of the foundation work upon which the structure of a more
efficient navy may be built.”35
A 1929 report from U.S. Captain J.M. Enochs, Chief of Staff, also gives a detailed
insight into how the mission functioned in collaboration with the Brazilian Navy officers
and personnel in the 1920s. As the report explained, “the organization of the mission
corresponds to that of the Staff of the Commander in Chief in the United States navy, in
which the sub-Chief is Chief of staff, acting as general executive for the Chief of Mission
and coordinator of the activities of the several officers of the Staff.” The officers of the
Chief of Staff were distributed according to the following: War College, one officer and
two assistants; one officer for each of the following departments: General Staff,
Personnel, Engineering, Destroyers, Gunnery, Aviation, Medical, Supplies, Naval
Construction, Submarines, and Communications. The Chief of the Mission, who acted as
the Commander Chief, was “responsible for the policy governing the work of the Mission
and for coordinating its activities and relations with those of the Brazilian navy.”
Importantly, “he maintains close relation with the Minister of Marine, Chief of Naval
General Staff, and other high officials.” The Sub-Chief of the Mission “supervises and
coordinates the work and activities of the Mission officers in accord with the policy and
organization of the Mission and the instructions and customs of the U.S. Naval service.
He is responsible for the internal routine, discipline and administration.” Importantly, “he
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maintains close relations with the Chief of the Cabinet of the Minister of Marine, the subChief of the General Staff of the Commander in Chief of the squadron.”36
Enochs’s report also explained the role of the officers assigned to the mission.
From his account, one can learn how American officers influenced specific departments
in the Brazilian Navy. According to the report, the U.S. officer serving at the War
College oversaw “all matters of the Naval Mission connected with the Naval War
College,” while cooperating with, advising, and assisting the director of the college. He
was also tasked with coordinating the work of “officers of the Mission on duty at the
Naval War College.” While the General Staff Officer “has charge of all matters of the
Naval Mission connected with the organization and administration of the General Staff
and with the activities of the War Plans and Operations Sections thereof. He is especially
accredited to the Commander in Chief for collaboration, advice, and assistance in
connection with organization, Operating Plans, and Strategic and Tactical exercises.” The
Personnel officer, “has charge of all naval matters connected with the ‘Diretoria de
Navegacao (Navigation management), Diretoria de Portos e Costas (Ports and Coasts
management), and Escola Naval, (Naval College).’” The Engineering officer “has change
of all matters of the Naval Mission connected with the ‘Diretoria de Engenharia Naval,’
(Naval Engineering management).” Moreover, “he has charge of all matters of the Naval
Mission connected with the construction, installation, operation, preservation and repair
of propulsive and auxiliary machinery afloat. He is especially accredited to the
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Commander in Chief of the Squadron and to the Commander’s Destroyers and
Submarine Flotillas for collaboration, assistance and advice in connection with the above
duties.” Enochs continued, “the Destroyer Officer has charge of all matters of the naval
mission connected with the organization, administration, Operation and training of the
Destroyer Flotilla. He should go to sea with the Destroyer Flotilla.” The Gunnery Officer
“has charge of all matters of the Naval Mission connected with the armament of the
Squadron, including mines and all forms of target practices.” The Submarine Officer “has
charge of all matters of the Naval Mission connected with submarines, their organization,
administration, operations and tactics.” He also “has charge of all matters of the Naval
Mission connected with the general subject of sports and athletics in the Brazilian navy.”
The Aviation Officer “has charge of all matters of the Naval Mission connected with the
‘Diretoria de Aviacao,’” (Aviation management), “and the organization, administration,
tactics, operations, training and exercises of the Naval Air Forces.” The Supplies Officer
“has charge of all matters of the Naval Mission connected with the ‘Diretoria da
Fazenda,’” (Treasury management), “and with the services of purchase, supply, pay, and
rationing of the navy.” Regarding the officers’ general duties, “they should be governed
NOT by their personal opinions or convictions concerning their personal experience, but
by standards of the U.S. Navy practice, and their best judgment concerning the consensus
of service opinion.”37
Throughout the 1920s, the mission continued to advise the Brazilian Navy,
influencing the teachings of the War College, as well as developing technical and
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communication plans. In 1925, the Brazilian Minister of Marine wrote the Chief of the
General Staff about a “Commission to study the distribution of machineries to Naval
Aviation centers and bases,” adding that, “as the commission works to better distribute
the machinery, it will “collaborate with the Naval Mission.”38 In 1926, then Chief of the
Mission, N.A. McCully, explained to the Brazilian Minister of Marine the necessity of
developing Brazilian Naval Aviation. The survey that McCully submitted explained the
need for the Army and the Navy to possess their own aviation departments.39 In 1929, the
Chief of the Mission sent a report to the Minister of the Marine regarding the activities of
the Brazilian Navy in 1928. Regarding the Communications division, the Chief was
pleased with the progress. He noted that, “a modern system of secret communication was
presented,” as well as a “‘Plan for Modernization of the Radio’ was approved,” and
finally, “the standardization of the Radio systems.”40
Highlighting the usefulness of the mission to the State Department, U.S.
Ambassador Edwin Morgan explained, “Rear Admiral McCully, like his predecessor,
Rear Admiral Vogelgesang, is less aware of the success which the Mission has attained
than this office which obtains reports from non-professional sources, that is to say,
among Brazilian civilians who have made the acquaintances of the members of the
Mission, as well as among the American colony, with whom the Mission and its
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personnel has secured substantial esteem.”41 As the mission neared the end of the four
year contract, Morgan wrote to the U.S. Secretary of the Navy in 1926, “‘Admiral
McCully in written dispatch which should arrive today has reminded the Navy
Department that the American Naval Mission contract will expire on December next and
that the negotiations should begin in May if its renewal is desired by the Brazilian
Government.” Praising the mission’s significance, Morgan urged, “in view of the
efficiency and success of the Mission and the existing international situation, does the
Department agree with this office that the Mission’s contract should be renewed.’”42
In the same way that U.S. officers’ observations offer insight into the purpose and
activities of the mission, Brazilian officers’ perception of the mission, and the
government’s reasons for contracting the mission, reveal how they perceived the work of
the American Navy officers, deepening our understanding of navy diplomacy. For
instance, some Brazilian Navy officers, although a minority, also influenced the hiring of
an American Navy mission. As Spears recalled, “the most pro-American of the Brazilian
officers was Captain Penido. This officer was as previously stated, Captain of the Minas
Gerais upon arrival of the first group of officers, later sub-chefe (chief) of the General
Staff and now Vice Admiral, Chief of the General Staff.” According to Spears, Penido
“requested and received a suggested plan of a Naval Mission for his own information.” In
fact, “Captain Penido became interested in this plan and was responsible for its being
jammed through in spite of opposition.” According to Spears, Penido wanted the
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American naval mission to take on a more active role. Spears added that, “Captain Penido
and a minority of officers wished to make the Chief of the Mission the real head of the
Navy with executive authority. But the majority, backed by the Minister of Marine,
insisted that the mission be restricted to an advisory capacity only.”43
In 1924, Brazilian 1st Lieutenant Alvez de Souza also explained the work of the
American naval mission. Souza wrote, “as in the practice of the American navy, the socalled military inspections will soon be initiated and thus we shall have the same process
of inspection and visits in our various types of ships.” Adding, “the Naval Mission has
outlined the organization for torpedo destroyers and submarines. When these
organizations are put into execution, uniformity will result, which will prevent the same
type of ship having different service regulations.” Souza also noted, “a new directory of
communications and the new general signal codes and tactics already installed are the
results of the work of the Naval Mission.” Regarding modifications in the regulations,
Souza noted, “all the manuals of the different specialties are being revised and are
already in the Naval Printing Office; they will soon be put into execution; they represent
the regulations in force of the American navy.” Moreover, Souza added, “the Mission is
also studying with special care modifications in the law of promotions in a way to assure
the rights of officers without injuring the morale and efficiency of the personnel; the
present law is very harmful to just rights.”44
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Regarding the pay of the Brazilian officers, Souza observed that the mission was
“studying a reasonable increase and better distribution of pay, and is giving its attention
to all branches of our activities, duties, and rights with the intention of improving and as
far as possible our stimulating our incentive.” Commenting on collaboration and
efficiency, Souza noted, “the problem of stability of personnel on board, already much
discussed in the Navy, and of cooperation between land and sea forces as to repairs and
supplies, are being revised.” Importantly, “[remodeling] of the Health Inspection
Department and that of Finances, a new schedule of rations, with a view of improving the
food of the enlisted men and new forms of official correspondence without burdensome
and obsolete ‘red tape’ are subjects soon to be treated by the Mission.” Although the
mission’s reorganization plans were substantial initially, the long-term impact of this
restructuring is also worth noting. As Souza explained, “by virtue of the revision of the
regulations of the Naval War College the system of cooperation with the Ministry of War
was established, which is very useful especially if we consider the unity of theory will
become a fact when all the chiefs of the administrative departments shall be officers who
have been instructed in the schools of command.” As the U.S. government’s purpose for
the mission outlined a more comprehensive lasting foreign policy strategy, Souza’s
comments on standardization of methods was very valuable. As he concluded, “in this
way a radical modification will take place in the establishment where new generations
will begin their career in the Navy and will not then become officers in different services
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but in one only. Advantages will be obtained by the graduation officers similar to that
practiced by the U.S. navy and instruction given through a new a simplified method…”45
A report in the Historia Marítima Brasileira, the “Brazilian Maritime History,”
from 1939, further explained the many functions of Brazilian Navy in 1922 and 1923,
highlighting the American naval officers’ contributions from the perspective of the
Brazilian Navy. According to the report, “the War Games course in the Naval School had
been extremely developed. The exhausting work of Commander Phillip Williams, who
was its first coordinator, was intensely followed by Commander C.T. Vogelgesang,
Admiral Bryan, and Admiral Fletcher. Under the direction of the later, there was a
notable momentum in teaching.” Moreover, a Brazilian Commission created to review
the school regulations, “presented to the Minister of Marine an organized regulatory
project, having the American orientation as its definite base.” This new regulation, decree
number 16.141, was issued on September 6, 1923.46 Specifically, “under article 21 of the
decree, it was established that the courses should have a practical character, including the
study of issues with tactics and strategy, and that the number of departments and
instructors would be chosen by the Minister of Marine.”47
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The Historia Marítima Brasileira’s report also highlighted the changes in the
School dynamics. In 1924, “the School’s first internal regime was approved,” dividing
the School into three departments; Command, Strategy, and Tactics. Under Command,
the school taught “preparation and translation of the Command decisions, via order and
instruction, and the organization of conferences or professional readings judged
necessary for teaching.” Under Strategy, it prepared in “the teaching of naval strategy and
practice of issues in strategy, and the teaching of issue of clarification, coverage and other
naval operations.” Under Tactics, it trained in “the teaching of naval tactics, the
formulation of issues in applied naval tactics.” Moreover, final exams consisted of a
thesis, applying the lessons passed on in the three departments. The school reorganized
again in response to changes in U.S. naval education. “In accordance with the new
orientation adopted by the American Naval War College,” the report noted, “the
organizations of the departments were altered according to announcement 5.778,
December 27, 1927, in which the School now had two departments- a Command and an
Operations department, with the later divided into two subdivisions, Strategy and
Tactics.”48
In 1923, the Director of the Brazilian Naval War College, Admiral Antonio
Oliveira Sampaio, delivered a speech which also outlined the naval mission’s influence at
the War College. Sampaio explained, “now the course of lectures has been inaugurated
under a new plan suggested by the North American Naval Mission. This plan resembles
more or less that of the American Naval War College…” He also acknowledged
Vogelgesang’s capabilities, “the only difficulty that must be surmounted is a clear
48
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comprehension of national naval psychology; but even this will not constitute a stumbling
block, for the Chief of the Mission, Admiral Vogelgesang is already well acquainted with
the circumstances in which he must work.” Applying U.S. President Theodore
Roosevelt’s foreign policy to the Brazilian Navy’s own foreign policy aspirations,
Sampaio believed that the mission would help Brazil’s global standing. Sampaio wrote,
“now that the duties of instruction under the new system are enlarged, it is to be hoped
that some good results will be reached and that the Mission can and will confirm the
wisdom of the ‘big-stick’ of the much lamented Roosevelt, which can very well be
assumed as the motto of the Naval War College in opposition to the theories entertained
by pacifists.” Sampaio added, “the school however, will not embarrass but on the
contrary will try to cooperate towards achieving universal peace, and for this object, will
know how to teach that this objective can only stand upon a solid basis supported by the
old Latin saying, ‘if you wish peace, prepare for war.’ In defending the idea of war we
contribute toward peace.”49
Cognizant of the nation’s fragility considering the most recent war, Sampaio
judged the mission necessary to strengthen the Brazilian Navy. Sampaio explained, “the
Great War which upset all Europe is not over yet. The spoils of war have not yet been
divided among the victors.” Consequently, “observing and reflecting upon the sad picture
presented to us by cultivated Europe, more and more we find it necessary that preventive
principles should be studied in this School, contained in Roosevelt’s maximum already
mentioned and in the national appeal, ‘let Brasil spread her wings.’” Sampaio also
49
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factored in Brazil’s regional prestige, deeming the mission necessary to develop a more
comprehensive national security strategy. Sampaio warned, “although recognizing the
traditional policy of approximation towards all the nations of the American continent, it
seems dangerous to me to insure peace only by means of treaties and demonstrations of
courtesy.” Finally, as the Santiago Pan American Conference approached, Sampaio
stated, “gentleman: in a few days the Santiago conference will have to decide one of the
most serious problems of our political existence. We must not neglect our enormous
seacoast, where vulnerable points lies precisely in its extension.” Sampaio hoped that the
Navy School would become familiar with these issues and “be able to give to politics the
precious information required for its guidance,” hoping that these lessons “will penetrate
and make an impression upon our political administrators.”50 This is an important
evidence of the connection between the Brazilian navy and politics.
A speech by the Brazilian President Artur Bernardes in 1925, also gives insight in
the government’s views regarding the mission. Bernardes commented, “the North
American Naval Mission, headed by the illustrious Admiral Newton [Mc]Cully,
continues to give to our naval administration the results of its experiences, not only in
matters of organization and the study of technical questions, but instruction and guidance
of the personnel.” The President added, “the superior organization frequently solicit their
judgment and opinion, seeking to adopt to our means and peculiar conditions the
measures and recommendations suggested.” Importantly, the President also noted the
necessity to couple the teaching of the naval mission with modernization of naval
50
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materials, “we could, however, better profit by the teachings of the Mission if the
conditions of the country would permit us to have at our disposal better floating material,
more numerous units periods of constant activity, without frequent necessity of repairs
and laying up in ports.”51
Regarding the work that the American Navy mission had been performing,
Brazilian Minister of Marine, Arnaldo Siqueira Pinto da Luz, also explained in 1925,
“like in the previous years, the American naval mission continued to provide the best
services to the Brazilian navy,” advising the administration and promoting efficiency.
Pinto da Luz added, “at the Naval War College, where two officials from the mission are
in charge of teaching strategy, tactics, and war games, great were the advantages acquired
by the officers in the class of 1925.” He also observed that if the Brazilian Navy and
ships were in better condition, that they would be better able to take advantage of what
the mission has to offer. The Minister of Marine also praised the services of the naval
mission, calling for the contract to be renewed for another four years.52
The Mission and the Expansion of U.S. Commerce:
Although on the surface the terms of the naval mission contract focused on the
modernization of the Brazilian naval methods, the underlying purpose of the mission was
multifaceted. First, with American officers in advisory capacity, U.S. naval diplomacy in
Brazil served as a tool for the U.S. to continue expanding its commercial power in the
region. As a 1923 report in the Division of Naval Intelligence explained, “European
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nations have long seen the trade advantages of missions, and have endeavored to gain
influence and control this way.”53 In fact, U.S. naval diplomacy in Brazil contributed to
the corporatism of the 1920s in a couple of different ways. In 1923, the Curtiss Aeroplane
Export Company’s Vice President’s note to the Secretary of Navy exemplifies the
advantages that U.S. naval diplomacy in South America brought to American businesses.
F.H Russel recalled that in 1919, the company “was originated for the purpose of
developing a demand for American aeronautical material in the countries of Central and
South America.” Moreover, he noted that, “the English, French and Italian Governments
had originated missions, furnished planes and in every possible way encouraged their
Nationals in the development of this market.” Russel also explained the purpose of these
efforts by the European nations, “first, to dispose of their surplus war material under the
best possible condition, and second, to develop a demand which would assist in
maintaining their aeronautic industries in time of peace, which in time of emergency
could be quickly turned towards the production of military craft for their own use.”
Russel observed that, “the [U.S.] Navy Department was quick to see the advantage in the
promotion of interest in airplanes of American design and assisted American companies
to some extent through their own National representation.” Later, the Curtiss Aeroplane
Export thought the navy department was competing in sales with the company.54
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Consequently, the U.S. Bureau of Aeronautics responded that they would recommend
that the U.S. Navy do not rid of their surplus naval materials directly in South America.55
Also in 1923, James Skinner of the American corporation E.W. Bliss Company
sought the aid of the American government to expand the company’s commerce
overseas. Skinner wrote the U.S. Navy Bureau of Ordinance, “as it appears to be public
knowledge that there are negotiations in progress between our government and the
governments of South America, looking towards the building up of the navies of the
South American republics and lending a helping hand towards the bringing of their
navies to a higher standard of efficiency, and that a commission has been appointed to
that end, we desire to make the following suggestion to the bureau.” He continued, “if it
can be found that it will be in the interests of the South American countries that they
purchase a supply of torpedoes… we think it might be wise that the commission visiting
our sister republics should have in mind the advisability of furthering this idea in their
suggestion.” In addition to helping to open an overseas market for an American company,
Skinner contended that there were strategic reasons for the navy to promote his firm. As
the note explained, “we have in mind not only the securing of orders for torpedoes to
keep in operation, if only to a limited extend, our very large highly specialized equipment
which is useful only in the manufacture of torpedoes as well as our testing station in Sag
Harbor in order as far as to minimize this tremendous fixed charges which go on from
day to day on this idle equipment…” Importantly, Skinner also explained, “keeping alive
and preserving of a small part of an organization trained in torpedo manufacture, with the
distinct idea in mind that when our own government desires us to resume the manufacture
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of torpedoes at some time in the future, we would have the nucleus from which could be
built up an organization able to produce torpedoes in such quantities as the Navy may
desire…” Therefore, in case of a future conflict, the company would be prepared to aid
the U.S. military.56
A few months later, the U.S. Director of Naval Intelligence transmitted a note
from the U.S. Naval Attaché to the U.S. Navy Bureau of Ordinance, regarding the sale of
torpedoes in Brazil. The Naval Attaché informed him that, “‘at present writing it appears
fairly certain that the Minister of Marine will award the contract of 10 new submarines to
the Electric Boat Co. This contract, however, will not be concluded until May. I have,
through various channels, been advancing the desirability of supplying these submarines
with Bliss-Levitt torpedoes, as per the Director’s policy as outline in his recent letter.”
The Naval Attaché warned, “it is essential, however, that the Bliss-Leavitt Company
immediately get an agent here prepared to deal directly with the Minister regarding
these…” the purchase will be of “considerable value.” The U.S. Naval Attaché also
advised that Bliss Company to appoint Commander Luis Aubry, who had previously
served in the Peruvian Naval Attaché in D.C., to represent the company’s interests in
Brazil. The Attaché explained that Aubry, “who is well know[n] to the Director, has been
instrumental in placing this matter before the Minister, and as he has the Minister’s
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confidence and friendship.”57 The Bliss company took the Naval Attaché’s advice, and
was grateful for the government assistance in promoting the company.58
As further evidence of the commercial impact of naval diplomacy, a confidential
Memorandum from the Bethlehem Steel Company to the U.S. Secretary of State in 1924
read, “British actively negotiating loan to include refunding loan larger railway material
order and complete Naval program will very likely be a success.” The Memorandum
explained, “Naval Mission about to take active steps opposing the naval part. Brazil still
owes four million dollars for Sao Paulo repair. Embassy long had orders to inquire about
payment but considered time inopportune so has done nothing.” Importantly, the
memorandum urged, “U.S. Secretary of State must direct Embassy to suggest to Brazil
that in case ships go to England US will expect immediate settlement but if they go to
U.S. we would not press.”59
Regarding the American naval mission of the 1920s and its commercial impact,
U.S. Captain Dudley Knox also explained in 1931, “the American officers of the
Brazilian mission established a naval war college at Rio and advised in every phase of
naval activity from the reorganization of the shore stations and ships to the administrative
training in gunnery, engineering, and other rudimentary branches.” Importantly, Knox
added, “thus our primary objective is economic, which is in keeping with the apparent
aims of all the European nations which have been sending military and naval missions to
57
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Latin America for so many years.” Commenting on the connection between military
diplomacy and commerce, Knox noted, “it has been a case of utilizing military forces for
diplomatic purposes with commerce a principal by-product during peace no less than
war, and it should be observed that the commercial by-product is mutually beneficial to
the country sending the mission and to the one receiving it, since exports and imports are
stimulated in both directions.”60
Accomplishments and Criticisms of the Mission:
By the mid-1920s, although encountering some criticism, the Navy Mission had
become a symbol of a strong U.S-Brazilian relationship. An article found in a
correspondence from the Brazilian Embassy in Washington to the Brazilian Minister of
Foreign Relations, explained the significance of the mission in 1924. The article, which
included an interview with Morgan, asserted, “so far as the United States is more
immediately concerned, interests in Brazilian relations may be focused on the work of
three missions or bodies, exemplifying the cooperation of Brazilians and Americans.
There is first, the American Naval Mission, second the Rubber investigation mission, and
third, the work done by the Rockefeller Foundation.”61 The article also praises the work
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the U.S. Navy had done in Brazil prior to World War I. With regard to the ways the
American Navy officers contributed to U.S.-Brazilian relations, the article explained,
“now, then, some dozen years ago, the Brazilian Admiralty requested the United States to
send a naval officer of high rank to act as professor at the Naval War College in Rio de
Janeiro. This was done, and so successfully that a succession of competent officers were
sent to the college by the United States.” Commenting on the impact of an American
officer teaching at the War College, the article noted, “again, the Brazilians judge the
results so beneficent, so much so, that at the close of the Epitácio Pessoa administration
the United States navy department was asked to send a group of naval officers to
reorganize the Brazilian navy.” Regarding the Navy Mission’s purpose, the article
asserted, “its main duty has been to frame resolutions for reorganizing the Brazilian navy
in all its competent parts and to aid the admiralty in its reform. In conversations with Mr.
Morgan it was made particularly clear that the Mission is a success and equally that its
achievement is based solely on a desire to increase the defensive value of the Brazilian
navy.” Finally, acknowledging regional dynamics, the article noted that the purpose of
the mission was not to “inspire Brazil with an aggressive spirit or to make Brazil a
menace to its neighbors.”62
Rear Admiral Hayne Ellis, Director of the U.S. Naval Intelligence, also shared
insights in 1934, which offer some perspectives on the American Navy Mission. Admiral
supervisors,” 20. Moreover, the Foundation had spent “more than $25 million over the next two
decades,” since 1921, helping to establish schools around the world, including São Paulo.
According to the foundation’s website, “the total contribution to schools of public health amounts
to $357 million in current dollars.” https://www.rockefellerfoundation.org/about-us/our-history/ ;
accessed on 10/31/16.
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Ellis explained that, “the mission furnished an example of practical cooperation between
the United States and South America which deserves the appreciation of the diplomatic,
commercial and naval interests of both countries.” The U.S. had also sent a naval mission
to Peru in the 1920s, another example of the usefulness of such efforts to American
foreign policy in South America in the 1920s.63 However, comparing the U.S. missions in
Peru and Brazil, Admiral Ellis explained, “one important difference between the
Brazilian and Peruvian missions was that in Peru the mission exercised executive
authority.” Unlike the mission in Brazil, “in Peru the Mission instituted the most drastic
reforms in every branch of the naval service, maintaining at the same time the most
cordial relations with the Executive, the naval personnel, the Congress and the Public in
general. By these reforms, the administration, discipline and efficiency of the Peruvian
navy were vastly increased.”64 However, there were times when the U.S. military mission
did cause conflict between the U.S. and Peru.
Offering a summary of the mission in Brazil, Ellis explained that, “commissioned
officers remained four years and chief petty officers two years.” Moreover, “all members
of the mission received their regular pay from the U.S. government and additional pay
from the Brazilian government.” Regarding the War College, Ellis explained, “the
Brazilian War College was enlarged and modeled along the lines of the U.S. Naval War
College. Two battleships were completely modernized in the New York Navy Yard at a
saving of well over a billion dollars to Brazil.” Importantly, “all Brazilian officers
attached to these two battleships were given an opportunity to take cruises on similar type
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U.S. vessels and to observe in practical operation the material being furnished. Specially
selected officers were sent to practically all of the U.S. navy service schools, such as
Sperry’s, Bausch and Lomb, Ford Instrument Co., and various construction plants.” The
mission positively affected many branches of the Brazilian Navy. Ellis noted that, “all
Brazilian naval vessels were completely reorganized with new watch, quarter and station
bills. A fleet training section was inaugurated in the General Staff for conducting target
practices. Aviators were trained both in Brazil and abroad.” Summarizing the
accomplishments of the navy officers, Ellis concluded, “in brief, through the superb
instruction given in the Brazilian Naval War College under the direction of Naval
Mission, and the various other avenues of instruction opened to the Brazilian officers
through this Mission, the Brazilian naval officers have been enabled to keep abreast of
Modern strategy and tactics in the art of naval warfare.” According to Ellis, “the Naval
Mission to Brazil remained until January 1931, when it was terminated by President
Vargas for economic reason.” Later, “at the request of the Brazilian government a Naval
Mission consisting of two commissioned officers and one chief yeoman was reestablished in November 1932. The contract period is for four years. The senior member
of this mission is President of the Brazilian Naval War College.”65
After the 1930 coup d’état in Brazil, an article in the New York Herald Tribune
also summarized the significance of the mission and the U.S. goals in Brazil in the
1920s.66 The article explained, “until the late war the proverbial suspicion and dislike of
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the United States, which was widespread in South America, seemed to be fed by a
persistent propaganda of European origin, with commercial advantage as the prime
motive,” adding, “the corroding influence of such a state of mind upon international good
will and friendly relations is painfully evident.” Highlighting the crucial role that the
American Navy officers played, the article praised the mission stating that the “correction
is possible only through personal contacts and wholesome intercourse of a nature to
constantly refute the outrageous misrepresentations, which have caused so many PanAmerican mischiefs for so many decades. This has been the great mission of the United
States Navy in South American since 1918.” The article also recognized the mission’s
significance in strengthening bilateral relations, stating, “its employment there has
provided one of the best examples of the utility of naval forces as instruments of
diplomacy and good will, as emissaries of peace and commercial intercourse, as
promoters of trade no less than stabilizers and protectors of sea transportation and
national business and prosperity.”67
Brazilian Vice Admiral Jose Maria Penido’s letter to the Brazilian Minister of
Marine in 1930 also reveals the impact of the mission in Brazil. Specifically, Penido
expressed his concerns about its cancelation in 1930, given the naval mission’s effective
teaching at the College. He wrote, “ever since the founding of this school, there has
always been an Americans navy official serving in it…with the contract of the Naval
Mission in 1923, when the course received a practical aspect, three officials were
designated in order to meet the course necessities in more detail in the various
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departments.” Penido praised the influence that the American navy officers had bestowed
upon the Brazilian Naval War College. He asserted, “this shows the recognition of the
need for American officials in this school and in the integral part of its organization. The
biggest teachings of the works achieved in this school are obtained in strategic and
tactical games.” Penido concluded, “these games are achieved by utilizing a determined
disposition and rules confidentially and directly provided by the Newport Naval War
College, through American officers who serve in Brazil.”68
Although the mission strengthened U.S.-Brazilian relations, some remained
critical of the effort. For instance, several American newspapers criticized the Navy
Mission on its one-year anniversary. Ambassador Morgan’s correspondence to the U.S.
Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Theodore Roosevelt Jr., son of U.S. President Theodore
Roosevelt, highlights Morgan’s displeasure with the negative press, as well as the
extreme relevance of the mission to American foreign policy. Morgan wrote, “it is
certainly annoying that the very source from which appreciation and support should be
received, is the one which takes an unfriendly view of the most interesting and successful
experiment which has done more than most things to bind us to Brazil and to prove not
only the efficiency but the good fellowship and high principles of the officers of our
navy.”69
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A 1928 report from the Correio da Manha was also very critical of the mission.
As the article specifically mentioned the pay of that the American naval mission received,
“by virtue of the infamous contract we pay them, in gold, higher salaries than they
received in their country of origin,” also complaining that the American Admiral had
“other advantages, such as exemption from customs, duties, automobiles, launches,
servants, travel allowance, etc.” The article also observed, “the other officers make never
less than ten contos,” Brazilian currency, “a month, more than any of the cabinet
ministers, justice of the Supreme Court, or even the Chief Justice.” Moreover, “more than
half” of the salaries were paid by the Brazilian Treasury, and the rest paid by the U.S.
Importantly, the article accused the American navy of separating themselves from the
Brazilian navy officers. The article noted, “but what is immediately emphasized, as a
result of these exceptional circumstances of [regalia], advantages, and salaries of the
American officers, is the complete separation of the two. The modest, difficult, and little
comfortable life of our officers, in contrast with the opulence of their American
colleagues, permits relations between them only during the fleeting office hours.”
Instead, “the American officers maintain social relations only with the ‘gros bonnets,’ big
shots, “of our industry and finance, generally foreigners like themselves, and never with
their Brazilian colleagues.” The article viewed the behavior of the American navy
officers as evident of class distinctions in contemporary society, “conditions of fortune
are the great differentiator.” The article noted that American officers preferred to attend
the Jockey Club and the Gavea Club in Rio de Janeiro, as opposed to the Naval Club.
Moreover, the “ostentation of luxury,” is displayed by the difference in automobiles. The
article also observed that the Brazilian navy lacked the money to properly train and
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modernize its own naval equipment, also pointing to the poverty among the general
population.70
Brazilian public opinion expressed concern over the hiring of military missions
overall. For instance, regarding the contracting of the French Army Mission, a 1928
correspondence in the U.S. Office of Naval Intelligence records explained, “precisely
when all peoples were seeking means and processes to overcome militarism, the result of
which had been the formidable butchery of the wretched period of four years of struggle,
President Epitacio Pessoa, with his retrograde mentality, was contracting foreign
professionals of warfare.” Adding, “indirectly, the foreign military missions are being
mentors of our foreign policy since they arrived here.” Also factoring in the
consequences of foreign military mission to regional dynamics, the correspondence
added that the mission, “helped the Argentine militarists to win their point and to behold
Argentina now much more heavily armed and with a superiority over us much greater
than before the disarmament conference.”71
Captain W.O. Spears was also critical of the structure of the contract. He asserted
that the agreement had not fulfilled the “expectations of the officers who had served on
the ‘commission,’” during World War I, specifically pointing to the lack of clarity
regarding the mission’s objectives, and the Chief of the Mission’s ranking among the
Brazilian navy officers. For instance, the contract was confusing as to whether
Vogelgesang should answer to the Brazilian Minister of Marine or the Chief of General
70
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Staff. Pointing to the expectations, Spears explained the puzzling instructions, “‘it shall
be the duty of the Chief of the Mission to advise and cooperate with the Chief of the
General Staff as his technical assistant in all matters relating to organization, equipment,
operation, instruction and training in the Brazilian navy.’ This of course supposes that the
Minister of Marine is interested in obtaining real efficiency in the Navy and that the
Chief of Staff is in accord with him.” Spears asserted, “this had never been the case. As a
matter of fact, the Chief of Staff had always been a figure-head, and by agreeing to
subordinate himself to him, the Chief of Mission lost considerable of his prestige.” While
commenting on the lower pay of American officers, Spears criticized the Brazilian
administration, stating that, “it should be borne in mind that their point of view is entirely
different from ours on this question. Their motto is usually ‘get what you can from the
government while the getting is good.’ It is not unusual for the Minister of Marine to
send his close friends abroad on special missions with some extraordinary pay and
allowances for them to recuperate their personal finances.” Given the money that Brazil
saved with repairing its two battleships, and the pay of American officers in the mission
in comparison with Brazilian officers on foreign service, Spears concluded, “it can be
easily deduced that not only has the naval mission, so far, cost the Brazilian government
nothing, but that they have actually gained financially by their presence as well as
received the benefit of their instruction!”72
Spears’s 1929 report also reveals his concerns regarding the mission’s
effectiveness. According to Spears, some factors threatening the mission were “the racial
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characteristics of the Brazilians which prevents perfect cooperation with anyone, even
among themselves.” Spears continued, “the failure of most of their revolutions is due to
their lack of cooperation…to cooperate with an American whom they are jealous,
envious; and against whom, they are always intriguing, is almost impossible.” Spears also
asserted, “they admit an inferiority complex, but they do not like us any better. They are
lazy and lack initiative. Of course,” Spears added, “there are a few exceptions.” Spears
also reported on the Brazilians’ “lack of real interest in adopting reforms,” asserting,
“there is little patriotism in a Brazilian as we know patriotism. There is no self-sacrificing
spirit. The Brazilian’s whole action is determined by how he personally benefits by any
reform.” Spears also pointed to what he called the “cliques and factions,” as potentially
threatening to the mission. According to Spears, “this is common in all Latin countries
where family relations has such great importance. There is little social life outside the
family. Brazilian naval officers never visit and get together like the families of American
naval officers. They instinctively distrust the stranger and outside of a few intimate
friends and the family everyone else is a stranger.”73
Highlighting an ongoing U.S.-Brazilian foreign relations concern, Spears also
warned of a “pro-British feeling,” asserting that, “there is a group of older men who have
been British trained, who would rather pursue British methods,” in addition to the
negative press that foreigners received in some Brazilian newspapers. Spears continued
his critique stressing a “lack of discipline.” According to Spears, “there is no such thing
as discipline among the officers of the Brazilian navy.” Spears argued that, “there exists
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in effect in the Brazilian Navy ancient laws, decrees, orders, etc. which have been
obsolete for years. But as they have never been repealed, when pressed for action as to
why he doesn’t act on some naval mission suggestion, the Brazilian officer can nearly
always produce one of these decrees, perhaps issued by Emperor Don Pedro, which is
contrary to the proposal.” Regarding education among Brazilians, Spears wrote, “as a
rule the Brazilian officer is well versed in theoretical matters. Portuguese being one of the
basic Latin Language, he can read with equal facility technical works in Italian or French.
However, having no opportunity for practical application due to the lack of industrial
plants in his own country, his theoretical knowledge is not of much value.”74
Importantly, similar to previous observations, Spears also believed that, “the
greatest problem confronting the Naval Mission is to decentralize the administrative
system of the Brazilian Navy.” Also pointing to the U.S. Navy Department, Captain
Spears explained, “there does not seem to be a realization on the part of all the bureaus of
the navy department of their continued responsibility in the naval mission to Brazil. It has
been shown that the object of a large mission with a high ranking officer, was to force the
Brazilians to accept certain reforms in their navy, so that the resulting increased
efficiency will further our national political and commercial relations.” Once again
emphasizing the purpose of a naval mission, Spears continued, “of course, the forcing
cannot be done at the expense of good feelings. That is where the common sense of
Mission must operate.” According to Spears, “the Navy department can be of great
assistance in furnishing material, descriptive literature, plans, drawings, equipment, etc.
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And perhaps the greatest service that could be performed is to send naval vessels
frequently to visit Brazil, where the Brazilian navy can actually see the material we are
trying to educate them to operate.” He also recognized the lack of repair facilities and
finances as potential challenges to the mission in Brazil. Finally, pointing to regional
limitations, Spears concluded, “the most probable Brazilian war operations would be
against Argentina. The problem involved is similar to our campaign in the pacific. That
is, due to the lack of land, transportation facilities, the navy must transport the army to
the probable theater of operations, the Southern border. This must be done against
Argentina naval activity. The large problem is to establish a complete understanding with
the army for joint operations.”75
Spears’s notes from 1929 on the U.S. Naval Mission to Brazil offer a detailed
insight into the purpose of the Navy Mission, and the contributions of the American
officers to U.S. foreign policy in Brazil. Although these notes reflect observations relayed
by one American officer, it is relevant to take his perception of U.S.-Brazilian relations
into consideration, for such observations do influence foreign policy. The background he
offers on South American navy history, and America’s relationship with the Southern
neighbors also helps contextualize the achievements of the mission within the scope of
United States-Brazilian relations. For instance, regarding South American navy history,
Spears wrote, “South American naval efficiency has always varied with the amount of
foreign help employed.” According to Spears, “a reading of the memoirs of Lord
Cochrane showing his difficulties in obtaining cooperation from the Brazilian naval
75
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authorities shows that the Brazilian character has changed little if any in the last 100
years.” In fact, “this was, without a doubt, the beginning of the very strong feeling that
has been passed down in the Brazilian navy causing antagonism towards the idea of
granting foreigners the right to exercise executive authority. They realize their
incompetency but will not delegate the necessary authority for reorganization.” Spears
also credited the American and British influence in the Brazilian navy with helping the
country’s navy after its independence. As evidence, Spears noted a decline in Brazilian
naval prestige after the Paraguayan War, “the only foreign influence at this period was
due to the training received in foreign ship yards when new ships were constructed.”
During the Paraguayan War, the Brazilian navy had “distinguished itself in river
warfare,” but the efficiency displayed during the War vanished afterwards.76
Evidence suggests that the mission continued to receive criticism throughout the
1930s. For instance, as the opportunity to contract an American mission to train the Rio
de Janeiro Civil police in 1931 came about, the U.S. Office of Naval Intelligence
observed diverse opinions about the American naval mission. The Brazilian newspaper
Jornal do Comercio spoke out against hiring an American mission “to organize and
instruct the civil police of Rio de Janeiro.” The proposal seems plausible, but the article
accused the American police of being brutal in their own country. Furthermore, the
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article used the American Navy Mission as an example as to why Brazil should not
contract an American mission to train its civil police. As the article asserted, “the
experience of the American naval mission is an example of complete failure. They did
not in any way advance our navy, which was excellent raw material in virtue of the
intelligence of its officers, by the docile temperament of its men and its thirst for
knowledge and improvement-excellent raw material to constitute a good efficient navy.”
The article continued, “the American nation is very young, and has an origin of
magnificent hybridism, but because of its youth, it has not yet learned how to fit itself, as
an integral part, into the world civilization. He who has to take lessons, should prefer a
professor and not the pupil of that professor. That principle was not observed in the
choice of the naval mission: the matter was ignored, and the pupil taken.”77 As Brazil
once again negotiated terms for a new navy mission in 1931, British influence continued
to impede the U.S. government’s motives to contract a naval mission with Brazil. The
U.S. Naval Attaché in Rio de Janeiro warned in 1931, “it is believed to be of prime
importance to American prestige and influence in Brazil, for the United States to accede
to this new request for a Naval Mission. Should our government decline for any reason to
accept the proposal, the Brazilian navy at least would feel we have become unfriendly
toward them; and they would undoubtedly turn next to the British navy.”78
As the mission entered a new phase in 1931, the relevance of the 1920s naval
mission and the U.S. officers who served in Brazil, is also seen in correspondences in the
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1930s, as the renewed U.S. naval mission, considerably smaller than its predecessor,
returned to Brazil. As the U.S. government drafted plans to eventually increase the
amount of Navy officers serving in the mission, it often referenced the original 1922
endeavor, noting that several Brazilian officers who had been receiving training in the
U.S. would return to Brazil with confidence in the mission, transmitting their
expectations to other Brazilian officers. The Senior Member of the U.S. Navy Mission to
Brazil noted, “this expectation is fortified by the assistance rendered the Brazilian navy
by previous large missions under Admiral Vogelgesang, Admiral McCully, and Admiral
Irwin. The benefits derived are probably appreciated more now than was the case before
the interruptions of these missions.” Regarding choosing the new navy officers, C.C. Gill
observed, “personality is important, as in addition to advisory work in writing, much
depends on practical contact with activities in progress.”79
Reporting in 1939 on the differences between the first phase of the naval mission,
from 1922-1930, and the second phase after the 1930 revolution, a report in the Office of
Naval Intelligence also observed, “the first Naval Mission to Brazil reported in 1922 and
except for a small period following the revolution of 1930 has been maintained.
However, the present contact differs considerable from the original contract and likewise,
it is understood, differs in relation to contracts made with other South American
Republics, especially in that Brazil receives bargain rates.” The report explained, “the
successful revolution of 1930 resulted in a considerable shake-up and change in the navy.
Much of the effort and work of the pervious naval mission was not personally known to
many that came into power and the files were not investigated. Thus, succeeding Naval
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Mission have had to begin all over again in connection with many matters.” Moreover, in
the aftermath of the revolution, the “exercise of police duties in internal troubles,” by the
Armed forces, “especially in time of insurrection, makes it almost impossible for
individuals to refrain from guessing the winning side and aligning themselves in some
form or other with that side.” Adding that after the revolution, the Brazilian army was in
“high favor,” and that the navy “attempted to remain neutral.” As the American naval
mission was about to expire in June 1940, the report also explained that the Army
mission had more prestige than the navy, noting that the colonel, “is furnished a car by
the Brazilian army with Brazilian official tag. The other members of the Army Mission
receive advance rank and wear advanced rank uniform,” and the “discrimination against
the Naval Mission in such cases is obvious.”80
After the 1930 coup d’état, the U.S. Office of Naval Intelligence report also noted
that the newly established Vargas’s regime might not have wanted foreigners during the
“clean up” phase of the transition. As the report noted regarding the reinstating of the
mission after the revolution, “two U.S. naval officers, under a greatly charged contract
were soon asked for and obtained solely for the operation of the Brazilian naval war
college, and this continued until 1936. During this time, U.S. naval officers took no part
in general projects for increasing the efficiency of the Brazilian navy and functioned only
at the war college.” By 1936, “it was ready again for the services of a naval mission,”
where, “the real purposes of this naval mission are the same as for 1922-1931, fewer
personnel,” eight officers and five chief petty officers, “was asked for and the
80
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remuneration was reduced,” although they were expected to deliver similar results as
during the first phase of the mission. Importantly, as the report observed, “it may be
noted that the purpose is apparently more restricted this time and does not specifically
provide for efforts along organization and administration except under the general phase
of ‘enhancing the efficiency.’ However, the Naval Mission has been called upon, and has
volunteered, information and activities in all lines of naval matters.” According to the
report, centralization in the Brazilin navy continued to be an issue due to lack of loyalty,
given past revolts and suspicions among government officials and the military. If these
concerns disappeared, then the Ministry of Marine could potentially decentralize,
delegate more tasks, and generate more efficiency.81
A report from 10 October 1932 also gives some logistics about the Brazilian Navy
during its second phase, particularly the lack of discipline, and motivation among the
Brazilian navy personnel, “it is pertinent here to refer to the fact that naval officers are
permitted to hold civil elective offices.” Also, “the establishment of a Republic in 1889
has apparently meant the average Brazilian relief from a restraining authority and the
necessity therefore of discipline has not yet been properly appreciated by the Brazilian
people.” Regarding structural changes in the 1930s, the report noted, “it is believed that
the enactment of the recent Pay Bill and the reorganization of the Brazilian navy under
the lines laid down by the Naval Mission to Brazil will enable the naval officers to better
attend to navy affairs, instead of private businesses affairs on shore during working
hours.” In regards to the reorganization of the Brazilian Naval Academy, the report
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explained, “the Naval Mission has completed the reorganization of the Naval Academy,
based upon the establishment of academic departments, the assignment of line officers as
instructors, the adoption of the text book system of instruction, the marking of daily
recitations, and other improvements have been practically nullified by the insistence of
the Brazilian authorities to retains the present life tenured professors.” In regards to Army
aviation, the report mentioned a clause in the French Mission contract which “demands
that all purchases of military material be made from French manufacturers,” so new
planes would probably be ordered from France. This observation of military missions
influencing the purchasing patterns of Latin American nations once again exemplifies the
commercial advantages expected from naval diplomacy. 82
A Memorandum to the U.S. Chief of Naval Operations, likely written in 1935,
also shed light on the purpose of the mission in the 1930s. The correspondence noted,
“the two-fold objective of the Brazilian navy should be, in general to assist the Brazilian
naval personnel by advice, instruction, and supervision to raise the operating efficiency of
the Brazilian navy to a degree which would enable Brazil as an ally to render effective
naval assistance to the United States, and in particular to maintain the Omaha—” cruisers
that the U.S. was planning to turn over to Brazil—“in such effective operational
condition that they could be re-acquired by the United States should circumstances render
it necessary to effect immediate reinforcement of the fleet.” The Memorandum proposed
the increase of the mission, hoping to reinstate it to the status prior to its cancelation in
1931, arguing conditions in Brazil had not changed during the previous five years.
Importantly, the memorandum acknowledged the legacy of the 1920s mission to U.S.82
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Brazilian relations. As noted, “the organization of the Naval Mission itself gave the
mission a greatly added and very necessary prestige. It was essentially a Naval Staff
organized to a naval job, and as such it was understood and appreciated by the Brazilian
navy.”83 This sentiment is revealing of how the naval mission in the 1920s would serve as
a model in 1930s. The memorandum noted the ways in which the Mission’s logistics had
been extensively worked out through practice over a period of twelve years.
As explored above, the mission’s purposes and activities were multifaceted
throughout its existence, fulfilling the goals of U.S. foreign policy to increase trade,
regional security and containing European influence. For instance, in 1933, after requests
made by the Office of Naval Intelligence for information, the then Senior Member of the
naval mission expressed concerns that the members of the mission might be accused of
being intelligence officers, which would he thought would undermine the mission. The
Senior Member explained, “the policy of the present Naval Mission to Brazil as regards
intelligence activities has been to forward to the Office of Naval Intelligence only such
information as has come unsought into the hands of the mission, and it did not interfere
with its closely restricted War College services, for which the Brazilian government
contracted.” Referencing the work of the previous naval missions, he continued, “it is
believed to have been the policy of former Missions, though their more numerous
personnel, performing widely varied duties, came into almost daily contact with
practically all phases of Brazilian naval activity, and thus had many opportunities for
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obtaining information without visible effort.”84 This example highlights the occasionally
indirect approach the mission took to influence the Brazilian navy. Additionally, it
illustrates some of the challenges to which navy officers had to adjust while engaged in
their role at the mission, a responsibility which required balancing their obligations as
military officers and as informal diplomats, while following their government’s
guidelines.
In the Historia Adminstrativa do Brasil, Organização e Administração do
Ministério da Marinha na Republica, Henrick Marques Caminha offers a comprehensive
account of the organization and administration of the Brazilian Navy over the years,
which can also help us identify areas in which the American Navy mission exerted
influence. According to this monograph, decree number 16.127 issued on August 18,
1923, read, “(according to a suggestion from the American Naval Mission), gave new
organization to the navy arsenals of the Republic and create the Technical school at the
Rio de Janeiro Navy Arsenal (with the purpose of forming civilian artifices).”85
Moreover, “between 1923 and 1930, under the Mission’s orientation, a profound
reorganization of the staff. The naval mission contract was rescinded in December 1930
in the aftermath of the 1930 coup in Brazil, then a new naval mission contract was
confirmed in November 1932, once again rescinded in December 1977.” Caminha also
points out the differences between the 1920s mission, and the new naval mission after the
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1930 coup d’état. Caminha notices that, “the American Naval Mission’s influence
diminished in its second phase of its contract,” adding that the Brazilian navy came to
rely on itself in regards to administration issues, with “models which were more in
accordance with its peculiarities, with the country’s judicial- administrative structure and
with its people’s idiosyncrasy,” after their experience during World War II.86
U.S. Captain Dudley W. Knox also asserted, “the commercial benefits flowing
from the new era of good will between Brazil and ourselves, in the establishment and
maintenance of which the naval mission has been a key element, may be gauged by the
progress in trade.” Moreover, as he explained, “before the war, the value of the United
States products imported into Brazil was exceeded by two European countries.
Meantime, we have moved up from this rather third place to a decisive first. In the
Brazilian markets, American agricultural tools and machinery, locomotives, typewriters,
adding and calculating machines, automobiles, rosin, turpentine, and motion pictures now
occupy a pre-eminent place.” He also asserted that the U.S. had been Brazil’s “best
customer,” especially due to coffee importation.87
Further explaining how bilateral relations through naval diplomacy strengthened
commercial relations, Knox explained, “one of the results of the stimulation of closer
Brazilian-American relationships during the last few years has been the inception of the
immense rubber project of Henry Ford in the Amazon basin.” Moreover, “American
electrical power companies also have been very active and progressive in the
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development of this form of Brazil’s industrial life.” He concluded, “there can be little
doubt that European diplomacy in South America, including its appendages of military
and naval missions, has been strongly colored by commercial competition of a national
scope. Knox was concerned that the mission would be canceled in the aftermath of the
Brazilian coup d’état in 1930. As he warned, “viewed from this angle,” the commercial
advantages, “the termination of the American Naval Mission to Brazil must be regarded
as an unfortunate diplomatic and commercial rather than a naval event”88
Since training became key to U.S. naval strategy, the American officers serving in
the mission and the U.S. Naval Attaché in Brazil played a crucial role in the success of
American foreign policy toward Latin America in the 1920s. As Spears observed, “social
relations of the Naval Mission with the families of the Brazilian navy is of great value.
The families of Brazilian officers frequently meet one another for the first time in the
homes of the members of the Naval Mission. The widening of the circle of acquaintances
of these families, and the increased contacts, is one of great value in reducing factions
and cliques.” Importantly, Spears added, “it is a force toward unifying and shaping the
service opinion of the naval personnel.” Spears also noted that other Americans, who
engaged in commerce in Brazil, met with Brazilians through the American officers
serving in the naval mission.89
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Those closer to the Brazilian Navy, following daily activities and personal
interactions, offered a nuanced observation of the nation’s military and political culture
that officials in Washington D.C. would likely not have acquired otherwise. Deploying
American officers to frequently interact on a personal level with Brazilians through the
navy mission facilitated a systematic and effective approach to U.S.-Brazilian navy
diplomacy. Scheina summarizes the tremendous influence the mission exerted upon all
aspects of the Brazilian navy, stating that “its chief military successes were remodeling
the war college after that of the United States, overhauling the second Brazilian
dreadnought at the New York Navy Yard, sending Brazilian officers to North American
schools, and reorganizing the routine in the Brazilian battleships along lines established
in the USS North Dakota.” Importantly, Scheina also notes the significant purchase of
equipment from the U.S. as a result of the Navy Mission.90
Although the Chief of the Naval Mission in Brazil commented in 1939, that “it
was considered by the first missions that the results were in no way commensurate with
the efforts being expended,”91 Spears had argued in 1929 that, “while the Brazilians do
not always accept this advice,” regarding suggestions the American officers had made to
the Brazilian Navy over the years, “they recognize the sincerity and cling to the Mission
as the basic force which stabilizes the Navy. If the Mission should be withdrawn at this
time the Navy would probably either disintegrate or revolt.”92 The work of the naval
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mission, through training and modernization, helped solidify U.S.-Brazilian relations in
the 1920s. The institutional memory of these relationships contributed to the retention of
U.S.-Brazilian naval ties over the subsequent fifty years, and their success was the basis
on which future collaborative efforts at naval partnership were founded.
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Chapter 8: Conclusion
After the brief interruption during the Brazilian coup in 1930, the U.S. naval
mission remained in Brazil until 1977. A detailed evaluation of the mission from 19311977, particularly after the Brazilian military coup of 1964, would shed a light on the
long-term impact of U.S. naval diplomacy in South America. A preliminary analysis of
post-1930s primary sources and historiography reveals a continuity in the American
strategy in South America of increasing economic integration, diminishing European
influence, and promoting regional security, particularly as tensions escalated in Europe in
the 1930s. For instance, in 1937, the U.S. Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) relayed to
the Naval Attaché in Brazil their concern about German influence in Brazil, and its
potential threat to U.S.-Brazilian naval relations, an issue that had afflicted American
policymakers since the 1890s. As the Director of Naval Intelligence wrote, “information
received from reliable sources indicates that forces actively favoring the establishment of
a totalitarian state in Brazil, supported by Germany and Italy, are becoming an
increasingly important factor in Brazilian politics.” Asking the Attaché to investigate, the
Director wrote that, “it is, therefore, desired that you conduct a discreet investigation in
order to determine the probabilities of this group gaining control of Brazil, and what their
attitude toward the Naval Mission would be in case of success.”1
Despite the work of the American naval officers in Rio de Janeiro, a 1939 ONI
report illuminates some challenges the Brazilian Navy encountered in 1940, which were
similar to the obstacles faced in the formative years of the mission. The report noted, “the
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standard complaint of the personnel is lack of adequate modern ships and material, the
lack of experienced officer engineers,” and the absence of a naval policy. The report
concluded that, “the organization of the Ministry is satisfactory for administrative
purposes in time of peace, despite centralization, but it is believed is unprepared to
function in war,” and that the country’s “Naval Aviation, as a trained efficient is woefully
underdeveloped.”2 One of the most challenging aspects for the mission had been the
centralization of the Navy Department, where a substantial amount of power was
concentrated in the hands of the Minister of Marine, and the General Staff Office, making
the job of the American Navy officers difficult, at times, since they were primarily in
contact with Brazilian officers at the War College.
Another 1939 report by the U.S. Chief of the Mission in Brazil also pointed to the
centralization of the naval establishment in Brazil as a complicated issue. The report
noted, “the Naval mission to Brazil from 1922 to 1931, all operating under the same
general contract, made exhaustive studies and research leading to a multitude of desirable
and necessary recommendations. The early problem was reorganization in the Ministry,
in the fleet, and in the somewhat detached ashore establishments.” Moreover, difficulties
were encountered with the “highly centralized control of the navy.” The report added
that, “it was realized that the most important factor influencing the Brazilian naval policy
in dealings with the naval mission was the political and naval importance of the Minister
of Marine.” Loyalty between Minister of Marine and the President had been eminent due
to the potential distrust among the executive and military branches of the Brazilian

2

17 August 1939, ONI Navy Department, “confidential,” Captain Beauregard to Admiral
Anderson (no first names). RG 38 Entry #48 (Chief of Naval Operations) Division of Pan
American Affairs, Correspondences with Naval Missions in Latin American Countries, 19221942, Box 2. A14-5/ef12 (cont) (old), NARA I.

293

government. Hence, the Ministers of Marine did not want to “give up their personal
control,” of the Brazilian Navy.
A correspondence from the U.S. Chief of the Naval Mission in Brazil to the Chief
of Naval Operations in 1939 suggests that past tensions between the military and the
government had generated centralization, as did the need for the branches to prove their
loyalty “in internal political questions and revolts.” Specifically, “with regards to navy,
this translates itself into the conception; 1. That the smaller the navy, the easier it is to
control in national disturbances; 2. That the smaller the navy, the less the cost of
maintenance and consequently the easier to obtain the funds required, 3. That there is no
reason for expected conflict with the countries of the Western Hemisphere; 4. That in the
event of conflict with a foreign power other than the American continent, the United
States will be obliged to come to the assistance of Brazil.” Those factors, and the
perception that the Army had received favored treatment, impeded an effective naval
policy in Brazil. Consequently, the Brazilian Navy was not adequately prepared for the
outbreak of hostilities that initiated World War II. The correspondence, for example,
notes that most of the advances brought on by the first U.S. Navy Mission had been lost,
and the present Navy Mission had to start almost from scratch.3 Similar issues of internal
instability, centralization of power in the Marine Ministry, and financial constraints,
seemed to plague the Brazilian Navy’s ability to develop a cohesive modernization
policy.
Nonetheless, the Navy Mission in its formative years from 1922-1930, was
effective in achieving the three broader strategic goals that U.S. policymakers had
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pursued in Brazil: economic integration and the advancement of U.S. economic interests
in Latin America, diminishing of European influence, and the promotion of regional
security. Explaining the significance of the mission in 1929, for instance, Captain W.O
Spears concluded, “the need for a Naval Mission is vital now and the service of a Naval
Mission will be required for many years to come.”4 Captain Spears’s conclusions in 1929
about the Navy Mission also illustrate the gradual move of the Brazilian Navy from a
British sphere to an American sphere of influence by the 1930s. To Spears, the Brazilian
government had maintained friendly political relations with the U.S. prior to World War
I, even when the Brazilian Navy was primarily under British influence, and held an
“attitude antagonistic to American methods.” Spears also noted that, “American
instructors and advisors were forced on the Brazilian Navy by political expediency.”
Highlighting the persistent naval presence that the U.S. fostered in Brazil in the early
twentieth century, Spears explained, “American officers have acted in an advisory
capacity in the Brazilian Navy since 1 April, 1918…” and “during this period, about 70
American naval officers have at various times been detailed for duty with the Brazilians.”
Spears also reported, “about 100 Brazilian officers have cruised on American ships and
been trained in American methods, this is about 30% of all line officers.” By 1929, he
concluded, “the hostile Brazilian attitude, by tact and perseverance, has been changed to a
favorable attitude towards American officers and methods.” Commenting on the success
of the modernization efforts promoted through U.S.-Brazilian naval diplomacy, Spears
noted, “Brazilian Battleships and cruisers have been modernized along American lines,
4
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aircraft acquired and the whole trained by American officers.” Moreover, he noted, “the
Navy Department has been completely reorganized, the administration decentralized, and
is now functioning in an embryonic stage under the supervision of the Naval Mission.”5
However, after the dissolution of the mission in 1931, the Marine Ministry once again
began moving toward a centralized administration.
Importantly, Spears also explained the relevance of naval diplomacy in continuing
to promote American businesses in Brazil. As Spears explained, “due to the possible
future expansion commercially and politically in South America the Naval Mission to
Brazil has gained a greater importance.” Spears’s comparison between American efforts
in Asia in the 1890s, and in Brazil in the 1920s is illuminating. As Spears remarked, “as
the acquisition and maintaining of the Philippines Islands was the strategical stepping
stone, both commercially and politically, for our expansion in Asia, the Naval Mission
can be used in a similar way for our expansion in Brazil.” Acknowledging the relevance
of modernization of the Brazilian Navy to American commercial power, Spears further
explained of the mission, “the strategical value, commercially, is the introduction of
American material and equipment in the Navy with the various by-products. This creates
a demand for replacements, which must be met by local dealers. The advertising of our
industrial plants, received because of the material furnished. The contacts with Brazilians,
made possible to commercial representatives by means of the Naval Mission.” He also
advised that the Navy Department should “more closely cooperate with the Mission in
sending U.S. vessels and air detachments to visit Brazilian waters and permit resumption
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of sending Brazilian officers to American ships for training.” Importantly, the naval
mission facilitated the establishment of Brazil as an ally in future wars, promoting
regional security by fostering friendly relations. As Spears concluded, standardizing the
Brazilian Navy also facilitates “joint operations of war.”6
In the 1950s, Brazil and the U.S. continued to collaborate militarily. A
Memorandum from the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs to the
U.S. Deputy Under Secretary of State explained, “the JBUSMC,” the Joint Brazil-United
States Military Commission, “in Rio has proposed a $50 million equipment program for
the Brazilian Army, Air Force and Navy.” However, the report also noted some tensions,
“the Pentagon is stalling, maybe with good reason, but the Brazilians are unhappy
because they thought their chances were good. The Brazilians are very irritated about not
obtaining from the U.S. a baby carrier, two submarines and four destroyer escort vessels.
They threaten to reduce the size of the U.S. Naval Mission, slow down improvements of
Brazilian naval bases, and cut down privileges of the U.S. naval radio facility in Recife,”
in northern Brazil. Importantly, the Memorandum also reported on U.S. aspirations to
acquire bases in Brazil, “the Pentagon is about ready to ask the Department of State to
negotiate an agreement with Brazil for certain rights and facilities in that country.”
Moreover, in 1954, the JBUSMC “submitted a recommendation to the Joint Chiefs of
Staff for a $50 million equipment program for the Brazilian Army, Navy and Air Force.
This report was signed by the top Brazilian and U.S. members.”7
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Brazil’s regional and global aspirations called for a stronger relationship with the
“Colossus of the North” in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. In fact, Brazil
gained important benefits because of the nation’s relationship with the U.S., ranging from
commercial advantages, to aid in modernization efforts of the Brazilian Navy, and in
other sectors of Brazilian society, particularly in the 1940s. As evidence of U.S.-Brazilian
military cooperation during World War II, “Brazil allowed the U.S. to build air bases in
the northeastern hump of the country and to organize an air ferrying services through that
region to Africa and the Middle East, assisted in air and naval patrolling in the South
Atlantic, provided strategic materials, and ultimately dispatched an expeditionary force to
Europe.” To the benefit of the Brazilian government, the U.S. “extended loans and
technical assistance for the national steel plant at Volta Redonda, gave Brazil substantial
Lend-Lease aid (three-fourths of the total to Latin America), equipped and transported
the expeditionary force, and ran diplomatic interference for Rio de Janeiro's successful
campaign to obtain a seat on the Security Council of the new United Nations (UN).”8
As the U.S. continued to expand its influence into Latin America, however, Brazil
became increasingly weary of an imperialistic United States. While a stronger U.S.
benefited Brazil’s aspirations, U.S. Cold War policy and Brazil’s internal political strife
eventually contributed to the deterioration of bilateral relations. Brazil hoped, for
example, that after the war the U.S. would continue providing aid to improve the
Brazilian military, while expecting to receive a substantial loan from the U.S. after the
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war, which did not materialize.9 After the war, the U.S. focused its foreign policy on
Europe, through efforts such as the Marshall Plan, while turning more of its attention to
Asia than was the case prior to the war. Brazil’s reluctance to support the U.S.-led effort
during the Korean War stands as an example of the divergence of interests during the
Cold War. Given the shortcomings of U.S. policy in Latin America after World War II,
Brazilian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Joao Neves de Fontoura, advocated for “long range
economic development,” in Latin America, “instead of rapid mobilization” during a
meeting of the foreign ministers in the hemisphere on March 1951 regarding the Korean
War.10 Brazilians were upset at “Washington’s use of economic aid to meet the challenge
in Europe and Asia, but insistence on ‘politico-police methods’ in Latin America.”11
In fact, historian Stanley Hilton argues that a shift in U.S.-Brazilian relations
occurred gradually during the Cold War, where Brazil sought the alliance of the SpanishAmerican nations, as opposed to the U.S. Hilton argues that even though Brazil had a
preferential system with the U.S., which included military assistance in exchange for
acting as a liaison in South America, “the result was a dramatic erosion of Brazil’s
confidence in the special relationship.”12 Furthermore, Hilton affirms, “by its reluctance
to pursue imaginatively an effective key-country approach to relations with Latin
America, Washington alienated Brazil, formerly an eager ally in hemispheric matters. It
also contributed powerfully to the long-range decline of American influence in the region
by propelling Brazil along the path of solidarity with its historical antagonists, the

9

Hilton, The United States, Brazil, and the Cold War, 1945-1960,” 600, 602. see also W. Michael
Weis, Cold Warriors and Coups d’Etat: Brazilian-American Relations, 1945-1964, (University of
New Mexico Press, 1993).
10
Hilton, “The United States, Brazil, and the Cold War, 1945-1960,” 610.
11
Hilton, “The United States, Brazil, and the Cold War, 1945-1960,” 618.
12
Hilton, “The United States, Brazil, and the Cold War, 1945-1960,” 600.

299

Spanish Americans.”13 Nonetheless, the U.S. Navy maintained a presence in Brazil until
1977, when issues pertaining to human rights violation in Brazil under the military
regime generated tensions between Brazil and the administration of President Jimmy
Carter in the United States.14
The historiography on U.S.-Brazilian relations during the Cold War has explored
the increasing negative influence that the U.S. had on the internal political and economic
development in Brazil. In fact, in the 1970s and 1980s, many works on U.S.-Brazilian
relations emphasized that U.S. policy, intentionally or not, fostered Brazilian dependency
on the U.S. For instance, historian Peter Evans explores class disparities in Brazil during
the Cold War, focusing on the dynamics of the Brazilian elite within the framework of
international economic development. Evans suggests that capitalism contributed to
Brazil’s “dependent development” state, which kept most of the Brazilian population
from enjoying the economic benefits of industrialization. As Evans explains, “examining
multinational corporations has the additional benefit of making it easier to demonstrate
that the struggle between elite and mass in Brazil cannot be separated from the conflict of
classes in the United States.”15 Evans argues that a “triple alliance” was created between
local, state, and international capital.16 Similarly, Jan Knippers Black’s United States
Penetration of Brazil, is critical of the bilateral relations between the U.S. and Brazil
during the Cold War, particularly pertaining to the Brazilian military coup of 1964, which

13

Hilton, “The United States, Brazil, and the Cold War, 1945-1960,” 624.
The Carter administration redirected the focus of American foreign policy towards human
rights in the 1970s, which often clashed with the military regimes in Brazil and Argentina (during
the Dirty War) for example.
15
Peter Evans, Dependent Development, the Alliance of Multinational, State, and Local
Capital in Brazil, (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1979), 5.
16
Evans, Dependent Development, 11.
14
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overthrew the democratic government of President Joao Goulart. Black highlights the
relationship between the U.S. government and American private business interests, which
she argues aided the military coup in Brazil. Although the U.S. did aim at influencing the
Brazilian military, as well as the country’s social, economic, and political systems during
the Cold War, my work shows that Brazilians had also exerted significant influence in
their relationship with the U.S. Moreover, considering the history of the Brazilian
military’s influence in domestic politics, my work also illuminate the traditional role that
the Brazilian military had in forging new regimes since the proclamation of the republic
in 1889.
Moving forward, comparative studies of the naval mission in Brazil and Peru, as
well as U.S-naval diplomacy in other South American nations between the 1890s and
1930s, would help fill a gap in the scholarship by expanding the discourse beyond U.S.
military occupations in Central America and the Caribbean, while also appreciating the
diverse ways in which American foreign policy utilized its navy as a tool of informal
diplomacy and empire building in the hemisphere.
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